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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
John Dahlgren is among the most famous officers in the
history of the United States Navy.

One of the first

officers to hold the rank of admiral, which was first
established during the Civil War, Dahlgren's career
prominent

in almost every written account of the

nineteenth-century American navy.
naval

is

But unlike most famous

figures who are usually recognized for their

achievements in battle, Dahlgren is best known as an
ordnance specialist.
histories,

When he is mentioned in naval

it is almost always in connection with the large

cannon that he designed in the decade or so prior to the
Civil War.

Shaped like a giant soda-bottle, wide at the

breech and tapered narrow at the muzzle,

the distinctive

Dahlgren gun was the navy's primary weapon on its ships
during the Civil War, and the main source of Dahlgren's
p r o m i n en c e.
I was initially

interested in John Dahlgren for two

reasons, neither of which had anything to do with his
ordnance career.

I was intrigued by his friendship with

President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.

I also knew

that Dahlgren had kept a personal

I had seen

Journal, which

printed excerpts of in numerous places, especially in
Dahlgren's M e m o i r s . and in various volumes of The Official
Bggflrds of the Uni_on_artd__Confederate Navies of the War of
the Rebel 1 i on.

It was my hope that his Journal would
v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

provide fresh insights into the workings of the Lincoln
administration.
Not knowing what to expect when I arrived at the
Syracuse University

library where the complete manuscript

copy of Dahlgren's journal

is located,

I was nearly

overwhelmed by the magnitude of the document.
started it in 1824, at the age of fifteen,
fifteen volumes, containing a total
thousand pages.

Having

the Journal

is in

of more than two

Dahlgren w as especially prolific

journal writing during the Civil War.

in his

For those four years,

the journal encompasses seven volumes and more than thirteen
hundred pages.

Despite periodic revelations about Lincoln

and his administration, however,

I discovered that

Dahlgren's journal

lacked the overall

depth of information

contained in other

important Civil War diaries,

like the one

kept by Lincoln's secretary of the navy, Gideon Welles.
Although I was disappointed that Dahlgren's journal
not provide the type of

information that I had

find, as 1 read Dahlgren's personal
career,

I became

increasingly

account of

did

hoped to
his life and

intrigued by the man.

I

quickly realized that Dahlgren's career me ri te d attention on
its own.
First and foremost,

this dissertation

of John Dahlgren's long naval

career.

is an account

Beginning with his

appointment to the navy

in 1826, as an anonymous sixteen

year old midshipman,

details his climb from

it

obscurity to

vi
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the relative fame and recognition that he enjoyed by the end
of his life as one of only a handful
the rank of admiral

of officers who reached

during the Civil War.

His career

demonstrates how many military men clawed their way up
through the ranks,

through whatever m eans they could.

Dahlgren's Civil War career

is also extremely revealing,

especially his Involvement with the Union's military
campaign against Charleston.

This campaign demonstrates the

absolute obsession that the North, especially the Navy
Department, had with trying to destroy this city.
Additionally,
Department
which

Dahlgren's Civil War career shows the Navy

in an entirely different

it is usually seen.

light than the one in

Compared to the War Department,

the Navy Department has generally been viewed as being
relatively flawless during the war, and its few failings
have been portrayed as innocent and well me aning mistakes.
The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's assignment to, and
subsequent command of,

the South Atlantic Blockading

Squadron shows that this was not the case, as Dahlgren was
primarily a pawn

in the Navy Department's and the Lincoln

administration's battles with their Congressional enemies.
This dissertation
man.

is also the story of Dahlgren the

It details the private side of his obsessive quest for

personal

glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled

to reconcile his Insatiable ambition with the realities of
his career.

While he enjoyed the outward trappings of
vi 1
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success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the
highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and
disappointed man;
victory

that was because he never experienced

in battle, which was the ultimate measure of

greatness for a naval hero.

Thus, Dahlgren's lifelong quest

for glory was never completely fulfilled.
Before I began this project, whenever I read the
acknowledgements section of a book I often wondered h ow an
author seemingly engaged in a solitary pursuit could owe so
much to so many.

Now I know.

My first and greatest thanks belong to my wife and best
friend, Judy Ridner.

Quite simply,

if it was not for her,

never would have completed this dissertation.
reached the end of my last chapter,
to dread hearing the question,

By the time I

I am sure that she came

Can you read this?

But

despite working on and completing her own dissertation

in

history, she always managed to find the time to read and
comment on my work, as well as to offer countless words of
encouragement.

While I would not recommend that any couple

try to complete two Ph.D.s at the same time, I w i 11 forever
cherish receiving our degrees at the same graduation
ceremony.
I will also always owe a debt of gratitude to
Professor L u d w e l 1 Johnson.

I came to William and Mary a

Yankee hoping to learn about the Civil War from the other
side.

I

Despite my northern heritage, which he graciously
vl 1 i
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suggested w as no fault of my own, he willingly accepted me
as a student.

I am indeed fortunate.

Time after time he

has taught me to consider things from as many perspectives
as possible,

and while we may disagree on some things, we

certainly agree on much more.

As an advisor for this

dissertation, he has been simply marvelous,
and even more

always helpful,

Importantly, always patient.

I also offer my thanks to three other William and Mary
historians.

Professors Richard Sherman, Ed C r a p o l , and Phil

Funlglello agreed to the onerous task of serving as readers.
Thanks to all

three for their prompt attention to my needs

in the midst of everything else that they had to do.
The history graduate student community at Wi lliam and
Mary

is indeed a special

one.

My Ph.D. classmates,

Julie

Richter, Wade Shaffer, Ann Smart Martin, Chris Hendricks,
and Mary Ferrari, by finishing their degrees, provided me
with extra incentive to keep on going during my most trying
moments.

Mark Fernandez, John Barrington, Tod d Pfannestiel,

and Mary Carrol 1 Johansen are Just a few of many others who
made my stay in Williamsburg one of the happiest

in my

life.

How can I ever forget having a room named in my honor? or,
winning the "Bubba Smith" award?

I hope that the spirit of

comraderie and cooperation which has characterized the
program for the entire time that I have been here will
c o n t 1n u e .
I had the good fortune to enjoy a one-year stay with
ix
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another group of historians.

Judy allowed me to tag along

while she was a fellow at the Philadelphia Center for Early
American Studies.

Special

thanks go to Director Richard

Dunn, Rose Beller, Donna Rilling, Jim Williams, John
M a j e w s k i , Anne Verplanck, John Hart, Roderick McDonald,
Thane Bryant, and Wayne Bodle

for always making me feel

a part of the group.

a l 1, I would

Allen Guelzo.

Most of

like

like to thank

From the moment that I met him, Allen treated

me as an equal colleague.

Our

long lunctime discussions

about the "War" were not only a welcome relief during my
second stay in a bastion of colonial

American studies, but

also valuable in helping to sharpen my own thinking about
many complex and controversial

issues.

Further thanks are

necessary for his agreeing to serve as theoutside
for this work.

His inclteful

improve the quality of it.

comments can

reader

only serve to

I only hope that someday I w l 11

be able to read as fast as Allen seems to write.
Of course,

this project could never have been completed

without the assistance of many
researchers, and archivists.

librarians, historians,
I want to thank the staffs at

the Earl Gregg Swem Library at Wil li am and Mary,
Arents Research Library at Syracuse University,
Historical

Society,

Historical

Society of Pennsylvania,

Library,

the N ew York Public Library,

the Army War College,

owe special

the George
the New York
the

the Duke University

and the National Archives.

thanks to the research specialists, archivists,
x
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I

and librarians at the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, especially Mike Klein, Fred Bauman, and Chuck
Kelly.

While they were not able to make my six months of

c amping on the outskirts of Washington enjoyable,

the daily

comraderie they offered certainly made the experience more
bearable.
Finally,
parents,

I w ou ld like to thank my family, especially my

Helen and George Legg.

Their love and support,

all of its many forms, w as always unconditional.
could any child ever hope to receive?

And Mom,

in

What more
I finally

have the answer to the question you asked me again and
again: The "paper"

is finished.
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is, first and foremost, an account of
John Dahlgren's long and often controversial naval career.
Beginning with his appointment to the navy in 1826, it
details his climb from obscurity to the relati’-^ fame and
recognition that he enjoyed by the end of his life: first as
the noted designer of the distinctive, bottle-shaped
Dahlgren gun, which was the navy's primary cannon during the
Civil War, and, second, as one of only a few officers to
attain the rank of admiral during the Civil War.
Dahlgren's career, both as an ordnance specialist and
as a line officer, demonstrates how many officers scrambled
up the military ladder.
Using whatever means they could,
including developing and utilizing political connections as
well as conducting personal public relations campaigns,
success often had little to do with true professional merit.
Dahlgren's Civil War career is also extremely
important.
His involvement with the Union's military
campaign against Charleston reveals the absolute obsession
that the North, especially the Union navy, had with trying
to destroy this city.
Additionally, Dahlgren's war career
shows the Navy Department in an entirely different light
than the one in which it is usually seen.
Compared to the
War Department, the Navy Department has generally been
viewed as b ein g relatively flawless during the war, and its
few failings have been portrayed as innocent and well
me an in g mistakes.
The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's
appointment to, and subsequent command of, the South
Atlantic Blockading Squadron shows that this w as not the
case, as Dahlgren was primarily a pawn in both the Navy
Department's an d the Lincoln administration's battles
against their Congressional enemies.
This dissertation is also the story of Dahlgren the
man.
It details the private side of his obsessive quest for
personal glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled
to reconcile his insatiable ambition with the realities of
his career.
While he enjoyed the outward trappings of
success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the
highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and
disappointed man.
Because he never experienced victory in
battle, which w as the ultimate measure of greatness for a
naval hero, Dahlgren's lifelong quest for glory w as never
completely fulfilled.

xi i
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CHAPTER I
Before the War
"I have long since dear Mary given up
hope of being a great man myself."

John Dahlgren's navy career began out of necessity.
Born

in Philadelphia on November 13, 1809, he w as the oldest

child of Bernard Ulrich Dahlgren and Martha Rowan Dahlgren.
As a young boy he received the benefits of a classical
education,

as had his father, who was a graduate of Uppsala

University

in Sweden.

But in 1824 his father died suddenly,

ending the youngster's formal

education.

Fortunately,

John

Dahlgren w as not, as one of his father's business associates
told the secretary of the navy,
fortunes,"

and the political

left "to establish his own

influence of family friends won

him a difficult-to-secure midshipman's appointment, which he
accepted on February 1, 1826.1
Because the Navy Academy did not exist at this time, a
midshipman's education came from serving on board ship under
the watchful

eyes of experienced officers.

Dahlgren served

his first two cruises aboard the U.S. Frigate M a c e d o n 1an of
the Brazil Squadron and the U.S.
Mediterranean Squadron.

Sloop Ontario of the

Shortly after returning to the

2
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3

United States In early 1832, he took the midshipman's
qualifying exam along with the rest of the 1826 appointees.
The results confirmed the rigorous nature of the exam; only
31 of the 70 who took it passed, with Dahlgren ranking ninth
o v e r a l 1.2
After a brief tour of duty aboard the receiving ship
Sea G u 11

located at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Dahlgren

received orders to report to the United States Coast Survey.
This appointment changed his career.

The idea of a general

and comprehensive survey of the country's coastline had
originated with the members of the American Philosophical
Society who recognized the needs of the nation's burgeoning
commercial

interests.

First recommended to President Thomas

Jefferson,

the survey had experienced a number of false

starts but was firmly established by the early 1830s.3
Assigning navy officers to the "Survey," as it was
commonly called, served a dual purpose.
an extremely small peacetime navy,
of the navy's excess officers.

First,

in an era of

it provided duty for some

Second,

it provided them

with scientific, mathematlc,

and survey training.

The

superintendent of the Survey

in the 1830s was Ferdinand

Rudolph Hassler, a world renowned mathematician and geodist.
He insisted, according to A. Hunter DuPree,

"that the Survey

be a true contribution to science and not just a compiled
map."

He also believed and made

it known to everyone that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4

as a scientist he should not be subject to interference of
any kind.4
Dahlgren work ed closely with the brilliant but
tempermental

Swiss scientist while he received training in

proper surveying techniques.

Hassler's skill

at political

maneuvering in Washington was not lost on the junior navy
officer.

Typically, navy officers assigned to duty on the

Survey served a two year tour, afterward returning to the
navy for regular duty.

Moreover, while assigned to the

Survey, officers continued to receive the standard pay for
their rank.

Hassler and Dahlgren fought a long-running

battle to exempt Dahlgren from both practices.
appealed all

Hassler

the way to President Martin Van Buren, who in

March 1837, approved a pay raise for Dahlgren from his
m id s hi p ma n's salary of $750 to the rather princely sum of
$3,000 "aggregate annual compensation."
stayed on the Survey past the usual

Dahlgren also

two years.5

Along with the gigantic pay raise, Dahlgren received a
promotion to the rank of lieutenant.
however, neither seemed very

Within months,

important.

Long hours of

tedious, eye-straining work had apparently taken a toll on
his vision.

The problem apparently became so severe that

the spring of 1837, Dahlgren

requested a medical

in

leave of

absence from the Survey.6
Through the summer of 1837, Dahlgren and Hassler kept
in close contact.

Hassler told Dahlgren that his condition

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"is very painful

to me" and if Dahlgren could "come upon

some idea by which I can do something to assist yout,]
should be glad to do it."
mind.

I

Dahlgren did have something in

He asked Hassler to intervene on his behalf to secure

approval

for a trip to Paris where he could seek medical

advice and to continue his $3,000 annual salary, based on
the claim that his condition had been caused by his work on
the Coast Survey.

Hassler agreed to Dahlgren's proposal

arranged Treasury Department approval.

and

Officially, however,

Dahlgren was going to Paris to purchase surveying equipment
not available

in the United States.7

The trip to Paris failed to cure Dahlgren.

Moreover,

he also failed to purchase any survey equipment,
ostensible purpose for the trip.
this he flew into a rage.
a bad predicament."

When Hassler

He told Dahlgren,

the

learned of

"It puts me

in

What w as he to say if anyone "asked me

what you did for the C.Coastl S.Curvey]

in Paris?"

Although

Dahlgren apparently proposed to return the salary he
received while in Europe, Hassler warned him,

"You must not

say a word about giving up your compensation,

it is all

over, provided nothing is said, otherwise

it may have very

disagreeable consequences."8
The advice came too late.

The first thing that

Dahlgren had done on his return from Europe was to report to
the Navy Department, which was normal procedure.

The

meeting with Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson quickly

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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became the center of controversy.
Dahlgren requested a seven day
home in Philadelphia.

A ccording to Dickerson,

leave in order to visit his

Because Dahlgren asserted that his

eyesight had not improved enough to resume regular duty,
Dickerson gave him a medical

leave of absence effective at

the end of his seven day leave.

This removed him from the

Coast Survey and his $3,000 salary.

More than likely

Dahlgren also admitted to Dickerson that he had not
purchased any survey equipment while

in Paris, because the

secretary of the navy spoke to his counterpart
Treasury Department w ho

in the

immediately wrote to Dahlgren

questioning whether he was entitled to any pay for his trip
to Europe.9
Afterward,

Dahlgren told Hassler of his predicament and

the head of the Coast Survey went to see Dickerson.
hearing Dickerson's version of events

After

it was apparent

Hassler that Dahlgren h ad not followed his advice.

to

He told

Dahlgren that he should not have done "so much talking"
the Secretary "as he thinks you unfit."

to

Fortunately,

Hassler told Dahlgren, Dickerson had said that Dahlgren
could reapply for the Coast Survey "and he will
Dahlgren, however,

grant

it."

disagreed with Hassler's assessment of

events and apparently told Hassler so.
seemed to lose all confidence
he w a s "almost rather

At this Hassler

in Dahlgren,

inclined"

telling h im that

not to do "anything else."

Despite his inclination Hassler did plead Dahlgren's case,
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again going to President Van Buren; but this time the
President sided with the Secretary of the Navy.

Dahlgren

was put on a leave of absence and told to report for duty

in

January 1839.10
A new secretary of the navy, James K. Paulding, was
appointed during Dahlgren's medical

leave.

When Dahlgren

reported for his next assignment as ordered he told the
secretary that his eyesight still
returning to active duty.
request a furlough,

prevented him from

Paulding asked Dahlgren to

the attraction of this for the secretary

of the navy was that Dahlgren's pay would be cut
$600.

This suggestion

in half to

initiated a lengthy and acrimonious

exchange between Dahlgren and Paulding, with the navy
secretary finally admitting that while he could not force
Dahlgren to go on furlough,
an officer to request
right.

His refusal

it.

it w oul d be becoming to him as
Dahlgren refused,

created a stalemate,

as w as his

although Paulding

told Dahlgren that any requests for leave in the future must
be accompanied by a navy surgeon's certificate attesting to
his d i s a b i 1i t y .11
Dahlgren w as not sitting still.

Just prior to

requesting another leave he had ma rr ie d Mary Bunker, and he
wrote to Hassler that he was not about "to live, or rather,
starve on $1,200 a year."

Could Hassler,

Dahlgren asked,

assist him in securing a government pension,

and "if

granted," he told Hassler, he would resign his commission.
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Again Hassler

intervened on h is behalf.

Hassler "went to

the Capitol" and convinced Congressman Seargent Smith
Prentiss of Mississippi
But because

to present a claim for Dahlgren.

It was so late in the session Prentiss d i d not

have time to lobby for support and the proposal

f a i l e d . 12

Dahlgren tried everything he could to get the secretary
of the navy to relent; ultimately he was successful.
31,

On May

1839, Paulding wrote to Dahlgren demanding to know if he

had gone to President Van Buren again.

Dahlgren responded

that he had told some people of his plight, but only
p as si n g conversation.
claimed,

He had not asked anyone, Dahlgren

to Intervene on his behalf.

stated innocently,

in

If anyone had, he

they had done so without his knowledge or

author izat io n .13
Someone had indeed gone to President Van Buren.

On May

25, John A. Quitman wrote to the President that his "young
friend"

Dahlgren had told him of his problems and being well

acquainted with his "most respectable family" he hoped the
President could do something for him.
governor of Mississippi,

Quitman,

lived in Natchez,

the former

the home of

Charles Dahlgren, John Dahlgren's younger brother.

Quitman

obviously had influence with the President as Van Buren told
Secretary of the Navy Paulding,

"Mr. Quitman's

representations are entitled to full confidence."

While

furious, Paulding also realized that Dahlgren had out
m an eu ve re d him and as a result he continued to grant him
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leaves of absence at regular three month

intervals until he

left office in March 1841.14
It is hard to say with any degree of certainty how
badly D ah lg re n/s eyesight had deteriorated.

Certainly

Hassler's comments and behavior suggest that he believed
Dahlgren was experiencing some kind of eye problems.
Dahlgren certainly never

But

lost his vision entirely and there

are a number of indications that Dahlgren may have
exaggerated his condition.

During his trip to Paris he

became acquainted with the ordnance experiments of General
Henri Joseph Paixhans and shortly after returning to the
United States, Dahlgren published an English translation of
P aixhans's treatise on naval

ordnance.

entire time while on medical

leave he maintained his

professional

Also, during the

correspondence with the Navy Department and

others as he tried to continue his leave and to secure a
government pension.

During this time he also continued

wr it in g in his private journal
small

and he successfully ran a

farm.15
There are a number of possible explanations why

Dahlgren might have exaggerated his vision problems.

He

clearly enjoyed the technical work of the Coast Survey.

It

is possible that he thought that he might keep working on
the Coast Survey as long as he could not perform regular
navy duties.

His experience on the Ontario provides another

possible explanation for his refusing to leave the Survey.
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During h is second naval
sea.

lost at

Dahlgren wrote repeatedly about this close brush with

death.
sea?

cruise his ship was almost

Could the near disaster have soured him on a life at
In addition, by this time he was courting Mary Bunker

and the two of them were m a r r ie d on January 8, 1839.
Staying with the Coast Survey would have allowed him to
remain with his wife.

His devotion to her would be the

major reason for his seeking shore duty
Finally,

after being awarded the pay

later in his career.

Increase to $3,000, he

was receiving more than twice the salary for a lieutenant on
regular duty.

Any, or all of these factors could account

for Dahlgren exaggerating his condit io n.16
Whether he exaggerated his condition or not, his
fondest memori es of this peri od in his life had nothing to
do with his victory over Paulding.
Bunker,

the daughter of a Philadelphia businessman,

newlyweds purchased a small
outside Philadelphia.
a small

After marrying Mary

farm in Bucks County, Just

There, he and his wife began life as

independent farm family.

busy and in his Journal
every farmer,

the

The farm kept Dahlgren

entries he expressed the concerns of

the weather, his quest to find inexpensive and

dependable help,

the price of supplies,

and the price being

paid for crops became his daily concerns.

The great joy of

these years were the births of his first three children,
Charles,

Elizabeth, and Ulric, whom he affectionately called

Charley,

Lizzie, and Ully.

He did not record a word about
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the navy in his journal;

it w as almost as if that part of

his life was over.17
Dahlgren continued to receive three month
extensions through March 1841.
changed.

leave

In June the situation

On June 23, he informed the Navy Department,

" Cm3y

prospects of being able once more to return to duty are
happily confirmed by the Improvement which my sight has
received."
eyesight?

What had happened?

Had he suddenly regained his

Did the replacement of Secretary of the Navy

Paulding in March have anything to do with this change?
Whatever occurred, one thing w a s sure, Dahlgren was not
willing to go back to active duty, not yet,
the new secretary of the navy,
still

lest, as he told

George E. Badger, his vision,

susceptible to deterioration, would once again be

impaired.

Thus he requested yet another leave, cautioning

if he did not receive it he might become "an invalid for
1 ife."18
D ahlgren's request was granted and he remained on leave
status until

the spring of 1842.

Finally, almost a year

after admitting that his vision had improved, he returned to
active duty.

Amazingly he did not have to go back to sea;

instead he w as again assigned to the receiving ship
Philadelphia Navy Yard.

in the

Back on active duty, Dahlgren sold

the farm and he and his family m o ve d to Wilmington,
Delaware.

From there he made a difficult daily trip to

Philadelphia,

out of the house at 5:30 a.m. not to return
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until 7:00 p.m.

Dahlgren, kn owing better than anyone the

difficulty in keeping duty on shore, continued this routine
for more than a year without complaint.
possible, he knew,
forever.

It was also not

to stay at the Philadelphia Navy Yard

In the summer of 1843 he began to angle for the

best billet he could get.

He requested duty as flag

lieutenant on the M i s s o ur i . but perhaps because of all the
years of being out of the normal
w as denied.

duty rotation, his request

Although "exceedingly disappointed,"

later that

summer he received orders for service afloat aboard the U.S.
Frigate Cumber 1a n d , assigned to the Mediterranean
S q u a d r o n .19
The Cumber 1and cruise was his first as a married man,
and when he left his home on September 26,

1843, he

behi nd his pregnant wife and three young children.
husband and wife felt the separation
he

intensely.

left
Both

On the day

left, Mary Dahlgren started writing entries in her

h u s b a n d /s Journal

and continued doing so until his return

more than two years later.
today for Boston,
to Join me

"My dear husband left at noon

to join the ship.

The very heavens seem

in the general sorrow & it is indeed a most

melancholy d ay — surely the saddest one of my life.
But partings should ever come!"
heartbroken about

John Dahlgren was just as

leaving home and he wrote often to his

wif e to explain why he w as forced to go to sea.
this great evil

Alas!

"In meeting

I am satisfied that I am only discharging a
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duty to you and to our little ones, and this must be done to
the best of my a b l 1 ities."20
Leaving behi nd his wife and children weighed heavily on
him.

In his letters home he continually bemoaned his

absence and called himself the “weary wanderer."

As the

cruise lengthened his letters took an increasing tone of
despondency concer ni ng his ability to take care of his
family.

As early as January 1844, he began to mention

possible way s of avoiding sea duty in the future.
this was Just the normal
but

Perhaps

talk of a sailor away from home,

in the spring h is planning became more than just mere

rhetoric.

On May 23,

1844, he received word that his son

John, born on November 19,

1843, the same day the Cumber 1and

sailed from Boston, had died.

He became sullen and bemoaned

his past and the prospects for the future.

"I have long

since dear Mary given up hope of being a great man
mys el f— there was some vague shadowing of the kind before
25— but that you kno w is past some time since, and now if I
can put my

little ones in the way of being useful

fellow beings as James Watt,

it will do."

to their

Clearly his

comment about "being a great man" referred to his time as
Hassler's assistant, but now his only concern was getting
home and being with h is family.
to the United States became

As the Cumber 1and's return

less and less certain because of

the growing possiblity of war with Mexico he grew even more
despondent.

At one point he considered asking his
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c ommanding officer,

Commodore Joseph Smith,

to send him home

on an outgoing stores ship, but then thought better of it.21
The C u m b e r 1and cruise marked a turning point
Dahlgren's career.

in

It convinced him he needed to find a way

to stay close to his family; at the same time he recognized
that he only had the navy to depend on for a career.

But

then he hit upon the perfect solution and he detailed his
idea to his wife.
that there

"When I do return, as it is now clear

is to be nothing but the Navy pay,

to attempt renting a farm,

it will

not do

for I should soon be ordered to

sea and must go, as the furlough pay of $600 w ou ld not
support us.
Ordnance
Mass.

Now there is a comfortable place in the

line which I could have.

It is in Springfield,

about 100 miles west of Boston on the R.Iaill Road to

Albany.

A nd if you could make up your mind to settle there,

I could keep clear of salt water for five years."

He

admitted to his wife that this scenario would be improved if
he could secure a post

in Philadelphia,

as he had done

1842, but they had to choose from the "least of
While

evil s .

in
"22

it wo ul d be more than nine months before Dahlgren

w o u l d return to the United States, he had decided to try to
secure a position

in the ordnance department.

Shortly after

arriv in g back home, Dahlgren received a letter from his
former commander

informing him that he had recommended him

for ordnance duty.

While nothing materialized from this,

later that year Smith again asked Dahlgren

if he wante d him
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to try to secure an appointment

in ordnance for him.

A few

months later Dahlgren received orders to report to the
Washington Navy Yar d for special

duty connected with

ordnance research.23
While personal

factors were the overriding motive

behind Dahlgren's decision to seek a position

In the Navy's

Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, he also had professional
reasons for doing so.
neither naval
centuries.

Through the early nineteenth-century,

guns nor battle tactics had changed much for

Until

this time the standard ship battery

consisted of a combination of different size smoothbore
cannon which primarily fired solid-shot;

the basic formula

for a vessel's strength was the number of guns it carried
and the total weight of metal
broadside.

it fired in a single

In this era of wooden ships and solid-shot,

captains attempted to maneuver their vessels across the
enemy's bow or stern where there were few guns, and tried to
overwhelm their opponents with the weight of their
broadside.

Because the guns fired solid-shot few ships were

actually sunk. Rather,

victories were achieved by the

destruction of masts and rigging, making the vessel
unmaneuverable, and by killing and wounding the crew of the
enemy vessel.

The employment of these tactics thus led to

the construction of increasingly larger vessels carrying
more and larger

guns.

24
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Under these conditions, the British Navy, with
great advantage

its

in both the number of large ships and guns,

was the world's leading naval power.
of France's defeat

But in the aftermath

in the Napoleonic Wars, French General

Henri Paixhans argued that France could contest Britain by
revamping its fleet.
but his greatest

Paixhans's plan had many components,

influence was in ordnance, especially

pioneering the use of shell-guns on naval

vessels.

in

25

Explosive shells had been experimented with and used on
a sporadic b asis from at least as early as the
fourteenth-century but they had never been widely adopted
for naval use.

While the advantages of using explosive

shells in lieu of solid-shot appear obvious enough, a number
of factors,

including the difficulty of safely storing

shells on board ship, and their propensity not to explode,
or even worse,

to explode prematurely thus threatening the

ship which fired them as much as the vessel which the shells
were

intended to destroy, kept navies from adopting

shell-guns.

All of these problems were largely a

consequence of poor fuze design.

Paixhans helped to correct

the problems with explosive shells and after demonstrating
the destructive c a p a b i 1i t K

j

of the weapon against some old

hulks, France began to employ some shell-guns on its
ships.26
Both Britain and the United States eventually followed
the French lead.

The United States adopted new ordnance
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regulations In 1841 and 1845 which placed 8-inch shell-guns
on American vessels and simplified ship ordnance by making
the 32-pounder the only solid-shot gun used.
and Britain, however,

Like France

the United States only used shell-guns

on a limited basis, and the guns were strictly considered an
auxiliary weapon to the primary system of solid-shot
32-pounders.

Thus,

in 1845, an American first-class frigate

carried a battery of eight shell-guns of 8-inch bore and
forty-two solid-shot 32-pounder cannon.27
Dahlgren first became acquainted with Palxhans's work
while

in France

in the late 1830s.

He was so impressed with

his ideas that he translated Palxhans's treatise on
shell-guns into English.

Like Paixhans,

Dahlgren was very

concerned with his navy's strength compared to Britain.
Dahlgren believed that by taking Palxhans's ideas one step
further, and employing an all shell-gun battery,
States would better be able to challenge
powerful

rival.

the United

its larger and more

From the moment that he stepped foot

in the

Washington Navy Yard, Dahlgren began what turned out to be a
seven and a half year effort to get the navy to abandon its
system of armament which r elied primarily on solid-shot guns
and only a few shell-guns and to replace it with a system
which exclusively utilized shell-guns.28
When Dahlgren first Jo ined the ordnance department in
January 1847, his goal was to replace the navy's solid-shot
32-pounders with the existing 8-inch shell-guns.

Dahlgren
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quite rightly argued that the larger explosive projectile
from the shell-gun was superior to the smaller solid-shot
projectiles fired from the 32-pounders.

But even though

most of the problems associated with explosive shells had
been solved by the late 1840s, he still

faced opposition.

This had less to do with technical m at te rs and instead was
more a consequence of the long held fears about shell-guns
held by many of the navy's older officers, who, as one naval
historian recently noted,
technological

"opposed progressive reform and

innovation because they he ld very traditional

ideas about the Navy and its r o l e . "29
Not
however,

long after he joined the ordnance department,
Dahlgren's goal

changed from simply wanting to do

away with the navy's shot-guns to replacing all of the
navy's guns with a gun of his own design.

The Dahlgren gun,

as his gun quickly came to be called, offered a number of
advantages over the navy's other guns, both 32-pounder
shot-guns and 8-inch shell-guns.

Because of principles of

ballistics the low velocity Dahlgren guns offered slightly
improved accuracy over the higher velocity shot-guns.

While

the navy's existing 8-lnch shell-guns also offered this
advantage, Dahlgren's guns were of nine-inch and eleven-inch
bore, giving them greater striking power.

It was another

feature of his guns altogether, however, and one which he
did not even mention when he first proposed them,
distinguished them from other guns.

that most

In the mid-1840s, army
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ordnance specialist Colonel George Bomford discovered that
the pressure inside the barrel

of a gun when fired was much

higher than previously believed and rather than declining at
a steady rate as the projectile m ov e d down the barrel,

the

pressure fell off rapidly as soon as the projectile moved.
Dahlgren designed his guns to conform to Bomford''s
discovery.

His guns thus had a unique soda-bottle shape,

the advantage of which was that

it concentrated the metal

the gun to correspond with the interior pressures.
made the gun

less susceptible to bursting,

common occurrence

in

This

a relatively

in the nineteenth-century.

shape of the Dahlgren gun had another benefit.

The unique
It gave it a

more favorable weight-of-gun to weight-of-projectile ratio
than the navy's other

large guns.

The importance of this

fact w as that replacing the existing batteries with a
battery of Dahlgren guns of the same total weight resulted
in a heavier weight of metal

fired in a broads id e. 30

Dahlgren exhibited the same resourcefulness in
overcoming opposition to shell-guns,

including his own, as

he did in his earlier struggles with the Navy Department.
He used his proximity to government
great advantage.
he made

leaders in Washington to

Soon after Joining the ordnance department

it a regular practice to invite anyone who might be

in a position to help him down to the Washington Navy Yard
to witness the test firing of the various naval guns.

The

list of people who visited Dahlgren was a veritable who's
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who of prominent

leaders.

President after president,

cabinet members, members of both houses of Congress,
dignitaries, and Journalists,
during Dahlgren's tenure.

foreign

all came down to the yard

The ability to present his

in private to these influential

ideas

leaders without other

ordnance specialists to offer contrary opinions was probably
the greatest advantage he had in getting his plans
implemented.

Dahlgren and his strange looking gun became

the talk of Washington, proving what so many military
officers already realized,

that one tour of duty in

Washington w as worth much more than many successful

tours

anywhere els e. ^1
Dahlgren's most valuable political

contact

in the early

1850s was Congressman Frederick P. Stanton of Tennessee,
Chairman of the House of Respresentatives Committee on Naval
Affairs.

Dahlgren secured an introduction to Stanton

through his navy colleague Matthew Fontaine Maury,
Superintendent of the Naval

Observatory.

Dahlgren sought to

meet Stanton for more than the obvious reason that he was
the chairman of an influential

committee.

Stanton had been

engaged in a long standing effort to reduce naval
expenditures under the Congressional buzzword,

"efficiency."

As Dahlgren pointed out often, since his guns were so much
larger than the navy's other guns, ships would carry fewer
of them, thus fewer men wo ul d be needed to work a vessel's
armament, resulting in a decreased payroll.

Dahlgren's
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first meeting with Stanton showed Dahlgren at his lobbying
best.

Stanton,

along with Congressman Hugh White from New

York who was also a member of the Naval Affairs Committee,
visited Dahlgren at the Washington Navy Y ar d eight days
after Dahlgren asked Maury to Introduce h im to the
Congressman.

Dahlgren did all that was humanly possible to

impress his influential
"Experimental

guests.

He took them down to the

Battery," which was what Dahlgren, ever with

an eye toward image, called the firing range that he had
laid out at the yard.

There he allowed both Congressmen,

neither of whom had ever seen a shell-gun fired before,
fire a IX-inch Dahlgren gun at a target set out
river.

to

in the

Of course Dahlgren conveniently had the target only

550 yards from the gun, which made
Stanton and White would miss.

it improbable that

Firing the massive weapon and

seeing the shells strike the target had the desired effect,
because not

long afterward Stanton sponsored legislation for

appropriations to arm the navy's ships with Dahlgren guns.
Of course while Stanton praised the guns for their technical
merits, he reserved his strongest and warmest comments for
the economic benefits, which according to his calculations
would amount to savings "annually something like two
millions of dollars."32
Although Stanton's bill did not pass, Dahlgren's
lobbying efforts eventually paid off.

In April

1854, when

Congress finally approved appropriations for the
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construction of six all-new auxiliary steam frigates,

the

proposed batteries consisted entirely of shell-guns.
Dahlgren h a d succeeded In completely changing the thinking
about arming vessel s.33
Dahlgren's success was not as complete as he desired or
thought

it should be.

While all of the advantages of the

Dahlgren gun and armament plan for navy vessels had merit,
not all of his navy colleagues thought that they added up to
as great an advantage as Dahlgren suggested.

Like the guns

it w as designed to replace the Dahlgren gun w as a cast-iron,
muzz 1e - 1oadlng smoothbore cannon.
gun had a relatively short range,

Therefore the Dahlgren
and while

accurate than the navy's existing guns,
marginally so.

Also,

indeed more

it was only

in an era when human muscle supplied

all of the power to load large weapons,
thirty-six pound shell

the one hundred and

Dahlgren's Xl-lnch gun used, along

with the gun's weight of 15,700 pounds, greatly slowed the
loading, positioning, and firing process.

Additionally,

because of the size of the guns, ships could carry far fewer
of them than other guns.

While the smaller number of guns

was a distinct advantage when speaking to budget-minded
congressman,

critics pointed out that the ability to carry

many more of the smaller guns, combined with the ease and
much shorter time needed to load and fire the smaller
pieces,

offset some,

if not all, of the purported advantages

of the XI-inch Dahlgren gun.34
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The main opponent of using the Xl-inch gun at sea was
Commodore Charles Morris, who w as named the Chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography

in November 1851.

this time Dahlgren served under Lewis Warrington.

Until

While

Warrington was among the navy's most respected officers (he
w a s a naval hero from the War of 1812 and two time secretary
of the navy on an ad interim basis), he w as not an ordnance
specialist.

Warrington deferred to Dahlgren on most

technical matters and he had not made h im conduct many tests
to demonstrate that his guns and armament plan were as
greatly superior as he claimed.
situation.

This led to an astounding

In August 1852, as Congressman Stanton tried for

the second time to win Congressional

approval

the navy's ordnance on Dahlgren's plans,

to reorganize

Dahlgren's entire

experience with his shell-guns rested on the casting of two
guns, one IX-inch gun which had been test fired a total

of

218 times and one Xl-inch gun which had only received its
proof tests.
Morris,

like Warrington, w as among the navy's most

respected officers.

Captain John Rodgers, perhaps the most

distinguished American navy officer of the
ni ne te et h- cen tu ry , described Morris as "a man of 'strong
discriminating mind,

of considerable science,

unites perhaps as much,
practical
service.'"

if not more,

...

theoretical

[who]
and

knowledge than any man of his age in the
Morris was also an ordnance specialist and early
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on and he ordered extensive trials to test Dahlgren's
IX-inch gun.
Farragut.

The first of these were c on ducted by David G.

He praised the strength of the gun, but he

expressed concern about handling the gun at sea.

Farragut's

reports on the difficulty of handling the sizeable IX-inch
gun s pelled doo m for the even larger Xl-inch gun.
Morris w as instrumental

Although

in getting the navy to adopt an all

shell-gun battery for the new frigates,

in 1854, when the

navy announced the batteries for the new frigates,

instead

of the batteries of IX-inch and Xl-inch guns as Dahlgren
wanted,

the navy equipped them primarily with the older

8-inch shell-guns and Dahlgren's IX-inch guns as Morris
recommended.
There w as one exception to this.

The navy decided to

build one of the six frigates on a different pattern.

As an

experiment to test the applicabli1ity of adapting features
us e d in commercial clipper ships the navy asked George
Steers,

famous for the yacht-schooner A m e r 1c a . to design one

of the six vessels.
vessel,

Steers's main priority

the N i a g a r a , was speed.

in designing his

Thus he did not want to

utilize the two deck armament system of a traditional
frigate because
vessel's speed.

its overall weight would compromise the
Dahlgren convinced Secretary of the Navy

Dobbin to allow him to work with Steers to arrange the
Niagara's armament, but as with the other frigates he was
only partially successful.

Steers agreed to place twelve of

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

Dahlgren's Xl-lnch guns on the spar deck but despite all of
Dahlgren's lobbying Steers w ou ld not consent to the
placement of any guns on the main deck or more of the
Xl-inch guns on the spar

deck.

36

The debate over arming the frigates brought out the
worst

in Dahlgren.

He viewed and subsequently portrayed the

decision against adopting his complete plan for the frigates
as a consequence of the same traditionalism which delayed
Initial

acceptance of shell-guns and he ignored Morris's

legitimate concerns with the Xl-inch gun.

Dahlgren became

bitter that none of the ships were based on his complete
plan and he complained in his private Journal,
that

"So after all

is the result that the Bureau takes my place for the

Gun deck— and Steers takes the spar deck— they dividing me
between t he m ."37
After the navy refused to arm the frigates exactly as
he wanted,

Dahlgren campaigned successfully to have a vessel

ar me d with both IX-inch and Xl-inch guns for tests at sea.
This resulted in his securing the Navy Academy's training
ship P I v m o u t h .

Armed with the first Xl-inch Dahlgren gun to

go to sea, as well as IX-inch Dahlgren guns, Dahlgren sailed
the PIvmouth to Europe and back in the summer and fal 1 of
1857.

In a carefully worded report of the sea trials of the

Dahlgren guns, he argued, he had proven that the criticism
of the guns, especially the Xl-inch gun, were without merit
because he had been able to exercise the Xl-inch gun at sea.
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He declared,

"there should be no objection to restoring that

part of my plan of armament which assigned a tier of
el even-inch guns to the spar decks of screw frigates."

Even

as carefully worded as his report was, however, Dahlgren
conceded that neither of his guns could be fired as rapidly
as the navy's smaller guns;
difference

and though he tried to make the

in firing time seem insignificant,

Dahlgren's

PIvmouth cruise was not enough to get his Xl-inch guns on
the spar deck of all of the navy's frigates.38
Dahlgren's bitterness did not decrease with time;
anything it increased.
service were spent

Because the Niagara's first years in

in non-tradltional

assignment w as to assist
trans-Atlantic cable,

if

r ol es — its initial

in the first attempt to lay the

followed by a cruise to Liberia to

return 280 Africans freed when the slave ship Echo was
captur ed — it did not receive
until

1859.

its battery of Xl-inch guns

On that occasion Dahlgren renewed his protests

over the armament of all of the steam frigates.
had been "mutilated,"

His plan

and therefore none of the vessels were

as strong as they could have or should have been, he
complained.

He was filled with the most "Inexpressible

mortification"

for fear that the frigates should meet up

with any of Britain's frigates.

But as much as he was

w or ri e d about the fate of the ships he w as also concerned
about his own reputation.

"I only wish," he concluded,

"now

that the Niagara is about to be brought before the service
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as a regular cruiser, with a battery which I am to be held
resposlble for,— to state what

I am responsible for."39

Despite failing to get the frigates armed the way he
desired,
1850s.

Dahlgren's public reputation soared by the late
One reason for the acclaim that he received was the

success a number of Dahlgren guns had in tests designed to
check their endurance.

Dahlgren repeatedly bragged of the

first Xl-inch gun cast, which endured 1,958 rounds before
falling.
normal

This was indeed remarkable considering that the

service

life for large cannon was 1,000 rounds.

Of

course Dahlgren did not often publicly mention that the
first

lot of Dahlgren guns which were cast for the new steam

frigates,

f a i 1ed miserably during their

initial proof tests

and that most of the guns had to be rejected.40
Bragging about the durability of his first Xl-inch gun
comprised just one part of a w e l 1-designed public relations
campaign that Dahlgren engaged in to promote himself and his
guns.

Dahlgren also took his case to the public.

By

w r it i ng and publishing a series of books on naval ordnance
at h is own expense, Dahlgren became widely known to the
general population.

These works,

the most

Important of

which was his Shells and S h e l l - G u n s , were not, as one might
well

expect, critical

assessments of the field of naval

ordnance, but rather highly subjective works supporting his
own opinions about the subject.41

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

Dahlgren did not devote his considerable promotional
abilities solely to g etting his guns and his other plans for
reorganizing the navy's ordnance department adopted.
Between the time that he Joined the Bureau of Ordnance and
Hydrography and the outbreak of the Civil War he
successfully engineered three pay raises for himself so that
he was paid well
received.

above what other officers of his rank

The first of these came in early 1848, when he

petitioned for an additional

yearly salary of $500 claiming

that he and his family could not afford to live in
Washington on the regular pay of a lieutenant.
bid for additional

pay w as not unprecedented.

Dahlgren's
In 1845,

Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury, who w a s named
superintendent of the Naval
subsidy of $350 until
superintedent's house.

Observatory,

received a housing

the navy completed construction of the
But Dahlgren's request was indeed

bold; not only did he ask for more money than Maury
received, but Dahlgren w as equating his position as a newly
appointed assistant

inspector of ordnance to that of Maury,

who because of his scientific mapping of the ocean's wind
and water currents was perhaps the most
renowned officer
Approval
increase.

internationally

in the U n ite d States N avy.42

of Dahlgren's request only brought a monetary

In time this p r ov ed Inadequate for Dahlgren's

driving personal

ambition.

In late 1850 he began to push to

have his position officially equated with Maury's.

Again,
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however, he had to content himself with a monetary reward.
On the same day that Congressman Stanton first

introduced

legislation to have a vessel built and armed along the plans
of Dahlgren's proposing,

another bill w as introduced before

the House, which stated in part,

"That the officer charged

with experiments in gunnery at the navy yard at Washington,
shall hereafter receive the compensation of a commander at
sea."
same
bill;

When this bill

failed to pass, a provision along the

lines was inserted into the annual
and on March 3,

navy appropriation

1851, passage of the bill provided

that Dahlgren receive an annual

salary of $2,500,

the pay of

a commander at sea rather than the regular salary of $1,500
for a lieutenant on d ut y. 43
Dahlgren continued to receive the pay of a commander at
sea for the rest of the 1850s— Dahlgren had been promoted to
commander

in 1855.

threatened.

In 1860 his cherished pay status was

The new Navy Pay Bill being discussed in

Congress had a provision

in it which ended the practice of

payin g any officer a salary above what other officers his
rank received.
political

Dahlgren put all of his lobbying skills and

contacts to use to defeat this provision.

Dahlgren wrote to the numerous senators and representatives
who had been

influential

in the naval buildup of the 1850s

and whose efforts he h a d supported with his frequent
testimony before Congress.

Dahlgren asked them if there had

been any shortcomings in his service since 1851 when he had
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first received pay not commensurate with his rank.

If it

had been acceptable to Congress to pay him $1000 above his
rank in 1851, he asked,

"why damage me so seriously now?"

He again equated his services with those of Maury.

Since

Maury continued to live at the Naval Observatory for free,
why not, Dahlgren asked, pay him a cash amount equivalent to
Maury's housing?

Dahlgren also claimed near impoverishment

as another reason to continue his higher salary.
asked upon slight consideration,"

he told F. H. Morse,

Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs,
being 34 years in the Service,
richer than when I entered:

"Nor is it

"For after

I am about one month's pay

from which fact

literally true,

your Committee may be assured that the compensation granted
from the first has been barely equal
strictly economical mode of
have

living."

to the demands of a
While Dahlgren may

indeed been only one m onth's pay richer than when he

joined the service, his assertion that he had followed the
most "economical mode of living"

contrasts sharply with his

reputation of being an active Washington socialite.44
Dahlgren's efforts pa i d off, and an amendment proposed
by Senator Rice w as added to the pay bill calling for the
continuation of the practice of paying Dahlgren at the rate
of the next highest rank.

With the support of Chairman of

the Senate Naval Affairs Committee Stephen Mallory, and all
of the other prominent Democratic Senators w h o had led the
effort to build up the navy,

the amendment passed.

On July
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2, 1860, Dahlgren happily noted that he received his first
check under his new pay rate of $4,200 a year, which was
that of a captain at sea, then the highest rank In the
n a v y .45
As with his attempt to arm all United States Navy
vessels only with his guns, Dahlgren's efforts at personal
aggrandizement also fell short of his goal.

Since 1841, the

Navy Department had been administered by a system of five
bureaus, under the overall
navy.

direction of the secretary of the

One of these was the Bureau of Ordnance and

Hydrography which Dahlgren was assigned to as an inspector
of ordnance.

In late January 1856,

Charles Morris,

died and Dahlgren tried to secure the

position for himself.
logical

the chief of the bureau,

candidate.

At first glance Dahlgren appeared a

While not everyone agreed with all of

his ordnance ideas, he more than anyone else was responsible
for the navy's adoption of the more powerful
battery for the new steam frigates.
ability

in the technical

shell-gun

He also certainly had

side of ordnance design.

Morris,

while he opposed using the Xl-inch shell-gun at sea,
recognized Dahlgren's value to the ordnance department, and
one of the first things he did after being named head of the
bureau in late 1851 was to make Dahlgren's appointment to
ordnance permanent.

Dahlgren, however, w as not eligible for

Morris's position because by

law the post had to be held by

a captain and he was only a commander.

According to
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Dahlgren, Secretary of the Navy Dobbin "did not know a
Capt.CainD

that he could prefer to me."

Since

it was

impossible to make Dahlgren a captain because promotion

in

the navy was strictly a function of seniority until midway
through the Civil War, Dahlgren,
proposed another solution.

in his classic style,

Why not separate the Bureau of

Ordnance and Hydrography into two parts.
latter to the Naval

Then attach the

Observatory and make Maury the head of

it, and make himself the chief of the now separate Bureau of
Ordnance.

The obvious reason for this proposal was that by

reducing the overall

responsibilities of each position

Dahlgren hoped that the the posts wo uld be opened to
commanders as well as captains,
eligible.
have been

thereby making himself

But whatever administrative benefits there may
in separating ordnance from hydrography,

there

w ou ld be no reorganization of the bureau system at this
t i m e .46
Dahlgren was as bitter at failing to secure the command
of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography as he was at not
seeing the frigates armed the way he desired.
tried to secure the post for himself

He again

in late 1859 by once

again proposing the separation of the bureau; but as in
1856, he was unsuccessful.

A colleague consoled him that

while he had not received the promotion that he had pushed
so ha r d for,

"you have with money at

least," referring to

Dahlgren's pay raise in the spring of 1860,

"received a
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certificate that you deserve it."
been content with partial
satisfied.

But Dahlgren had never

victories and he was far from

Events a few m onths later only Increased his

dissatisfaction.

In September 1860, Captain Duncan Ingraham

who had served as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and
Hydrography since Morris's death

in 1856, stepped down.

Again, Dahlgren had to watch as someone from the list of
captains was chosen to fill

the position.'!7

Thus on the eve of the Civil War, Commander John A.
Dahlgren was among the most prominent and influential
officers in the United States Navy and simultaneously among
the least happy and least satisfied.

Widely hailed for

reorganizing the navy's ordnance and designing the unique
bottle-shaped cannon that bore his name, he was generally
viewed as the United States Navy's leading authority on
ordnance.

Besides seeing the navy's newest and most

powerful vessels armed entirely with shell-guns, Dahlgren
also chalked up a creditable

list of other accomplishments

during his tenure at the Washington Navy Yard.

These

included laying out a firing range on the Anacostla River,
the design of a series of small bronze howitzers which could
be converted from use on board small

vessels and ship

launches to use on land as conventional

field pieces, and

the construction of the navy's first gun factory.
also well

He was

established in Washington's highest social circles

and he enjoyed the company of the some of the nation's
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leading political

figures.

At the same time, however,

Dahlgren's successes were tempered by the knowledge that not
all of his plans for ordnance had been implemented and
because of the organization of the Navy Department, he was
not eligible for the position of Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance and Hydrography.

Not only wo ul d have the

appointment allowed him to implement all of his ordnance
plans it also would have given him the official

recognition

he so badly wanted and thought he deserved.48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes to Chapter I
1John Dahlgren, "Memoir," 45 page script document dated
June 29, 1856, in, John Adolp hu s Dahlgren Papers, Library of
Congress, Washington D. C . , hereafter cited as JADLC; Judge
Richard Peters quote in, Pete rs to Navy Department, October
23, 1824, Ibid.; Dahlgren's first application was rejected
but when renewed it was approved.
His two applications
included testimonial letters from teachers, prominent
Philadelphia business and political leaders, and a
recommendation from the P ennsylvania State General Assembly,
all contained in, Ibid.; for the difficulties in securing a
midshi pm an' s billet, see, Charles Oscar Pauli in, P a u 11in 's
History of Naval Administration. 1775-1911: A Collection of
Artic le s from the U.S. N a val Institute Proceedings
(Annapolis, MD, 1968), pp. 194-95.
2 Dahlgren,
Ontario Cruise,
Arents Research
York, hereafter
Memoirs of John
(Boston, 1882),

"Memoir," JADLC; Dahlgren, Journal of
in, John Adolphus Dahlgren Papers, George
Library, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New
cited as JADSU; Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren,
A. Dahlgren. Rear-Admiral United States Navv
pp. 65-66.

3A. Hunter DuPree, Science in the Federal Government
(Cambridge, MA, 1957; reprint e d . , New York, 1980), pp.
29-33, 53.
4 DuPree, Science in the Federal G ov e rn m e n t , p. 52;
Ri ch a rd S. West, "The Be ginning of the Coast Survey,"
Proceedings 61 (May 1935): 665-70.
^Hassler to Dahlgren, April 6, 1835, JADLC; Dahlgren to
Dickerson, August 11, 1835, Ibid.; Hassler to Dahlgren,
August 11, 1835, Ibid.; Dickerson to Dahlgren, September 23,
1836, Ibid.; Dahlgren to Dickerson, September 26, 1836,
Ibid.; Hassler to Van Buren, March 5, 1837, excerpt in
Ibid.; Woodbury to Hassler, March 27, 1835, excerpt in
Ibid.; Woodbury to Van Buren, March 18, 1837, excerpt in
Ibid.; Woodbury to Van Buren, March 22, 1837, excerpt in
Ibid.; Treasury Department quote in, Treasury Department to
Captain Swift, March 27, 1837, Ibid.; it is difficult to
pinpoint why Hassler went to such lengths for Dahlgren.
It
m ay have been a matter of Hassler b eing impressed with
Dahlgren's work and the two m en having become close friends.
The cantankerous Hassler, however, was forever fighting
35

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

with Congress over alleged slights and his support for
Dahlgren was more likely simply another in the long series
of fights he had with his superiors.
The lack of any
personal correspondence between the two men in either
Hassler's or Dahlgren's private papers dating to the years
after Dahlgren left the Survey supports the latter argument.
^Hassler to Dahlgren, May 19, 1837, Ibid.; according to
a navy surgeon, Dahlgren "suffered from incipient
Amaurosis," which is a loss of eyesight with no observable
change in the eye itself, see Naval Medical Certificate,
October 14, 1838, Ibid.
7 Hassler quote in, Hassler to Dahlgren, June,
illegible, 1837, Ibid.; Hassler to Dahlgren, August 2, 1837,
Ibid.; Dahlgren to Hassler, September 10, 1837, Ibid.;
Hassler to Dahlgren, May 19, 1838, Ibid.; Hassler to
Dahlgren, October 12, 1837, Ibid.; Woodbury to Hassler,
October 31, 1837, Ibid.; Ferguson to Butler, November 4,
1837, Ibid.
®Hassler quote in, Hassler to Dahlgren, May 19, 1838,
Ibid.; Dahlgren to Paulding, August 31, 1838, Ibid.;
Ferguson to Van Buren, August 12, 1838, Ibid.
^Hassler to Dahlgren, June 20, 1838, Ibid.; Ferguson to
Van Buren, August 12, 1838, Ibid.; Dickerson to Dahlgren,
June 16, 1838, Ibid.; Dahlgren to Paulding, August 31, 1838,
Pickett to Dahlgren, June 16, 1838, Ibid.; Dahlgren to
Pickett, June 18, 1838, Ibid.
*°First Hassler quote in, Hassler to Dahlgren, June 20,
1838, Ibid; second Hassler quote in, Hassler to Dahlgren
June 25, 1838, Ibid.; Ferguson to Van Buren, August 12,
1838, Ibid; Hassler to Paulding, August 22 1838, Ibid.;
Ferguson to Dahlgren, August 20, 1838, Ibid.; Dahlgren to
Paulding, August 31, 1838, Ibid.
11Dahlgren to Paulding, August 31, 1838, Ibid.;
Paulding to Dahlgren, January 29, 1839, Ibid.; Dahlgren to
Paulding, January 30, 1839, Ibid.; Paulding to Dahlgren,
February 6, 1839, Ibid.; Dahlgren to Paulding, February 11,
1839, Ibid.; Paulding to Dahlgren, February 19, 1839, Ibid.
12Dahl gren quote in, Dahlgren to Hassler, February 1,
1839, Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler Papers, University of
Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Hassler quote in,
Hassler to Dahlgren, February 7, 1839, JADLC; Hassler to
Dahlgren, February 12, 1839, Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler
Papers, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia;
Prentiss to Dahlgren, February 18, 1839, JADLC.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

13Pau)ding to Dahlgren, May 31,
to Paulding, June 4, 1839, Ibid.

1839,

Ibid.; Dahlgren

14Quitman and Van Buren quotes in, Quitman to Van
Buren, May 25, 1839, letter endorsed by Van Buren, Ibid.;
Paulding to Dahlgren, August 30, 1839, Ibid.; Paulding to
Dahlgren, December 4, 1839, Ibid.; Paulding to Dahlgren,
March 7, 1840, Ibid.; Paulding to Dahlgren, June 8, 1840,
Ibid.; Paulding to Dahlgren, September 4, 1840, Ibid.;
Paulding to Dahlgren, December 17, 1840, Ibid.; Paulding to
Dahlgren, March 23, 1841, Ibid.
15Henri Joseph Paixhans, An Account of the Experiments
Made in the French Navv for the Trial of Bomb C a n n o n , trans.
John A. Dahlgren, (Philadelphia, 1838).
^ D a h l g r e n w ould often recall the near disaster on the
O n t a r i o . The most vivid account he ever gave was on the
15th anniversary of the event, September 8, 1844, see
Dahlgren to Mary Bunker Dahlgren, Journal Letter, August
21-0ctober 3, 1844, John Adolphus Dahlgren Papers, Naval
Historical Foundation Collection, Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C., hereafter cited as JADNHFC.
17There is a three page description of the farm
contained in the Naval Ordnance section of Dahlgren's
papers, Box 20, JADLC; for Dahlgren's descriptions of his
life during these years see the corresponding years of his
journals, JADSU.
13Dahlgren to Navy Department, June 23,

1841, JADLC.

19Upshur to Dahlgren, May 3, 1842, Ibid; Dahlgren, June
9, July 1, 31, September 4, 1843, Journal Entries, Vol. 5,
JADSU, Dahlgren quote from July 31 entry.
20Mary Dahlgren quote in, Mary Dahlgren, September 26,
1843, Journal Entry, Ibid.; John Dahlgren quote in, John
Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, September 29, 1843, JADNHFC; for
mor e on Dahlgren's emotions about leaving home, see, John
Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, September 30, 1843, October 4,
1843, October 15, 1843, October 26, 1843, November 15, 1843,
Ibid.
21Dahlgren quote in, John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren
February 2, 1845, in Journal Letter, January 1-March 6,
1845, Ibid.; also see, John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, July
7, 1844, Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, January 18,
1844, Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, January 30,
1844, Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, May 23, 1844,
Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, March 2, 1845, Ibid.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

2 2 John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, February 5, 1845,
Journal Letter, January 1-March 6, 1845, Ibid.

in

28 Smith to Dahlgren, January 21, 1846, JADLC; Dahlgren,
August 28, 1846, Journal Entry, Vol. 5, JADSU; Navy
Department to Dahlgren, January 6, 1847, JADLC; years later
Dahlgren gave a very different account to explain his
motivation for joining the ordnance department.
"My main
purpose in seeking Ordn. Duty w as to fit myself more fully
for sea service— In so doing I have become more Interested
in the pursuit than Intended at the outset."
Dahlgren to
unidentified, February 7, 1856, Ibid.
24 Spencer Tucker, Armin g the Fleet: U.S. Navy Ordnance
in the Muzzle-Loading Era (Annapolis, MD, 1989), pp. 19-50;
Tucker provides a good introduction to the technical side of
American naval ordnance through the end of the Civil War.
2 5 Ibid., pp. 177-80; E. H. Jenkins, A History of the
French. N a v y : From Its Beginnings to the Present Dav (London,
1973), pp. 288-89.
26T u c k e r , Arming the F l e e t , pp. 176-78,; Peter
Padfield, Guns at Sea (New York, 1974), pp. 146-49;
Paixhans, An Account of Experiments for the Trial of Bomb

Cannon.
2?Tucker, Arming the F l e e t , pp. 146-52, 180-96; D. K.
Brown, Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship Design.
Propulsion and Armament in the Roval N a v v . 1815-60 (London,
1990), p. 36; in the Unit ed States navy, shot-guns were
characterized by the weight of shot they fired and
shell-guns by the diameter of their bore.
The 32-pounder
had a 6.4-inch bore and fired a 6.3-inch solid shot of 32.5
pounds.
It also could fire a shell of about 26 pounds.
The
8-lnch shell-gun fired a 7.9-inch diameter hollow shell
which when filled with gunpowder weighed 51.5 pounds.
The
8-inch shell gun did not have a solid shot designed for it.
The reason for the slightly smaller diameter projectile than
bore w as to ease the loading of the gun.
2 8 It is difficult to date precisely when Dahlgren first
proposed to rearm vessels with an ordnance system comprised
soley of shell-guns.
His first official report proposing
this measure w a s dated February 15, 1849, well after he
Joined the ordnance department in January 1847. See,
Dahlgren to Warrington, February 15, 1849, JADLC;
there is
evidence, however, that he w a nt e d to reconfigure the
ordnance of the navy even before he Joined the ordnance
bureau.
After returning from the Cumber!and cruise, he
maintai ne d a steady correspondence with his crewmate, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

one of the few close contemporary friends he h ad In the
navy, Andrew Hull Foote.
Unfortunately, few of Dahlgren's
letters to Foote have been found, but Foote's answers to
Dahlgren's letters give an indication of Dahlgren's ideas
about ordnance before he Joined the ordnance department. In
his May 18, 1846 letter, Foote told Dahlgren that he
wholeheartedly agreed with his ideas concer ni ng the
reconfiguration of the armament of the frigates in the
fleet.
While Foote did not provide specific details, the
actions Dahlgren took as soon as he Join ed the ordnance
department to displace shot-guns, the official report he
submitted in February 1849, aski ng to arm a vessel soley
with shell-guns, and the battle he fought in the early 1850s
to arm the navy's new frigates entirely with shell-guns,
make it probable that the suggestions he made to Foote
followed along these same lines.
See, Foote to Dahlgren,
May 18, 1846, Ibid.; a few of Dahlgren's letters to Foote
are printed in, James Mason Hoppin, Li fe of Andrew H u l 1
EQ_o_te, Re_ar-Actmlr_aI__Unlted States Navv (New York, 1874).
29Dah lgren to Warrington, February 15, 1849, JADLC;
John H. Schroeder, "Matthew Calbralth Perry: Antebellum
Precursor of the Steam Navy," in, Captains of the Old Steam
Navv: Makers of the American Naval Tradition. 1 840-1880. ed.
James C. Bradford, (Annapolis, MD, 1986), p. 7.
While
Schroeder's comments referred specifically to the older
officers reaction to the Introduction of steam power, many
of them held the same sentiment for shell-guns.
30The origin of the Dahlgren gun is widely
misunderstood.
His original reason for proposing it w as the
potential of greater accuracy and striking power.
This can
be discerned from, Dahlgren to Warrington, October 15, 1849,
JADLC.
No pu blished account of Dahlgren mentions this
report, but Robert Schneller in a recent dissertation
correctly identifies and explains the technical reasons
b eh in d the proposal of the Dahlgren gun.
Schneller provides
good technical analysis of this and other technical aspects
of Dahlgren's career.
See, Robert John Schneller, "The
Contentious Innovator: A Biography of Rear Admiral John A.
Dahlgren U.S.N (1809-1870): Generational Conflict, Ordnance
Technology, and Command Afloat in the Nineteenth Century,"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1991); This present
work is not primarily a technical analysis of Dahlgren;
rather it is mostly concerned with Dahlgren's Civil War
career.
It is necessary, however, to have an understanding
of Dahlgren's technical career and the met ho ds he used to
get his plans implemented in order to see him in proper
perspective.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

3 1 For an indication of Dahlgren's visitors, see,
Dahlgren, Journals, Vols. 5 and 6, JADSU; Dahlgren's prowess
at pol it ic ki ng has been admired by one naval historian, see,
Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of Naval Policy. 1798-1947.
ed. Rowena Reed, (Annapolis, MD, I960), p. 164.
3 2 Dah Igren to Maury, December 24, 1850, m isf il ed in
1866 folder, JADLC; the account of Stanton's visit, which
took place on January 2, 1851, is reconstructed from Maury's
report to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis on the state of
American coastal defenses.
See, M. F. Maury, "Report to the
Secretary of War, August, 1851," in, U.S., Congress, House,
H. Ex. Doc. 5, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess.
Dahlgren w as also
asked to report to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and he
used this as another opportunity to push for the adoption of
his guns.
See, Dahlgren to Secretary of War Davis,
September, 1851, Ibid.; F. P. Stanton, H. R. 473, A B i 11 to
Increase the .efficiency of the naval s e r v i c e . February 20,
1851, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess.; Stanton quote in, F. P.
Stanton, U.S., Congress, House, House Report 35, "To
A ccompany Bill H.R. No. 473," February 20, 1851, 31st Cong.,
2nd Sess.
3 3 For information on the new steam frigates, see,
Donald L. Canney, The Old Steam Navv. Volume One: Frigates.
SJooPS. and Gunboats. 1815-1885 (Annapolis, MD, 1990), pp.
45-59.
The six frigates were known as the Merrlmac class,
and also included the C o l o r a d o . R o a n o k e . W a b a s h . M i n n e s o t a ,
and N i a g a r a .
3 ^The heaviest 32-pounder weighed 6,300 pounds and the
heaviest 8 - inch shell-gun wei gh ed 7,000 pounds.
The
Dahlgren IX-inch gun we ighed 9,000 pounds and used a
8.9-inch diameter hollow shell weighing 72.5 pounds when
filled with gunpowder.
3 ® T o follow the debate between Dahlgren and Morris,
see, Dahlgren, Naval Reorganization Report No. 1, August 10,
1852, JADLC; Morris to Secretary of the Navy, August 13,
1852, National Archives, Washington D. C., R ec or d Group 74,
Entry 1, "Letters Sent to the Secretary of the Navy and
C hie f s of Bureaus," hereafter cited as NARG74-1; Morris to
Secretary of the Navy, August 19, 1852, Ibid.; Morris to
Secretary of the Navy, May 30, 1853, Ibid.; Dahlgren, Naval
Reorganization Report No. 2, May 31, 1852, JADLC; Dahlgren,
Naval Reorganization Report No. 3, December 9, 1853, JADLC;
M o rri s to the Secretary of the Navy, December 19, 1853,
NARG74-1; Dahlgren, Naval Reorganization Report No. 4,
JADLC; Morris to Secretary of the Navy, January 30, 1854,
NARG74-1. Schneller follows this argument but he dismisses
M o r r i s 's objections as a consequence of traditionalism and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

ignores the very real concern of the slow rate of fire of
the large gun and the problem of handling It at sea.
This
would be a real concern throughout the Civil War and later
in the war there was a move away from the use of such large
guns for just these reasons. See, Canney, The Old Steam
N a v v . pp. 122-23; For Stanton's efforts, see, F. P. Stanton,
“Improvements in the Navy," Speech before the House of
Representatives, August 17, 1852, copy in, JADLC; F. P.
Stanton, Offering Amendments on the Naval Appropriations
Bill, August 17, 1852, Congressional G l o b e . 32nd Cong., 1st
Sess.; For Farragut's tests and comments, see, Morris to
F a r r a g u t , September 3, 1852, Farragut Papers, Library of
Congress, Washington D. C . ; Farragut to Morris, May 28,
1853, Ibid.; Farragut to Morris, June 25, 1853, Ibid.;
Faragut to Morris, July 8, 1853, Ibid.; Farragut to Morris,
August 3, 1853, Ibid.; Farragut to Morris, August 9, 1853,
Ibid.; Farragut to Morris, August 31, 1853, Ibid.; Rodgers
quoted in, Pauli in, Naval Administration. 1775-1911. p. 169.
3 6 For Dahlgren's efforts with Steers, see, Dahlgren,
May 12, July 8, 11, 28, 29, August 5, 8, 23, 1854, and March
29, April 9, 1855, Journal Entries, Vol. 5, JADSU;
the
exact battery for the other five steam frigates was
twenty-eight IX-inch guns on the main or gun deck, twenty
8 - inch guns on the spar or upper deck, and three X-lnch guns
for pivot chase guns on the spar deck.
Canney, The Old
Steam N a v v . p. 46; this X-inch gun was a compromise by
Morris.
He continued to believe the Xl-lnch was entirely
too large for effective use at sea so he allowed Dahlgren to
design a X-inch gun to replace it.
Dahlgren did not see
this as an acceptable compromise.
37Dahlgren, July 29,
JADSU.

1854, Journal

Entry, Vol. 5,

33 Dahlgren to Secretary of the Navy Toucey, "Report on
Cruise of Ordnance Ship Plymouth," November 20, 1857,
p rinted in, Annua] Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
U.S., Congress, Senate, S Ex Doc 11, 35th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 603-20.
3<^For the early history of the N i a g a r a , see, Canney,
The Old Steam N a v v . p. 56 ; Dahlgren, Report on Niagara's
Armament, May 19, 1859, JADLC, underline In the original.
40John A. Dahlgren, Shells and Shell-Guns
(Philadelphia, 1856), p. 15; Dahlgren to Morris, October 31,
1855, JADLC; there was a great deal of controversy over the
failure of these guns.
After the Navy decided to arm the
new frigates with shell-guns, contracts were let with
various founders.
Dahlgren had developed strong views on

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

proper casting methods and he demanded strict specifications
for the contracts.
The reason for all of the specifications
was to attain guns with iron of high tensile strength and
density because there had been some evidence that these
characteristics predicted the durability of a gun.
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founders pointed out Dahlgren h a d to at least share in the
blame.
See, Tucker, Arming the F l e e t , pp. 70-71; Parrott to
Morris, November 15, 1855, JADLC; Knap and Wade to Morris,
January 17, 1856, Ibid.; Schneller follows this controversy
in great detail, see, Schneller, "The Contentious
Innovator," pp. 206-27.
41Next to Stanton, Dahlgren's most important political
ally in the 1850s w as James C. Dobbin w ho was Secretary of
the Navy from March 8, 1853 to March 6, 1857. See, Harold D.
Langley, "James Cochrane Dobbin," in, ed. Paolo E. Colletta,
AmerJcan Secretaries of the N a v v . 2 vols. (Annapolis, MD,
1980), 1:279-300; John A. Dahlgren, System of Boat Armament
in the United States Navy: Repor te d to Commodore Morris
(Philadelphia, 1852); Dahlgren, Shell3 and S he l l- G un s ; these
works along with, John A. Dahlgren, Memoir of Ulric
D a h l g r e n . ed. Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, (Philadelphia,
1872); and Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, Memoir of John A.
P a h L g r e n . Rear-Admiral United States Navv (Boston, 1882);
have been the sources of a great deal of misunderstanding
about Dahlgren's career.
43Dahlgren's pay raise has generally been portrayed as
resulting from his immediate superior's initiative.
It is
true that Lewis Warrington, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
and Hydrography, requested the pay raise for Dahlgren, but
only after Dahlgren's urging; see, Dahlgren to Warrington,
February 10, 1848, JADLC; Dahlgren, March, 1848, Journal
Entry, Vol. 5, JADSU; Dahlgren to Mason, February 10, 1848,
JADLC; Warrington to Dahlgren, March 9, 1848, Ibid.; Frances
Leigh williams, M&Uh.ew._Fsnt.atrie. MaMr-y ,!-S g..lep U ,gt o f th e Se.a
(New Brunswick, NJ, 1963), pp. 156-62; Wi ll ia m Stanton,
"Matthew Fontaine Maury: Navy Science for the World," in,
ed. Bradford, Captains of the Old Steam N a v v . p. 46; The
Naval Observatory w as also commonly known as the National
O bs er v at o ry .
43Warrington to Secretary of the Navy William Graham,
October 4, 1850, JADLC; quote from, U.S., Congress, House,
H. R. 474, "Making Appropriations for the Naval Service,"
February 22, 1851, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess.; U.S., Congress,
Senate, "Regulating Pay of Navy," S. Ex. Doc. 68, 32nd
Cong., 1st Sess.
It is unclear w ho sponsored H. R. 474.
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Most likely, it w as Stanton, and Dahlgren thanked him for
his efforts almost a decade later when he w a s Involved in
another attempt to increase his pay; see, Dahlgren to
Stanton, March 30, 1860, JADLC; it also could have been Hugh
White of New York, however.
On January 11, 1851, Dahlgren
wrote to White asking h im to support legislation for
expanding the Ordnance Department.
See Dahlgren to White,
January 11, 1851, Ibid.; Dahlgren wrote a similar letter to
the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee as well. See,
Dahlgren to Thomas H. Bayly, January 13, 1851, Ibid.; see
also, Dahlgren to Robert Toombs, January 14, 1851, Ibid.
44D a h 1g r e n , October 11, 1855, Journal Entry, Vol. 5,
JADSU; first Dahlgren quote in, Dahlgren to Pearce, February
20, 1860, JADLC; second Dahlgren quote in, Dahlgren to
Morse, March 31, 1860, Ibid.; for additional material on
this event, see, Dahlgren to Toombs, February 18, 1860,
Ibid.; Dahlgren to Green, March 27, 1860, Ibid.; Dahlgren to
Stanton, March 30, 1860, Ibid.
45 Dah lgren, March 27, July 2, 1860, Journal
Vol. 7, JADSU, qoute from July 2 entry.

Entries,

46Paullin, Naval Administration. 1 7 7 5 - 1 9 1 1 . pp. 205-47;
Morris to Secretary of the Navy, February 4, 1852, NARG74-1;
Dahlgren, January 30, February 1, 5, 7, 1856, Journal
Entries, Vol. 6, JADSU, Dobbin quoted in February 5 entry.
47Dahlgren, December 24, 1859, Journal Entries, Vol. 6,
Ibid.; Percival Drayton quote in, Drayton to Dahlgren, May
27, 1860, JADLC.
48For some of the specifics and p ar ticulars of these
accomplishments, see, David K. Allison, "John A. Dahlgren:
Innovator in Uniform," in, ed. Bradford, Captains of the Old
Steam N a v v . pp. 26-45; Taylor Peck, Round-Shot to Rockets: A
H istory of ..the Washington Navv Yar d and U.S. Naval Gun
Factory (Annapolis, MD, 1949); James C. Hazlett, Edwin
Olmstead, and M. Hume Parks, Field Artillery W ea po n s of the
Civil War (Newark, Delaware, 1983), pp. 141-46.
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CHAPTER II
Loyalty Rewarded
"Congress has by law authorized the President to give
[Navy] Yards to C om m an d e r s . ...[the law] originating
entirely from reasons personal to myself."
Early

in his adult

private Journal.
activities,

life John Dahlgren began to keep a

While primarily an account of his daily

on every New Year's Day he generally devoted at

least a few lines to reflect about the events of the old
year and the prospects for the new.

In this respect, his

January 1, 1861, entry w as no different from any other New
Y ear's Day entry he had ever written.

The events of the

previous few months, however, made this New Year's Day entry
anything but t y p i c a l .

A memorable New Y ear's d ay ,— for one of the Stars
has dropped from the Constitutional firmament, and
the process of further dissolution is going on.
The public mind begins to be impressed by the
nature of the crisis, but by no m e an s to the
extent required to avert the evil.
In fact the
Federal G o v .[ernment] proves to be a shadow in
presence of State power, and there is apparent
everywhere an utter want of loyalty to the
National Un i on . 1

Fourteen years of duty at the Washington Navy Y ar d
c om bined with the numerous political

contacts that he had

44
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developed while lobbying to implement his ordnance program
gave Dahlgren an ideal vantage point for viewing the
heightening sectional

struggle between the North and South.

He had ties to "men from all sections" of the country, he
boasted to one of his sons.

Moreover,

prominent men I know Intimately."

"Most of the

On a recent day, he

continued, he had met with a Republican Senator, w h o
displayed "no misgiving"

at all about the crisis.

"[Hie &

his friends behold the comin g tempest with firm hearts."
Then afterwards he met wi th
he told his son,

"Jeff Davis & c.," and "I am,"

"perhaps the only outsider they speak [to]

f r e e l y ."2
In a better position to watch events than most people,
like many Americans he h a d conflicting feelings about what
the dispute between the North and South meant for the United
States.

Although a northerner by birth, Dahlgren's

sympathies rested with the South.

In late 1859, he had

written to a navy colleague w ho had inquired about his
feelings:

"The mere form of Union may not disappear at this

time, but

it is certain that the good feeling which

reality the Union has been sadly shocked."

is in

And while "It

has always been my earnest wish never to live so long as to
witness"

the breakup of the Union, he told his colleague,

"there seems more danger of civil strife by keeping together
than by [severing! the ties at once."
"painful"

Of course it was

for him "to entertain such a sentiment— But
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madness rules the hour and fanaticism stalks unrebuked in
the No rt h— han d in hand with blasphemy— God help them!"

In

another letter, to his son, he wrote, while "In the North
there is no personal
classes."

servitude,

... there is Slavery of the

Moreover, Southerners had a "duty to the Negro,"

and by "what right," he asked, did the "Northern man
infringe on his [Southern slaveholders]
Instead,

...

admitted duty."

"Let him [Northerners] see to the starving laborers

in Kansas and elsewhere."3
Perhaps it w as Dahlgren's pro-Southern sympathies which
led his closest friend in the navy, An dr ew Hull
write to him in early 1861 and ask,

Foote,

to

"I know your opinions

are no less than fixed than mine, and a little more so on
many subjects.

I wish however that you would give me your

views in full, and what you think is to be the result of the
crisis,

as you are

in Intercourse with

all sections of the country."

leading statesmen of

Dahlgren's answer,

letters he sent to his son Ulric,

like the

showed that he embraced

the most prevalent pro-slavery arguments of the day.
he pointed to biblical
institution of slavery.

First,

evidence for supporting the
"[A]nd I cannot believe

it would

have e scaped our Saviour's denunciation," he told Foote,
a tithe wer e true that

is now urged against

the slavery spoken of in the Bible
of white men by white men,

it."

"if

Moreover,

included the enslavement

"whereas with us it is the

Slavery of an inferior race, developing resources of rich
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soils, which white men cannot work,"
problems with slavery,

There were certainly

Dahlgren admitted, but "ttihe abuses

of a system are no argument against the system Itself."

The

main concern of the moment, however, w a s not "to enquire w ho
is to blame for the present troubles— But to endeavor to
allay them in such a manner as to preserve the rights of all
sections, under the Constitution."

And, he concluded, when

it came to preserving the rights of each section of the
country,

"it is not to be forgotten that the North can yield

more than the South, because the latter are exposed to a
perilous liability

in case their Negroes become excited.'"4

Despite his northern birthright and upbringing,

it was

not at all surprising that Dahlgren had such strong
pro-Southern sympathies.

During his years of campaigning

for the reorganization of the United States Navy's ordnance,
most of his support had come from Southern Democrats who

led

the charge for the naval buildup which occurred in the
1850s, and he h ad developed personal
of his supporters.

relationships with many

But he had other reasons as w e l 1.

His

younger brother Charles had m o ve d to Natchez, Mississippi,
after their father's death
worke d himself
aristocracy.

in 1824.

There,

Charles Dahlgren

into the ranks of the Mississippi planter
In 1860, Charles Dahlgren's plantation boasted

a harvest of 1,000 bales of cotton, a substantial

sum even

for the extremely wealthy and large plantations of the
Mississippi Valley.

Additionally,

f o l 1owing Mary Dahlgren's
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death In 1855, Charles Dahlgren had helped to take care of
John Dahlgren's children, which

included supporting Ulric

Dahlgren as he read to become a lawyer.

In the late 1850s,

Ulric, w h o w a s unquestionably John Dahlgren's favorite
child,

lived in Natchez with his uncle.

When Ulric came to

the North to visit his father in early 1860, John Dahlgren
noted that his son,
color:

"shows the Southern climate in lack of

But prefers it and the prospects there to a l 1 I can

h ol d out elsewhere;

So I shall

his fixed inclination."

not cross what seems to be

Was it any wonder then that John

Dahlgren felt the way that he did?5
While Dahlgren embraced Southern arguments, he
fervently w an t e d to avoid war.

That was why

in late 1859 he

had s uggested the separation of the North and South,
believing that keeping the two sections of the country
together offe re d a greater potential
problem was,

of "civil strife." The

as he told his son, there were "Southern

e x t r e m l s t C s l ," like "Tombs [sic],"

and "old fogies"

like

Charles Sumner in the North who "argue [about] the abstract
right of secession."
man can fail
solicitude."

"No American with the feelings of a

to regard the present crisis with the deepest
But rather than resorting to war,

must "be avoided peaceably."

the crisis

As late as the last month of

1860, he still believed that there were "practical men [who]
will

deal with facts."6
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Dahlgren's optimism about the ability of Northern and
Southern politicians being able to find a peacable solution
began to fade during the first we ek s of January 1861.
Following South Carolina's secession,

rumors began

circulating that a band of secessionists from the
surrounding slave states of Maryland and Virginia were
p lotting to attack Washington.
Buchanan,

On January 8, 1861, Franklin

Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard,

informed

Dahlgren that he had Just learned that these secessionists
had pl an s for "securing the arms and ammunition now in the
Armory a nd Magazine to be used in preventing the
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln."
will

Buchanan told Dahlgren,

"you

... prepare for the defense of the Y ar d all the

Howitzers now available

in the Ordnance Department with as

much secrecy as possible."

Furthermore, he told Dahlgren,

"This yard s h a l 1 not be surrendered to any person or persons
except by an order from the Hon.Corable] Secretary of the
Navy, and in the event of an attack,

I shall require all

officers and others to defend it to the last extremity...."7
Dahlgren,
capital,

along with just about everyone else in the

took the talk of these secret plots very seriously.

The day after receiving Buchanan's "Strictly Confidential"
orders, Dahlgren wrote to a friend in his hometown of
Philadelphia.
place

"The apprehension gains ground that this

is likely to be the scene of a row," and although "the

Go v. [ er nm e nt 3 is making preparations against such a
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contingency,"

the threat seemed genuine.

"A number of

ugly-looklng customers are to be seen about the streets,"
and although "no one knows whence they came or on what
errand,

...

like the stormy petrels they are generally seen

in advance of trouble."

Providing details of events In

Washington was not his purpose in writing, however;
care of his finances in the event of war was.

taking

He thus asked

h is friend to open a bank account for him, with the money
"to be had In specie If necessary,"

and "above all," he

wrote, make sure the account was "perfectly secure."®
There were other reasons for his concern.
day that he was seeing to his financial

On the same

affairs, Mississippi

followed South Carolina's lead and passed an ordinance of
secession.

Five other Southern states,

Georgia, Louisiana,

Florida, Alabama,

and Texas, quickly did the same, so that

by February 1, seven states in all had seceded.

Then,

in

the first weeks of February, representatives from the
seceded states met

in Montgomery, Alabama, where they

rapidly adopted a provisional contitutlon, elected a
provisional

president and vice president, converted the

constitutional
all

convention

Into a provisional

legislature,

of which transformed the seven seceded states Into

Confederate States of America.9
Dahlgren gave

little indication of how he felt about

the formation of the Confederacy.
simply

in his Journal,

On February

11, he noted

"The Union has lost the Cotton
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States, who have Just confederated and elected Mr.
Jeff.tersonD Davis President."

In fact,

In the weeks

immediately following this, he gave few clues about how he
felt about anything.

On March 4 ,

Lincoln's inauguration.
his Journal:

he attended Abraham

He made only a brief notation In

"Witnessed the Inauguration of President

Lincoln, which went off quietly enough in spite of ominous
f orebodings."10
Within days of Lincoln's Inauguration Dahlgren's
Intentions finally became clear.

On March 13, Lieutenant

Badger, a Junior officer who had served under him on the
P l y m o u t h . wrote and asked about the possibility of once
again serving with Dahlgren

in the event of war.

Dahlgren

immediately wrote back and his answer showed not a hint of
equivocation.
assuredly,

"You are altogether right," he stated

"I am for maintaining the integrity of the old

flag under which we have so long served and I feel
will be maintained; At all counts," he continued,

that

it

"I shall

... do my duty as I have from the first— and as for any
bias,"

he said in sharp contrast with what he ha d been

saying to family members and to his closest friends,

11that

is naturally to the North, because I am a Northern man by
birth, habit 8. residence when ashore."1 ^
Just as it was not surprising that Dahlgren held such
strong Southern sympathies,

it is also not surprising that

he ultimately cast his lot with the North.

He w as

indeed,
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as he told his navy colleague,
[and] residence."

"a Northern man by birth

...

But per hap s even more Important,

Dahlgren's strongest ties were to the United States Navy.
As he told his wife Mary Dahlgren

in the 1840s,

they only

had the navy on which to depend.

During the decade and a

half prior to the outbreak of the Civil War he had
ceaselessly struggled to mak e his fortune in the navy, and
by early 1861 Dahlgren enjoyed prominence and influence
matched by few of his peers.

To have made any decision

other than stay with the United States Navy would have meant
giving up everything which he h ad striven so hard to attain.
This w a s a choice that Dahlgren could never seriously
c o n t e m p l a t e .12
Even after he clearly stated his intentions to Badger,
Dahlgren remained uncharacteristically quiet about the
important events taking place all

around him.

President Lincoln's inauguration,

the next entry in his

Journal

After noting

came on March 31, when Wi ll iam Howard Russell,

famous London Times war correspondent,

visited him.

the

Russell

had only recently arrived in the United States to report on
the war which seemed likely to erupt between the North and
South at any moment.
meet and talk with all
leaders.

His trademark reporting style was to
the prominent political

and military

His visit to the Washington Navy Yard gives some

indication of the level of prominence that Dahlgren had
risen to by 1861; and re alizing this, Dahlgren was quite
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pleased with Russell's visit.

He wrote,

"Mr. Russell

the

celebrated correspondent of the London Times visited me and
remained two hours or more.

He is very c lev er ." 13

Russell's comments about Dahlgren were similarly
positive for the most part.

"In a modest office, surrounded

by books, papers, drawings, and models,
Capt.Iainl

... we found

[sic] D a h l g r e n ....A 1 1 inventors, or even adaptors

of systems, must be earnest, self-reliant persons,
confidence; Captain

full of

[sic] Dahlgren has certainly most of

these characteristics."

But Dahlgren also exhibited another

of his personality traits.

As he showed Russell

navy yard, Dahlgren, according to Russell,
"the navy department,
[navy] commissioners,"

... the army,

around the

lashed out at

... [navy] boards,

...

as he recounted the acrimonious

battle he had waged with his superiors throughout the 1850s
to get his guns and other ordnance plans adopted, or as he
would have termed it, as he tried to establish the proper
organization of the navy's ordnance.

When Russell's diary

w as published in 1863, Dahlgren reacted angrily.

"He

[Russell] relates all he sees & hears!,] not omitting
private conversations— I am brought out in five or six
places, whenever he met me and what I say is given without
s c r u p l e ."14
The Washington Navy Y ar d had an even more Important
visitor a few days later.

On April

2, in an unannounced

visit, President Lincoln came to the yard.

The President
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had apparently heard much about Dahlgren and his big guns
and he reportedly had come hoping both to meet the famous
ordnance expert and to see a demonstration of his equally
famous guns in action.

Unfortunately,

as Dahlgren recorded,

"It was 3 1/2 PM and I h ad left half an hour before."15
Besides wanting to see Dahlgren give a demonstration of
his guns, the President may have had an ulterior motive for
visiting.

The following day Dahlgren attended the wedding

of Captain Franklin Buchanan's daughter.

The President was

also invited to the we dd ing and while he arrived too late to
give away the bride, as h a d been arranged, he did come to
the reception afterwards.

The President's presence at the

wedding quite probably h ad more significance than simply
adding to the "very brilliant party"
the event as being.

When Russell

that Dahlgren described

received an invitation to

the wedding, he noted in his diary:

"The superintendent of

the Washington Navy Yard is supposed to be very little
disposed in favour of this present Government;
C a p t .... Buchanan may be called a secessionist."

in fact,
One Lincoln

scholar has suggested that Lincoln may have agreed to "give
away the bride"
to the Union.

as a means of trying to keep Buchanan
Of course,

if this were true,

loyal

it also might

have meant that President Lincoln had similar motives for
seeking to meet Dahlgren the day before.

Dahlgren had quite

openly announced his sympathies for the South to his fellow
officers.

Additionally,

the Washington Navy Yard was
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generally viewed as being a center of pro-Southern
sentiment, and by virtue of being stationed there Dahlgren's
loyalty had to be at least somewhat suspect, as was
everyone's who worked ther e. 16
Whether or not the President had ulterior mo tives for
his visits,

the wedding provided an opportunity for Dahlgren

to meet the President;

and when

introduced,

according to

Dahlgren, Lincoln "took my hand in both of h is — spoke
freely,— conversed for half an hour." Circumstances brought
Dahlgren and Lincoln together again the following day, April
4, but this time there m eet i ng was purely business.

Earlier

that day, Dahlgren received a telegram from his friend
Andrew Foote, who w as then the executive officer at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, asking him to send ten boat howitzers
with ammunition to New York.
what

Rather than telling Dahlgren

the guns were for, Foote told him,

President."

Dahlgren

"Refer to the

immediately "posted to the White

House;" but the President

told him,

"'I know nothing about

it,'" and suggested that Dahlgren go and see Secretary of
the Navy Gideon Welles.

But

like the President,

the

secretary of the navy did not know anything about Foote's
request and he asked Dahlgren to return "early to-morrow"
while he tried to find out what Foote's telegram was all
a b o u t .17
What was going on w a s that President Lincoln had
decided during the last days of March to try and maintain
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control of the few federal properties which federal

forces

still held in what was now the Confederate States of
America.
the most

At the moment this amounted to a handful

of forts,

Important of which were Fort Sumter in Charleston,

South Carolina, and Fort Pickens in Pensacola,

Florida.

But

in incredible behind the scenes bungling which was taking
place

in the Lincoln administration, Secretary of State

William Henry Seward diverted some of the ships, weapons,
and men, originally

Intended for Charleston to Pensacola, as

he tried personally to control

the federal

policy at this crucial

As requested, Dahlgren

point.

government's

reported to the Navy Department early on April

5.

When he

arrived, Secretary Well es was m eeting with Commodore Silas
Stringham whom Welles had recently named as his assistant

in

charge of the important responsibility of detailing the duty
of officers.

When Stringham left Welles's office he stopped

to speak to Dahlgren and stated,

11'You had better see the

Secretary about those Howitzers,

I have explained it to

him.'"

Dahlgren then "went in,— the Sec.tretary]

or six [howitzers] w o ul d do, and a d d e d t ,] 'I tell

said five
you in

confidence that these are to go to Charleston in the
Powhatan.'"

Dahlgren asked when will

W e ll es responded,

the Powhatan sail?

"Sunday morning," April

7 . 1®

The Powhatan's diversion from Charleston to Pensacola
d id not matter.

The Lincoln administration's decision to

try and relieve the federal

garrisons became readily
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apparent to Confederate

leaders as the relief expedition was

being outfitted in New York.

If that was not enough,

and It

was, on April 6, Lincoln directed Robert S. Chew, a State
Department clerk,

to deliver the following message to

Governor Francis Pickens of South Carolina:

I am directed by the President of the United
States to notify you to expect an attempt will be
made to supply Fort-Sumpter [sic] with provisions
only; and that, if such attempt be not resisted,
no effort to throw In men, arms, or ammunition,
will be made, without further notice, or in case
of an attack upon the Fort.

Chew delivered his message on Monday, April 8.

Rather

than w aiting for the expedition to arrive, which wo ul d at
the very

least delay the evacuation of Fort Sumter,

Confederate authorities gave the order to open fire, which
occurred in the early morning hours, April

12, 1 861.19

News of the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter
reached Washington by telegraph the same day

It began.

Dahlgren's first thoughts were about the ability of the
federal

garrison to withstand the attack and he was anything

but optimistic.

Even "If the Fort were fully m ann ed and

a rmed It w ou l d be reducible by proper means.
garrison

is so feeble

But the

... that every disability counts."

As

for the relief effort that had been sent, even not knowing
that Seward's Interference h ad diverted the Powhatan to
Pensacola, Dahlgren hel d out little hope of success.
large [ships]

"[TDhe

... could not enter and those that can would
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not pass the fire of the batteries,
s erved,— and a proper parole

If they were efficiently

[patrol] of a rmed steamers

w o u l d prevent any attempt by boats to Introduce men or
s t o r e s. "20
Dahlgren's feelings about the fate of Major Robert
Anderson and his tiny garrison were correct.

After enduring

a fierce bombardment for approximately thirty hours,
Anderson ordered his colors be taken down and he
surrendered.

By the evening, April

Washington of Anderson's surrender.
Fort Sumter spread in the capital,
emotions.

13, wo r d reached
As news of the loss of
there w as a mixture of

On one hand, as Dahlgren noted,

excitement."

there was "Great

At the same time "people [were] almost stunned

by the news."21
President Lincoln mo ve d quickly after the fall of Fort
Sumter.

After m eeting with his Cabinet on Sunday, April

14,

he issued a Proclamation calling for 75,000 militia, whose
"service,"

the President declared,

"will probably be to

re-possess the forts, places, and property which have been
seized from the Union."
session of Congress,

Lincoln also an nounced a special

to convene on the most patriotic of

American holidays, July 4.

Telegrams from Northern

pol it ic ia ns and citizens poured into the capital
support for the proclamation.

announcing

Offers of troops far

outstripped both the President's request and the
government's ability to outfit them.22
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While public reaction in the North exhibited widespread
support for Lincoln's actions, public feeling in the South,
in marke d contrast, w a s almost universally against the
President's request for troops.
President's proclamation,

Two days after the

the Virginia legislature responded

by passing an ordinance of secession, reversing an earlier
vote against secession; and other Southern slave states
which had not yet seceded took actions which made
likely that they w o u l d quickly follow suit.
the Virginia militia seized the federal
Ferry made so famous by John Brown
earlier,

it seem

In addition,

arsenal

at Harper's

little more than a year

and seemed pois ed to do the same with the navy's

Gosport Navy Y a r d in Norfolk,
Important base.

the navy's largest and most

To prevent this, on April

19, W e ll es sent

all of the available ships and troops In Washington to
N o r f o l k .23
Up to this point Commander Dahlgren had primarily been
an observer; but Just as the uncertainty surrounding the
fate of the Norfolk expedition reached a climax, he suddenly
found himself called into action.

On the mor ni ng of April

22, Dahlgren was as usual busy doing his ordnance work
his office located at the Washington Navy Yard.
one of Secretary W el l es ' s sons rushed in.
of breath and exhibiting a great deal
W ell es told Dahlgren,
Yard,"

in

Suddenly,

Undoubtedly out

of excitement,

"there was something going on

and he had orders for him from his father.

young
in the

"You will
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assume temporary command of the Washington Navy Yard,"
orders read?

furthermore,

the

"Discharge all suspected persons

upon satisfactory evidence of their disloyalty to the
Government,

and place the yard in the best possible state of

defence Esic] . 1,24
Dahlgren did not have to wait
"going on."

Shortly afterward,

Captain Franklin Buchanan,

the commandant of the yard,

sent for him.

the navy's most respected officers,
as the United States Naval

long to find out what was

Buchanan, one of

as bespoke his selection

Academy's first superintendent,

w a s a Marylander by birth and an ardent supporter of states
rights.

He believed Maryland w o u l d follow Virginia's lead

and also secede and being u nw illi ng to take up arms against
his native state, Buchanan had agonizingly decided to resign
the commission that he had held ever since the last days of
the War of 1812.

Dahlgren, by virtue of being the highest

ranking officer assigned to the yard after Buchanan received
c ommand of the p o s t . 2 5
By this time, Washington had been

Isolated.

The city

w a s in a state of panic as rumors flew all around that the
capital w ou l d be attacked at any moment.

Despite the

numerous promises from Northern governors that troops were
on the way, none had yet arrived and President Lincoln
agonized aloud,

"Why don't they come?

Why don't they come?"

Almost as quickly as the panic arose, however,

it ended.

The day after Dahlgren took command, elements of the
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expedition to Norfolk began returning.
to save the Gosport Yard,

Although they failed

the 700 marines and 400 sailors

made a welcome addition to Washington's defenses.
25,

On April

the Seventh New York Regiment finally arrived in

Washington via Annapolis, Maryland;

they were followed two

days later by the Seventy-First New York Regiment.
nightfall

of April

27, about

By

10,000 troops in all had

arrived and more were arriving every day.26
Dahlgren had never exhibited any bashful ness about
u si ng political

influence to promote his own career and he

w as not about to start now.

Even though he had only met

President Lincoln on a few occasions— first at Nannie
Buchanan's w edding on April 3, and briefly again each of the
next two days while trying to make sense of Andrew Foote's
request for howitzers— on Sunday, April

28, Dahlgren

traveled the two miles or so from the Washington Navy Yard
up to the White House and boldly asked to see the President.
If his past

lobbying efforts provide any clues to his

behavior, Dahlgren was undoubtedly prepared with a
w ell-orchestrated presentation.
either in its strategic
really

Despite few similarities

Importance or the danger it was

in, Dahlgren probably compared the Washington Navy

Y a r d and his actions to "save it" with the events at the
Gosport Navy Yard.

Dahlgren told the President that because

of his actions since April 22 he was entitled to both
Franklin Buchanan's post and to his commission.27
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It is not certain how the President

initially felt

about Dahlgren's bold request because the only account of
the meeting comes from Dahlgren's personal papers.
According to Dahlgren,

the President

"c la i ms . ..very favorably."
words,

But

"received" his

if actions speak louder than

the President may not have been nearly as favorable

as Dahlgren suggested, because neither of his requests were
honored, at least not then.
done very much.

In reality Dahlgren had not

Although he h ad remained loyal while many

other officers were resigning their commissions,
war ra nt ed a promotion.

this hardly

Moreover, the Washington Navy Yard

h ad never been physically threatened— in contrast, at the
Gosport Navy Y a r d a body of the Virginia militia was
actually present outside the yard and at one point General
William B. Taliaferro, who commanded the Virginia troops,
demanded the yard's surrender— and all Dahlgren did wa s to
take command after Buchanan resigned.28
Even though he was only the temporary commander of the
yard, Dahlgren performed his work with

industry and vigor;

a nd the job was an Important one in the early days of the
war.

With the secession of all of the coastal

Virginia south,
securely

states from

the yard was the southernmost navy base

in federal hands, and it wa s quickly transformed

from a relatively quiet and unimportant
to a center of the Union war effort.

installation that

In the first days

after the fall of Fort Sumter, when many people in the
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capital believed Washington w ou ld be overrun at any moment,
the War Department seized four private steamers which plied
the local waters and sent them to the navy yard where
Dahlgren outfitted them with ordnance and crews.

These

vessels, along with the few navy vessels In home waters at
the outbreak of the war, were designated as the Potomac
Flotilla, whose assignment was to prevent any movement of
enemy troops from the Virginia side of the Potomac and to
make sure that navigation of that river remained open.
While he did not command the Potomac Flotilla himself, as
commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, Dahlgren's job was
to make sure that the vessels were supplied and equipped
with whatever they required.

Furthermore,

to better

facilitate communications between the Navy Department and
the Potomac Flotilla, as well

as with blockading vessels

along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,

a telegraph

line was

established linking the Navy Department and the Washington
Navy Yard.

In this way, Dahlgren's office became the

central

communications center between Washington and vessels

at sea.

Besides these tasks, Dahlgren remained In charge of

the ordnance production facilities at the yard.

With the

outbreak of war the demands for guns and ammunition rapidly
exhausted reserves, especially with the loss of so many navy
bases and federal

arsenals located throughout the South.

Dahlgren quickly put the yard's ordnance factory on a
wartime production schedule, with work beginning early every
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mo rning and carrying on well
Included.

Into the night, Sundays

This last decision of Dahlgren's led someone to

complain to President Lincoln,

to which Dahlgren could only

respond:

[1 31 has been my wish to have no work executed on
Sunday that could be a v o i d e d , ...[with the work
b ei ng done] chiefly embracing the manufacture of
cannon and the repairs of Vessels of the [Potomac]
Flotilla, or the equipment of others fitting for
sea....I am sure no man can regret more than
myself that a necessity exists for putting the
sabbath to other uses than those for which it is
designed.29

All was not work for Dahlgren during those first few
w eeks he commanded the Washington Navy Yard, however.
May 9,

Lincoln again visited the Navy Yard,

On

this time at

the invitation of the commander of the Seventy-First New
York Regiment, whose troops were temporarily being housed
there,
honor.

to a hear a concert performed in the President's
While Dahlgren may not have

he certainly knew how

invited the President,

to take advantage

After the concert he took the

President

of his presence.
and his entourage

aboard the U.S.S. Pensacola so that they could w itness the
firing of one of his Xl-inch guns.
one of Lincoln's secretaries,
pleasant'"

According to John Hay,

the display was "'novel

and

and the "'Prest. was delighted.'"30

A few days later
short voyage down the
and his powerful

Lincoln w as back,

this time to take a

Potomac with Secretary of State Seward

ally from New York, Thurlow Weed.

The
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cruise w as probably Intended to assuage Seward a nd Weed,
both of whom felt that the President had been
powerful New York State party boss.

Ignoring the

Less than a week later

Lincoln and Seward were back again, now to Inspect the
ordnance facilities at the yard.31
Through the late spring a nd early summer,
reason or another,

for one

the President's visits to the yard became

more and more frequent.

The Washington Navy Yar d became a

refuge for the President, a place for him to escape the
pressures of the presidency and the constant work that
confronted him at the White House.

He seemed to enjoy

nothing better than making short excursions up and down the
Potomac River.

While almost all of the President's early

visits to the navy yard had something to do other than
specifically to see Dahlgren,
change.

after a time this began to

As historian Robert Bruce argued persuasively,

Lincoln, who has generally been characterized as the
r a l 1-splitting pioneer,

In temperament also had much

In

common with the "englneerCsD or scientistCsD" who were
bringing mid-nineteenth-century America Into the "Machine
Age."

From early in his life he exhibited a fascination

with the technical and mechanical

advancements of the day.

With the outbreak of the Civil War this translated into a
deep personal

Interest in weapons.

Dahlgren represented the

very embodiment of the spirit which so characterized the
Lincoln that Bruce described; and thus in Dahlgren,
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according to Bruce,
the tools of
But

w a r

"Lincoln had found his chief advisor on

,"32

if the President had found something in Dahlgren,

the reverse was also true.

Dahlgren continued to ho ld the

temporary command of the Washington Navy Ya r d through the
early summer.

Officially, however, Dahlgren w a s not

eligible for the position because by law it required the
rank of captain, Just
Hydrography.

like the Bureau of Ordnance and

Sometime that summer a number of captains who

apparently w an te d the position for themselves p oi nt e d this
out.

By the time this occurred,

the President had

befriended Dahlgren, and when Lincoln

learned of the other

offic er s/s desires, he reportedly stated,
not be taken from [Dahlgren]
would,

"The Y a r d shall

... he held it when no one else

and now he shall keep it as long as he p le as es ." 33

While the President may have want ed Dahlgren to keep
the post, the legality of this still

remained.

To solve

this, on July 26, Charles B. Sedgewlck who c haired the House
of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee, and w h o w as
known for his cooperation with the Navy Department,
Introduced a bill

to amend the law which stipulated that the

Washington Navy Yard could only be commanded by captains.
With the chairman's support and influence the bill

sailed

through the House.3,4
It was a different story

in the Senate.

introduced to the Senate on July 30.

But when

The bill was
it was
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forwarded to Naval Affairs Committee,
with the understanding that

it wo ul d not be considered until

the next regular Congressional
In December.

the bill was shelved

session, scheduled to begin

This created a flurry of behind the scenes

activity that became obvious the next day.
r econvened the following morning,

When the Senate

two senators arose

simultaneously to ask that the bill be reconsidered for open
debate before the full Senate.

Although he was the second

one to propose the motion, Senator James Dixon of
Connecticut,

Secretary of the Navy W e l l e s /s home state and

an ally of Welles and the Navy Department, he was the first
senator to explain his reasons for wan ti ng debate reopened.
Rec al li ng the events surrounding Dahlgren's temporary
appointment to the position, Dixon made an emotional
for reconsideration of the measure,

appeal

saying to do otherwise

would In effect be a censure of Commander Dahlgren, w ho "was
almost the only officer who remained faithful
The Senate agreed to reconsider the bill.
were

immediately Introduced.

to his duty."

Two amendments

The first, offered by Senator

John Sherman of Ohio, proposed that the command of all
yards be opened to commanders as well

as captains.

navy

Senator

James Grimes of Iowa, another staunch supporter of the Navy
Department,

followed with his own amendment, proposing that

the measure to open command of navy yards to commanders also
be extende d to Include commands of navy bureaus, such as the
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography.

This proposal,
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according to Grimes, resulted from his be in g "approached by
those who were very

intimately connected with the Navy, and

who have expressed the opinion that the public

interests

w o u ld be more promoted by having commander Dahlgren at the
head of the Bureau of Ordnance than in any other position
the Government."

in

Suddenly at debate was the very position

that Dahlgren had coveted ever since Commodore Morris's
death
place.

In 1856.

But not everyone agreed with what w as taking

After Grimes had proposed his amendment,

Senator

John Hale of New Hampshire, w ho chaired the Senate Committee
on Naval Affairs, addressed the Senate.

Hale,

a longtime

member of Congress, had achieved notoriety for himself with
his early opposition to the spread of slavery

into the

Mexican Cession, which won him the nomination of the Liberty
Party as a presidential

candidate

in 1848.

During the Civil

War, however, he wo ul d constantly oppose Welles.

Hale had

been the first person to propose that the original bill be
reconsidered.

That morning, he now startlngly revealed to

the Senate, he h ad a visit from none other than Commander
Dahlgren, w h o w a nt ed to talk to him about the shelved bill.
That visit w a s why he proposed that the bill be
reconsidered; but unlike Dixon it w as not to pass it, but to
defeat

it.

In an obvious attempt to make the bill so

outrageous that

it w o ul d be rejected, he asked, why not open

the yards and bureaus to lieutenants?
the measure defeated?

But why did Hale want

Ever since he had been a member of
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the Senate, Hale explained,

"the Navy Department have had a

set of pets,,,.who, some by law and some without
against

law and

law, have been paid extravagant salaries, altogether

beyond what belonged to them by the rule which their
fel low-off leers were paid, and Commander Dahlgren has been
among the men w ho have been paid these extravagant sums."
Hale acknowledged that Dahlgren had never received any extra
pay without the sanction of the law behind It, but that did
not mean that he believed that Dahlgren came by his extra
pay

Innocently.

Hale recalled another and long forgotten

debate in Congress that occurred In 1851, when then
Lieutenant Dahlgren successfully
of a commander at sea.

lobbied to receive the pay

Hale had argued against that as

well; but, he remembered,

"While I w a s endeavoring to

Impress my views on the Senate In open session by as fair
considerations as 1 could suggest,

lobby agents came and

looked In my eyes and winked, and took out Senators and
lobbied them, and got them to vote for the proposition which
I was endeavoring to combat
seen; and I have seen
Dahlgren."

in the Senate.

That I have

It In the case of this very Mr.

He had witnessed enough of this type of

behavior, especially

in Dahlgren's own case, Hale argued,

"tilt Is," he concluded,

"time to stop this special

legislation for Commander Dahlgren."

And If the Senate was

concerned about rewarding Dahlgren, Hale assured his
colleagues,

that was "fully met

long ago,

in the fact that
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you have paid him what you have never paid anyone else — not
the highest sea-servlce pay of the grade to which he
belongs, but the highest

... of the grade next above h i m . "35

Hale did not find much support for his proposal.

Other

s enators gave emotional appeals on Dahlgren's behalf.

The

most notable one was made by Senator Henry M. Rice, who had
authored the bill
told the Senate,
leaving,

for Dahlgren's pay raise In 1860.

Rice

that as officers all around him were

"Commander Dahlgren stood by his flag.

Mutiny was

Inaugurated there [at the Washington Navy Yard], and he met
it manfully; and for eight or ten days and nights that man
never took off his clothes.

He labored incessantly."

Rice

co nc lu de d his appeal by giving overblown significance to
Dahlgren's actions:

"if to any one man more than another we

owe the safety of the city of Washington,

it is to Commander

Dahl g r e n ."36
Hale seriously miscalculated if he thought he could
stop the move to reward Dahlgren.
bill

Where the day before a

simply asking to make Dahlgren eligible to keep command

of the Washington Navy Yard was quickly removed from
consideration,

the following day the bill was reintroduced

a nd passe d with the proviso that Dahlgren also be mad e
eligible for the command as a bureau chief.
the Senate amendment,
again

The bill, with

then went back to the House where

it did not face any opposition, being approved on
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August 1.

The next day, President Lincoln signed the bill

Into l a w . 3 7
Despite Senator Hale's strong feelings against the
effort to reward Dahlgren, once the President signed the
bill

it would be hard to argue that

It did not make perfect

sense to appoint Dahlgren to the position of the Chief of
the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography.

On August 3,

Secretary Welles telegraphed Dahlgren in his office at the
yard and asked him to "Report to the Department
early as convenient"

to do Just that.

declined the secretary's offer.
Welles's immediate response,
he was dumbfounded.

in person as

Remarkably,

Dahlgren

While there Is no record of

it would not be surprising if

Furthermore,

it w o ul d not be at all

surprising to find that Welles was more than a little bit
angry because he had obviously played a large part

in having

the bill reintroduced and amended so that he could appoint
Dahlgren to he ad the ordnance bureau.

But Welles,

if he had

lost his composure, obviously regained it and he asked
Dahlgren to "consider further 8. answer

in the morning."

Dahlgren agreed to reconsider.38
On the face of it, Dahlgren's decision seemed to defy
all

logic.

First of all,

the appointment w as a prestigious

one and w ould have provi ded a ringing endorsement for his
past ordnance work, which had not engendered the complete
approval

of his colleagues.

Furthermore,

and maybe even

important, as head of the Bureau of Ordnance and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

Hydrography, Dahlgren no longer w ou l d have been subject to
interference from above a nd w ou ld have h a d a more or less
free rein to determine the direction of American naval
ordnance

in the future.

But

it must be remembered that

Dahlgren always did what w as in his greatest self

interest,

and this was certainly the case now.
What explains Dahlgren's answer?
declining the bureau,

First of all, by

Dahlgren did not stand to lose any

influence at all reg ar din g ordnance matters.
April

Since

late

the bureau had been run by Captain Andrew Harwood, who

h ad been appointed to fill

the vacancy temporarily.

Harwood

w a s not only a good friend of Dahlgren's, he was also not an
ordnance specialist.
appointment,

Consequently,

since Harwood's

Dahlgren had already enjoyed ultimate authority

in the ordnance department.

With Dahlgren's refusal, Welles

w ou l d more than likely simply keep Harwood in place,
insuring Dahlgren's c on tinued dominance of the ordnance
d e p a r t m e n t .39
There were other factors which contributed to
Dahlgren's decision.

If he turned down the ordnance post,

he w o ul d not walk away empty-handed because the Washington
Navy Y a r d still needed a permanent commandant.
certainly

less prestigious,

While

command of the yard h ad benefits

which more than comp en sa te d for any loss in status.

The

position at the yar d gave Dahlgren unparalleled prominence.
As has already been described,

the Washington Navy Yard
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quickly became one of President Lincoln's favorite places
and the President made

It a regular routine to take

excursions upon the local waters.

As command er -1n - c h 1e f ,

many of Lincoln's trips can be characterized as official
military voyages as he personally w ant ed to see the extent
to which Confederate batteries along the Virginia side of
the Potomac affected navigation.

Besides these more or less

official military reconnaissances,

the President more

frequently used the navy yard and its vessels to entertain
and Impress cabinet members,
dlgnataries, and friends.

important politicians, visiting

Dahlgren usually went on these

trips and he was often the center of attention because a
cruise almost always included a demonstration of the famous
Dahlgren guns,

fired by the famous Inventor himself.

Underscoring what Dahlgren s to od to lose If he accepted the
ordnance bureau, while he w a s still

considering the offer,

Secretary of State Seward brought Prince Joseph Charles Paul
Napoleon to the yard for a tour.

If he accepted the bureau

Dahlgren would have surely m i ss e d out on this type of public
exposure.40
Dahlgren had another reason for turning down the
ordnance bureau, and this m ay have been the most
one.

Since he had been

important

in c ommand of the Washington Navy

Ya r d he had been Involved In prosecuting the war.
his role in "saving Washington"

Besides

and his serving as

intermediary between the Navy Department and the Potomac
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Flotilla, which at least gave Dahlgren the opportunity to
propose operations along the Potomac,

Dahlgren had also been

Involved In the army's first move Into Virginia.

After

Washington proper was secured with the arrival of troops in
late April, one of the first things that Northern military
leaders want ed to do w as to move troops south across the
Potomac River

in order to protect the capital

from being

bombarded by artillery fire and to keep the Potomac River
clear.

But because Virginia's secession ordinance did not

become official

until

May 23, when

its citizens voted to

approve the legislature's action, no troops were m ove d
across the river before then.
officially seceded federal

As soon as Virginia

troops were ready to move, which

they did on the night of May 23.

Dahlgren personally

led

the small flotilla that transported the First N ew York
Zouave Regiment sent to occupy Alexandria, Virginia.

This

operation w o ul d have created little notice except for the
death of Colonel

Elmer Ellsworth, a former student

Lincoln's Illinois law office.

Dahlgren, by virtue of

hav in g remained off of Alexandria,
body back to the Navy Yard.

in

transported the colonel's

His report of the death of

Ellsworth, who he said was "deliberately murdered by one of
the inhabitants"

after taking down a Confederate flag which

was flying over one of the town's buildings, was probably
the first one to reach President Lincoln, who reportedly
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broke down

into tears when he learned of Ellsworth's

d e a t h .41
That w as not the only time that the motley assortment
of vessels that Dahlgren had at his disposal were utilized
that summer.
of General

In early July, Dahlgren helped to ferry some

Irvin McDowell's troops across the Potomac River

as the main and ill-prepared armies of the North and South
p re p ar e d to meet

in the first major battle of the Civil War.

Like everyone else,

Dahlgren awaited wo r d of the outcome,

and in his Journal he wrote expectantly,

"And thus the North

and South are at last face to face,— with all

the armed

strength each has been able to collect to this time....What
is the question to be decided!"

W ri ti ng those words on the

m o r n i ng of July 21, Dahlgren's question was quickly
answered.

At about 7 p.m.

that evening,

Dahlgren received

an emergency telegram asking him to send any vessels he had
to Alexandria in order to help stop a possible advance of
the Confederate army, which seemed all

too likely in light

of the rout of the Union forces earlier that day in the
Battle of Bull Run, or, as Southerners called it, the Battle
of Manassas.

Fortunately for the North and Washington,

victory disorganized the Confederate army as much as defeat
disorganized the Union army; and the only warship that
Dahlgren had his disposal,

the obsolete bri g Perrv which he

h ad towed to Alexandria, was not ne ed ed .42
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As minor and Indirect as his participation may have
been
still

in all of these military operations,

they undoubtedly

gave Dahlgren the feeling that he was playing an

active role in the war; and this, he had to have realized,
would have completely disappeared if he accepted the post to
head the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography.
surprisingly then,

Not

Dahlgren "Went to the Secretary," he

noted in his Journal,

"and declined fully the B ureau,— he

had given me Cto] the last minute, as the Senate had but one
and Ca] half houris]

to s i t . "43
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There is very little known about Charles Dahlgren.
In his own memoirs, John Dahlgren never discussed Charles.
Like his brother, however, Charles Dahlgren tried to make a
career in the military, but he gave this up by the
mid-1830s.
John Quitman's intervention on John Dahlgren's
behalf in 1839 (see Chapter I), indicates that Charles was
in Mississippi by the late 1830s.
Based on average crop
yields and labor requirements for cotton cultivation, his
cotton harvest for 1860 suggests that he w o u l d have had at
least 75 to 100 field hands, who at this time were valued at
approximately $1,800 each.
In order to produce 1,000 bales
of cotton he w o ul d have needed at least 750 to 1,000 acres
in active production, and this would have only represented a
portion of his land holdings.
The cash value of his harvest
for 1860 was $75,000 based on the going rate of cotton of 15
cents a pound in 1860.
These figures place Charles Dahlgren
among the elite of Southern slaveholders.
See, Clement
77
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Eaton, The -gr.c»w.th-Qf Southern .
C ivilization (New York, 1961),
pp. 25-49.
Charles Dahlgren enjoyed sufficient prominence
and influence that he w as made a general in the Confederate
Army at the beginning of the Civil War.
He served in the
Mississippi Valley through late 1863, when he resigned,
because, in true Dahlgren family fashion, he took offense
when someone was placed in command above him.
The little
that is known about Charles Dahlgren is gleaned from passing
references in the Dahlgren family pre-Civil War
correspondence, John Dahlgren's Journals, and a few
references in the The War of the Rebel 1 ion;, A. C o m P l 1at ion of
the. Qffic-ial Recoc.ds_.Qf _the Union and Confederate Armies 128
vols. (Washington D.C., 1880-1901), hereafter cited as O R :
see, Charles Dahlgren to Jefferson Davis, December 3, 1863,
QR, I, 52, p t . 2, pp. 568-69; Charles Dahlgren to Joseph E.
Johnston, December, 1863, Ibid., pp. 569-70.
6 John Dahlgren to Ulric Dahlgren, November 26, 1860,
JADLC; John Dahlgren to Ulrlc Dahlgren, December 24, 1860,
Ibid.
^Buchanan to Dahlgren, January 8, 1861, Ibid.; for the
situation in Washington, see, Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham
Lincoln: _A Biography (New York, 1952), p. 236; Margaret
Leech, Reveille in Washington. 1860-1865 (New York, 1941),
PP. 22-23.
8 Dahlgren to Paul, January 9, 1861, JADLC; in another
letter, Dahlgren wrote, "I am hoarding the little I have in
order to keep afloat as long as I can."
See, John Dahlgren
to Ulric Dahlgren, December 24, 1860, Ibid.
9David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1 8 48-1 86 1.
co mpleted and ed. Don E. Fe hr en ba ch er , (New York, 1976), p.
547.
10Dahlgren, February 11, March 4, 1861, Journal
Entries, Vol. 7, JADSU.
11Badger to Dahlgren, March 13, 1861, JADLC; Dahlgren
to Badger, March 14, 1861, JADLC, underline in the original.
1 2Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Mary Dahlgren, February 5,
1845, J A D N H F C .
18Eugene H. Berwanger, "Introduction," Mv Diarv North
and S o u t h , by William Howard Russell (New York, 1988), pp.
3-4; Dahlgren, March 31, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU.
14Russell, Mv Diarv North and S o u t h , pp. 3-4, 54-55;
Dahlgren, January 30, 1863, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU;
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Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Indianapolis,
1956, reprint edition, Chicago, 1989), pp. 7-8.
15Dahlgren, April 2, 1861, Journal
JADSU.

Entry, Vol. 7,

16Dah)gren, April 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7,
Ibid.; for Russell's comments about Buchanan, see, Russell,
Mv Diarv North and S o u t h , p. 53; for Lincoln's attendance of
Nannie Buchanan's wedding, see, Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools
of W a r , p. 9; see also, Todorich, "Franklin Buchanan," in,
ed. Bradford, Captains of the Old Steam N a v v . p. 102.
17For Dahlgren's first mee ti ng with Lincoln, see,
Dahlgren, April 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU; for
the events of April 4, see, Foote to Dahlgren, Telegram,
April 4, 1861, JADLC;
Dahlgren, April 4, 1861, Vol. 7,
Journal Entry, JADSU; Lincoln, quoted in Ibid.; for
background on Foote, see, John D. Milligan, "Andrew Foote:
Zealous Reformer, Administrator, Warrior," ed. Bradford,
Captains of the Old S te am ■N a vv , p. 124.
18Dahlgren, April 5, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7,
JADSU; the standard sources for the Lincoln administration
during the secession crisis are, Kenneth M. Stampp, And the
War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis. 1860-1861
(Chicago, 1964); David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in
the Secession Crisis (New Haven, 1962); Richard N. Current,
Lincoln and the First Shot (Philadelphia, 1963); for more
detailed accounts of the activities of Secretary of State
Seward and the consequences of his actions, see, John Niven,
Sldeon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navv (New York,
1973), pp. 324-39;
Ludwell H. Johnson, III, "Fort Sumter
and Confederate Diplomacy," Journal of Southern History 27
(1960): 441-77; Ludwell H. Johnson, III, "'The Few Brave and
Hungry Men': Another Look at the Fort Sumter Crisis," The
South Atlantic Quarterly 84:1 (Winter 1985): 81-88.
19Lincoln to Chew, April 6, 1861, in Roy P. Basler,
ed., The _Col lec-ted Works, of Abraham Lincoln 9 vols. (New
Brunswick, NJ, 1953), IV: 323-24, hereafter cited as
Collected W o r k s .
20Dahlgren, April
JADSU.
21Dahlgren, April

12, 1861, Journal
13-14,

Entry, Vol. 7,

1861, Journal

Entries,

Ibid.
22Lincoln, "Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening
Congress," April 15, 1861, Col 1ected W o r k s . IV, pp. 331-32;
Thomas, Abraham L i n c o l n , pp. 257-59.
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2 3 Ib id .; John Niven, Gideon Welles; Lincoln's Secretary
of the Navv (New York, 1973), pp. 339-45; Ri chard S. West,
Jr., Mr. Lincoi n's Navv (New York, 1957), pp. 30-43.
2 4 Dahlgren, May 3 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU;
Welles to Dahlgren, April 22, 1861, JADLC.
2 5Buchanan had obviously been contemplating resigning
for some time.
On February 26, he asked Secretary of the
Navy Toucey whether or not Dahlgren should be considered
attached to the yard in the event of Buchanan b ei n g absent.
In his endorsement, Toucey told Buchanan that Dahlgren was
considered attached to the yard; thus when Buchanan
resigned, he hande d over the yard to Dahlgren, see, Buchanan
to Toucey, February 26, 1861, National Archives, Washington
D. C., Record Group 45, Entry 34, Letters From Commandant
Washington Navy Yard, hereafter cited as NARG4 5— Entry 34,
Buchanan to Dahlgren, April 22, 1861, National Archives,
Washington D.C., Record Group 45, Entry 354, W ashington Navy
Yard Order Book, hereafter cited as NARG 45— Entry 354;
Dahlgren, May 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU; in an
ironic twist, Maryland did not secede and in early May,
Buchanan tried to with dr aw his resignation.
Secretary of
the Navy Welles refused and Buchanan eventually Joined the
Confederate States navy, where he won fame as the commanding
officer of the C.S.S. V iroi n ia . better known as the
M e r r l m a c . and after this vessel was scuttled, in command of
the C.S.S. Tennessee used in the defense of Mobile Bay.
See, Charles M. Todorlch, "Franklin Buchanan: Symbol For Two
Navies," ed. Bradford, Captains of the Old Steam N a v v , pp.
102-03.
2 6 Lincoln quoted in, Thomas, Abraham L i n c o l n , pp.
262-63; Dahlgren, May 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol 7, JADSU;
for the situation in Washington from Lincoln's election in
the fall of 1860, through the end of the war, see, Leech,
R.e.v_e_i 1_1e._in Wash 1ngton . 186 0- 18 65 ; Peck, Round-Shot to
Rockets: A History of the Washington Navv Y a r d .
2^Dahlgren, May 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU;
Dahlgren, "Memoranda from letters 8. c." April 28, 1861,
filed in Box 26, JADLC.
28D a h 1gren apparently also pressed his claims with
Secretary of the Navy Welles, see, Dahlgren, May 3, 1861,
Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU; West, Mr. Lincoln's N a v v . pp.
40-41.
2 ^For the history of the Washington Navy Ya r d during
the Civil War, see, Peck, Round-Shot to Rockets: A History
of the Washington Navv Y a r d , pp. 111-57; r eg arding the
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telegraph line between the Navy Department and the yard,
see, Dahlgren, May 3, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU;
for Dahlgren's response to the criticism of working on
Sundays, see, Dahlgren to Welles, October 9, 1861,
N A R G 4 5 — Entry 354; to follow Dahlgren's dally activities at
the Washington Navy Yard, see, N A RG 45 — Entry 34, Letters
Fro m Commandant, Washington Navy Yard; as well as,
N A R G 4 5 — Entry 354; Dahlgren's relationship to the Potomac
F lotilla has been misinterpreted by historians.
One
historian wrote, "Until 1863 the Potomac rested largely on
the ships under his command."
See, Schneller, "The
Contentious Innovator," p. 269.
Dahlgren never commanded
the squadron and his primary Involvement with it w as to
supply the vessels and to transmit messages between the Navy
Department and the commanders of the various vessels.
The
first commander of the Potomac Flotilla w as Commander James
H. Ward, w ho was killed on June 26, 1861, while conducting
operations along the Potomac.
W a r d w as temporarily replaced
by Lieutenant Foxhall Parker until Commander Thomas Craven
w a s appointed.
The early operations of the Potomac Flotilla
can be followed in Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Navies in the War of the R e b e l l i o n . 31 vols.
(Washington D.C., 1894-1922), hereafter cited as O R N . all
refere nce s to Series I, see O R N . 4.
30Dahlgren, May 9, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU;
Earl Schenck Miers, e d . , Lincoln Dav bv Day: A Chronology.
1809-1865 3 vols. (Washington, 1960), III, p. 41; Bruce,
Lincoln and the Tools of W a r , pp. 17-19; Hay, quoted in
I b i d . , p. 18.
31 Dahlgren, May 12, 18 1861, Journal Entries, Vol. 7,
JADSU; Miers, e d . , Lincoln Dav bv D a v . Ill, pp. 41-2;
Lincoln to Seward, April 18, 1861, Collected W o r k s . IV, p.
337.
3 2Dah lgren, May 24, June 9, 1861, Journal Entries, Vol.
7, JADSU; Miers, e d . , Lincoln Dav bv D a v . Ill, pp. 43-50;
Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of W a r , pp. 3-21.
Bruce
follows Dahlgren's and Lincoln's relationship from the
presidential inauguration onward.
Bruce contends that from
the very first me et in g of the two men at Nannie Buchanan's
w e d d i n g on April 3, 1861, the President 11took an immediate
fancy" to Dahlgren.
I disagree with Bruce about the nature
of the relationship of Dahlgren and Lincoln, at least at its
very outset, which can be discerned from my description of
their first mee ti ng earlier in this chapter.
While the two
men did Indeed develop a very close friendship, there is no
evidence to support Bruce's assertion of Lincoln's feelings
for Dahlgren until the latter conclusively demonstrated his
loyalty to the Union.
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33 L incoln, quoted in, Dahlgren, August 4, 1861, Journal
Entry, Vol. 7, JADSU.
3^U.S., Congress, House, H. R. No. 78, An act
supplemental to the act entltledC.3 "An act providing for a
naval peace establishment, and for other purposes." Charles
B. Sedgwick, July 26, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st S e s s . ,
Congress ion a i_ G lobe. Vol. 31, p. 279; Albion, Makers of
Naval P o l i c y , p. 150.
38Senate debate, July 30, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess.,
The Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 31, p. 332; the debate in the
Senate can be followed in, July 31, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st
Sess., The Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 31, pp. 358-61; for
Grimes's relationship with the Navy Department, see, Niven,
Gideon W e i l e s . p. 376; for Dahlgren's lobbying efforts for
personal pay raises, see, Chapter I of this dissertation.
36Senate debate, July 31, 1861, 37th Cong.,
The Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 31, pp. 358-61

1st Sess.,

37August 1, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., The
Congressional G l o b e . Vol 31, pp. 383; August 5, 1861, 37th
Cong., 1st Sess., The Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 31, p. 438.
38Welles to Dahlgren, August 3, 1861, Telegram, JADLC;
Dahlgren, Journal Entry, August 5, 1861, Vol. 7, JADSU.
39N i v e n , Gideon W e i l e s . p. 346; West, Mr. Lincoln's
N a v v . p. 49; Bruce, Lincoln .and the Tools of W a r , pp. 16,
19-20.
■^Dahlgren was not very Impressed with Prince Napoleon,
who was the nephew of, as Dahlgren described him, "the
Napoleon." Dahlgren, August 5, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7,
JADSU, underline in the original; between the time that
Dahlgren took temporary command of the yard and when he
turned down the Bureau of Ordnance, President Lincoln, with
numerous guests in tow, visited the Washington Navy Yar d no
less than fifteen times on the following days, May 9, 12,
18, 21, 24, 30, June 2, 11, 14, 19, 30, July 7, 14, 21, 24,
1861, see, Miers, e d . , Lincoln Day bv D a v . Ill, pp. 41-56.
41Dahlgren's role in the operation is detailed in,
Peck, Round-Shot to R o c k e t s , pp. 123-24; see also, Leech,
Reveille in W a s h i n g t o n , pp. 80-82; Thomas, Abraham L i n co l n,
pp. 269-70; Secretary of the Navy Welle s said that Dahlgren
did his job well, see, Welles to Edgar Welles, May 26, 1861,
Reel 19, Cont. 19, Welles Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington D. C., hereafter cited as WellesLC; for
Dahlgren's own view, see, Dahlgren, May 24-25, 1861, Journal
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Entries, Vol. 7, JADSU; Dahlgren to Navy Department, 9:15,
[May 24, 18613, Telegram, NARG45— Entry 34; Dahlgren quote
In, Dahlgren to Welles, May 24, 1861, N AR G4 5— Entry 34;
Ellsworth's death w a s the cause of one of Lincoln's first
visits to the Navy Yard.
As soon as he learned that
Ellsworth had been brought to the navy yard, Lincoln, along
with his wife Mary Todd Lincoln, immediately drove to the
yard.
Ellsworth's body had not yet been prepared for
viewing, and Dahlgren rode in the President's carriage and
gave his view of what had occurred.
42D a h 1gren, July 21, 1861, Journal
JADSU.

Entry, Vol. 7,

43Dah Igren quote in, Dahlgren, August 6, 1861, Journal
Entry, Ibid.; the position of bureau chief w as a
presidential appointment and thus required Senate approval.
By turning down the ordnance bureau Dahlgren w a s made
permanent commandant of the Washington Navy Yard; Andrew
Harwood was retained as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
and H yd ro g ra p hy .
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Chapter III
Stuck

in Washington

"it was perhaps my

last chance for a flag"

At first, Dahlgren's routine at the Washington Navy
Y a r d did not change after he w a s named the permanent
commandant.

The yard remained as busy as before.

for cannon and ammunition con ti nu ed unabated,
ordnance factory wo rking at full bore.
aftermath of the Battle of Bull

Requests

keeping the

And in the immediate

Run, concern about keeping

the Potomac River open also remain ed of the utmost
importance,

and therefore D ahlgren's responsibility to keep

the Potomac Flotilla we 11- s u p p 1ied and equipped demanded
constant attention.

"I am occupie d incessantly," he noted,

"but am none the worse for

it."

Thi s changed quickly,

h o w e v e r .1
While the first major battle of the Civil War did not
end the conflict between the North and South, as most people
either hoped or expected,

it did have dramatic

impact.

Within four days of the battle. President Lincoln signed two
bills authorizing the r ecruiting and enlisting of a total
1,000,000 three-year volunteers.
s ummo ne d General

The President also

George Brinton McClellan to Washington to
84
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train and lead these new t r o o p s . 2
McClellan, who in his own exaggerated words had
"annihilated two armies"

in western Virginia, was an ideal

person for what was needed;
troops already

first,

to rally the demoralized

in Washington; and second,

to organize the

thousands of men who were flooding Northern recruiting
offices in response to the President's call.

He quickly

demonst ra te d his abilities as a superb organizer and
administrator,

and wlth dramatic flair McClellan took

Washington by storm.

Rather than

living with his army in

the field, McClellan took up residence

in Washington.

became a common sight around the capital

It

to see the general

da sh in g around to and fro in a seemingly m a d frenzy, with
his staff following behind in a struggle to keep up with the
young and energetic army commander.
arrival

Within days of his

in Washington, William Howard Russell who had

disparaged the rag-tag army that General
battle,

McDowell

led into

remarked that there had been much "improvement

the look of the men."
that McDowell

in

McClellan w a s also promised something

had not received,

time; and he used this time

to begin organizing the tens of thousands of troops arriving
m onthly

into a well-trained and w e l 1-dlsclpllned army.3

Even though McClellan did not put his army on the
offensive,

the situation in and around Washington changed

considerably.

In late September, Confederate forces

w it h dr e w from one of the most forward positions they had
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taken after Bull Run.

This relieved some of the tension in

the capital, which had a pronounced effect on Dahlgren's
schedule.

Where only a short time before he was "occupied

incessantly," military duties no longer occupied so much of
his time that he had to forgo participating in Washington's
active social

scene.

His Journal

entries give an indication

of both the extent of the capital's social
participation

in it.

life and his

On September 23, Dahlgren was at the

Brazilian Minister's, who gave a party in the honor of
Prince de Joinville, who had just arrived from France.
While happy to meet the Prince, Dahlgren noted despondently
that the party "was an exhibition of the melancholy wreck of
our social
mustered."
party,

ci rc le ,— only a half a dozen

ladles could be

The following night Dahlgren attended another

this one at Secretary of State Seward's house,

"where,"

Dahlgren noted, "we had besides de Joinville,

the

Count of ParisC,] heir to the French thronei,] and the Duke
de Chartrest,] his brother."

Then on September 25,

"I

[Dahlgren] dined at the President's with some of his
friends,--the only notability there was Mr. Holt,
Secretary of War to Buchanan."

late

The following day was "Ctlhe

fast day procla im ed by the President,— the first day in
which there has been a suspension of labor in this Yar d
since I took command."

While the yard may have been absent

its workers, Dahlgren was busy at the yard entertaining the
Duke de Chartres.

Later that evening,

Dahlgren took a

I
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friend w ho was visiting h im from Philadelphia to Seward's,
where "we talked with the ladles, and were soon Joined by
the French Princes and Mr. Seward:

then came

in the

President and we had a very chatty evening."4
Dahlgren's account of the Washington social scene

in

the early fall suggests Just how dramatic a transformation
had occurred in the capital
most people

in Washington,

since Bull Run.

lack of activity. Early

September Dahlgren noted in his Journal,

affairs."

little or no change

A few days later he wrote,

the river and the lines."
question McClellan,

like

Dahlgren quickly focused his

attention on General McClellan's

pr og ressing with

Still,

in

"Matters

in the state of
"Every thing quiet on

If Dahlgren was beginning to

this changed

general paid him the honor of an

on October 4 ,
" informal

when

the

v i s i t ." Dahlgren

suddenly only had glowing w o r d s for McClellan.

"Though

rather below the average size, he is of martial

figure,— the

countenance open and not

impressed with any one

characteristic, but h ar monising much

intelligence and

m a n l l n e s s . ...You reconlze mind, and firmness and a fine
disposition, but no one of them too dominant.
Dahlgren continued,

He is,"

"well educated and bred; without the

least assumption in manner, but winning in his address."
Dahlgren also wrote to one of his sons to tell him of
McClellan's unexpected visit.
Dahlgren,

McClellan, he told Ulric

"came in last e vening about dark,

took tea and
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staid until

llo c ....We had a cosy time....We parted very

good friends and I was much p le as e d with h i m — he is a fine
f ell ow ."5
The general's visit made Dahlgren much more optimistic,
and by mid-October
preparation,

it appeared to h i m that after months of

the Army of the Potomac,

as the Union army

under McClellan was now named, w as about to move forward.
On October 13, just as he did before Bull Run, Dahlgren
w rote expectantly,
decision.

"So, here we are again, on the verge of a

Mighty hosts will

soon be in collision,

more than w as decided on the 21st of July,
no small matter."

to decide

though that was

But the following day McClellan

unexpectedly visited again, and their conversation
Dahlgren anything but sanguine.

left

McClellan complained to

Dahlgren that General-in-Chief W inf ie ld Scott was
continually

interfering with his plans.

He further

explained that the cause of the inactivity of his army the
past month s rested entirely with Scott.

"He says," as

Dahlgren recalled his conversation wit h McClellan,

"Scott

does not want to fight, but considers delay the policy."
McClellan further suggested to Dahlgren that he had a very
different view and that

if he w as allowed to exercise

command by himself he would move the army forward
lmmedlately.6
Dahlgren accepted McClellan's allegations completely,
and he sided with the young general.

"Scott has," Dahlgren
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stated,

"tried his plan and nearly lost the

Capital,— McCClellanD should act freely and be assisted."
"I could not but feel apprehensive,"

Dahlgren concluded,

"when I found that on the eve of another trial
leader was to be parallzed in this way."

the real

"What Madness!"7

McClellan's revelations to Dahlgren were probably not
some happenstance event.

"I am firmly determined,"

McClellan wrote the day before to his wife Mary Ellen
McClellan,

"to force the issue with Genl Scott— a very few

days will determine whether his policy or mine
prevail."

is to

And while Dahlgren never made any mention of

whether he spoke to Lincoln on McClellan's behalf, on
November 1, the President,

after months of trying to work

out a compromise between the aging general-ln-chief and the
ambitious commander of the Army of the Potomac,
accepted Scott's resignation,

finally

first tendered on August 9.

Hearing this news, Dahlgren noted with relief,

"Gen.Cerall

Scott finally retires."8
McClellan's promotion to General-in-Chief of the Army
did not lead to any sudden offensive operations.
as McClellan and the Army of the Potomac went

But even

into

hibernation for the winter, Dahlgren found plenty to occupy
his time.

Administrative duties at the navy yard took up

much of his days, and the active Washington social
helped to fill his evenings.
the fall providing informal

scene

Dahlgren also spent much of
charter service for Lincoln and
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others.

Besides providing the President a chance to escape

the mounting pressure facing him In Washington,
with General McClellan's inactivity,

especially

these Junkets also gave

Dahlgren numerous opportunities to press his own interests.
Permanent command of the Washington Navy Y a r d had not
satiated Dahlgren's hunger for personal

aggrandizement.

Even before he accepted the post he had renewed his request
to the President to be promoted to captain.

To be promoted,

however, required a vacancy in the ranks above;
of retirement, resignation,

or death.

the result

Many spots had

opened since the beginning of the war, but promotions were
accorded strictly by seniority and Dahlgren w a s too far down
the list of commanders to benefit.9
One memorable cruise in mid-November showed that
Dahlgren had the President's support.
which

This particular trip,

included Lincoln, Seward, Welles, Secretary of War

Simon Cameron, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair,

and

Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, had quickly developed into
"a very hilarious party," according to Dahlgren, as the
President poked fun at Seward about a story maki ng the
rounds of the capital

that he had "got drunk."

Besides

chiding his secretary of state, Lincoln also brought his
desire to promote Dahlgren to Welles's attention.
will,'" Lincoln told the secretary of the navy,

"'I

"'make a

Captain of Dahlgren as soon as you say there is a place.'"
The wine which had been served on the trip h ad apparently
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flowed very freely because Cameron followed the President's
declaration by exclaiming that

If the President transferred

Dahlgren to the army ordnance department, he w ou l d put
Dahlgren "at the head of it and make

...

[him] a

Brlg.Cadier] G en eral."10
Dahlgren was not w illing to accept a transfer to the
army, even for a promotion.

Within weeks, however, Dahlgren

thought he might get his promotion anyway.

The condition of

the navy officer corps had concerned Welles since the start
of the war.

He felt that there were too many

inefficient

officers In the upper ranks because the navy h ad no formal
system of retirement.

At the end of the special

session of

Congress held in the summer of 1861, Welles man ag ed to push
legislation through Congress establishing a board of
officers whose task was to examine all

those on the Navy

Register to see if they were fit for duty, and to retire any
"incapacitated by old age,

ill health and the enervation

incident to service in the old navy."

Unfortunately,

a

variety of factors, not the least of which was that the
b oa rd members were close friends of the officers they were
examining, resulted in few officers actually being retired.
When the new Congressional

session opened in December,

W e ll es renewed his effort to purge his department of what he
considered deadwood.

This time,

instead of an examining

board, a bill was proposed to make retirement mandatory for
any officer who had served for forty yea rs .11
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Dahlgren was extremely

interested in the bill because

the retirement of older officers ahead of him on the Navy
Register meant that their slots would be opened.
other hand,

the bill

On the

automatically retired an officer after

forty years of service, regardless of age, and Dahlgren
w o u l d be slated for retirement in 1866, when he w o u l d only
be fifty-seven.
amended.

Dahlgren went to work to get the bill

As he had been so often before, he was successful.

When the bill was signed by President Lincoln on December
21, Dahlgren proudly noted in his journal

that he had gotten

one Senator "to extend it to 45 [years of service before
retirement].

Then 60 years of age was added."

as a

mandatory retirement age regardless of the number of years
of service, and "I got [Congressman] Sedgewlck to amend
[that] to 62 years."

As soon as the bill passed,

Dahlgren

renewed his request for promotion to captain because the
bill had opened fifty s l o t s . *2
Secretary Welles's purpose

in getting this legislation

pas se d had nothing to do with promoting Dahlgren.
he

Instead,

Intended to reform the Navy Department, and the

retirement bill was Just the first
legislative reforms he had planned.

in a series of
Therefore,

being, he left the many vacancies unfilled,

for the time

to Dahlgren's

c h a g r i n .13
Shortly after the retirement bill passed,

the second

and third parts of Welles's legislative package came before
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Congress,

and again Dahlgren showed his ability to shape

legislation to his advantage.

The first of these w as a

st raightforward bill which called for adding two new bureaus
to the department.

But when the bill was sent to the Senate

Naval Affairs Committee for review,

It was completely

rewritten and renamed “An Act to Reorganize the Navy
Department."
new bill

Instead of simply adding two new bureaus,

the

reorganized the existing five bureaus Into eight.

Am on g the most significant differences In the revised bill
w as that the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography w as divided
into two separate bureaus,
Bureau of Navigation.
since 1856.

the Bureau of Ordnance and the

Dahlgren had been calling for this

Furthermore, between the time that the

Reorganization Bill was Introduced and the bill w as revised,
Dahlgren wrote to the chairman of the Senate Naval
Committee,
department,
money.

and outlined a plan for a separate ordnance
emphasizing how this w ou ld save the government

Dahlgren's handiwork was evident

the bill.

Affairs

Among its original

in another part of

provisions was one calling for

the chiefs of all of the b ureaus to receive an annual
of $3,500.

salary

This was less than Dahlgren was already being

paid, and he obviously po in te d this out.

During debate on

the bill, Senator Grimes of fered an amendment, which passed
both Houses of Congress,

to allow any new bureau chief who

w a s already receiving a higher salary than that provi de d for
by the current bill be a llowed to keep

it.

"My purpose

In
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offering this amendment,"
leave the President,

Grimes told the Senate,

"is to

if he sees fit to employ the services

of Captain isle] Dahlgren at the head of a bureau,

the

privilege of doing so without any diminution of the salary
to which he is now by law en ti tl ed. "1'4
While debate on the Reorganization Bill wa s Just
beginning,

the third part of Welles's legislative package

was introduced: House Resolution No. 280,

"An Act to

Establish and Equalize the Grade of Line Officers of the
United States Navy."
naval historian,

at

This bill has been de scribed by one
least as far as navy line officers were

concerned, as "the most

important naval

Civil War, or indeed the most
founded."

Prior to the war,

legislation of the

important since the navy was
there were only four officer

ranks in the navy, midshipman,

lieutenant,

commander,

and

captain.

Navy personnel

h a d complained about this for

decades.

Among the loudest of their complaints wa s the lack

of any rank above c apt ai n— officers who commanded squadrons
were accorded the unofficial

title of commodore.

Prior to

the Civil War the main probl em with having no rank above
captain was that it put American squadron commanders at a
disadvantage in the number of guns fired in salute when
encountering squadron commanders of foreign nations, who
were

in most cases a dm irals— an admiral was entitled to a

thirteen gun salute w hile a captain received nine guns in
return and in the highly ritualized navy this w as hardly
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considered irrelevant by most officers.
exposed a more serious problem.

The Civil War

The war brought the army

and navy into closer contact than at any other time before,
and combined operations were conducted from the earliest
stages of the conflict.

In the navy, squadron commanders

were captains, whereas in the army, commanders of armies
were generals.
army colonel,

Because a navy captain only equated with an
this created an awkward question of authority

when naval and army forces w ork ed together.

Since the

beginning of the war this difficulty had been dealt with on
an unofficial basis, but Welles w a nt ed to eliminate the
problem officially.15
Like most navy officers,

Dahlgren wholeheartedly

supported the creation of a rank above captain.

He also

agreed with the second major provision of the bill, which
called for a partial

introduction of a merit-based promotion

system to replace the existing seniority-only system.
Still, Dahlgren believed one component of the bill
amending.

needed

This section, he noted, pertained to himself, and

he only most "reluctantly" brought

it up; but, as he pointed

out to Charles Sedgewlck, w ho w a s both the Chairman of the
House Naval Affairs Committee and the author of the bill, as
it w as then written, he would not be eligible for the new
rank because admirals were to be "selected from the Captains
and Commanders for dlstLnguished conduct

in B a tt le ."

Dahlgren felt that this provision w as unfair to himself.

In
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a letter to Congressman W i l l i a m Kelly, Dahlgren wrote,
present bill bears upon me with peculiar severity."

"the

By

taking command of the W ashington Navy Yard, Dahlgren argued,
he had "rendered an important service...at the most critical
perio d of the Rebellion."

Then, because he had remained at

this post, he argued, he had not been able to serve afloat.
"It w ou ld be cruelly unjust,"

Dahlgren concluded,

"to render

these circumstances to disfranchise from the highest grade
of my profession and pass Junior officers over my head.

All

that I ask is to have these conditions amended so as to
include that of 'other m er it or i ou s conduc t. '" 16
The Navy Grade Bill
officers,

interested not only navy line

it w as also very

because one of

important to members of Congress

its key provis io ns dealt with control of

midshipmen slots in the Navy Academy.

Debate over this

issue dragged on for mont hs as congressmen fought Jealously
to protect their prerogatives.

Because of the overall

importance of the bill, however, as Congress drew to a close
certain

legislative procedures were waived in order to make

sure that the bill came up for a vote.
bill

is brought up for debate

the bill

Normally, before a

in the full House or Senate,

is printed, which allows the legislators to read

the exact provisions being debated.

But because of the

length of debate in committee there was no time for printing
the bill.

Therefore,

the p ro p os e d bill was simply read
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aloud in Its entirety and then debate began before the full
House.
The reason why this was not normally done soon became
apparent, which in turn also exposed Dahlgren's
effectiveness in lobbying Congress.

As already noted,

Dahlgren h ad been wr it in g to various legislators trying to
alter the language regarding promotion eligibility.

One

person that he had written to was Congressman Phelps of
Missouri.

When the House reached the section

listing the

eligibility requirements for admiral, Phelps rose and
objected because

it excluded "all w ho shall

distinguished themselves in battle."

not have

There w as one, not so

slight, pro bl em with Phelps's objection, and Sedgewlck, whom
Dahlgren h ad also written to as he wor ke d to reword the
bill, quickly po inted it out to him.
told Phelps,
read,

"The bill,"

Sedgewick

"has been altered in that particular."

It now

"That nine rear-admirals may be commissioned, who

shall be selected, during war, from those officers

... who

have heretofore distinguished themselves,

or hereafter

distinguish themselves by courage, skill,

and genius in

their profession."

In other words, Sedgewlck w as telling

Phelps, Commander Dahlgren was now eligible for the higher
r a n k .1?
In the military,
status.

rank and position determine one's

Thus the fact that Dahlgren w a nt ed to amend any

bill before Congress that affected his rank

is hardly
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surprising.

What

is surprising is Dahlgren's uncanny

success in shaping almost every piece of
affected him.

legislation that

At the very least, his success in doing so

illustrates how influential

he had become.

source of Dahlgren's influence?

What was the

One explanation

is that

Congress seems to have want ed to reward Dahlgren for his
loyalty.

Dahlgren certainly utilized this theme In his

campaign with individual

congressmen.

He repeatedly

recalled the circumstances surrounding his taking command of
the Washington Navy Yard, which
"at the most critical

in his own words was done

period of the Rebellion,"

and which,

in his interpretation, had saved the Union from disaster.
While this was an overblown analysis of his contributions,
it seemed to have a positive effect with members of
Congress.

There was at

both the special

least one other factor involved.

In

session of Congress held in the summer of

1861, and the regular session of Congress that began

in

December 1861, one of the bills passed involved the
administration of the navy's ordnance department.

In the

debate over each bill, Dahlgren was specifically mentioned
in connection with this post.

While Dahlgren's ideas may

have been controversial, by the beginning of the Civil War
he was recognized as the navy's leading ordnance authority.
It was logical

therefore,

to make him eligible to hold the

position of chief of ordnance.
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Of course, neither the legislative debate on naval
reform nor Dahlgren's lobbying efforts took place
vacuum.

in a

By the time that the Reorganization Bill and Navy

Grade Bill were Just reaching the Congressional

floor for

the first time, after months of relative Inactivity, Union
forces began offensive operations.

These included the

combined operations of navy and army forces under Captain
Andrew Foote and General Ulysses Simpson Grant, who moved
against the Confederate forts which controlled the Tennessee
and Cumberland rivers.

The first of the forts, Henry,

fell

quickly to the guns of Foote's flotilla of gunboats on
February 6.

Foote and Grant then moved rapidly to assault

the second Confederate stronghold, Fort Donelson, and while
it proved tougher to capture than Fort Henry,

it fell on

February 16.18
The Union successes at Henry and Donelson brought Foote
and Grant an avalanche of praise.

Dahlgren was happy for

Foote, who was his longtime friend, but the Union victory at
Fort Donelson also concerned Dahlgren.

When he began his

lobbying efforts to make himself eligible for promotion to
admiral

it was far from certain that he w ould succeed.

the legislation then stood,

As

the only sure way to be eligible

for the new rank was "for distinguished conduct

in battle."

Even more important, as far as Dahlgren was concerned,
Foote's and Grant's victories marked the beginning of the
end of the war.

"After the capture of Fort Donelson,"

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100
Dahlgren wrote to one of his sons,

"I allowed 60 days for

the final denou em en t— things move rapidly now."

In other

words, Dahlgren b el i ev e d that time was quickly running out
for him if he wa s going to get p ro m ot ed . 19
While the fall

of Henry and Donelson were

important for the Union war effort,

Indeed

the main reason for

Dahlgren's optimism was that after months of inactivity,
McClellan's Army of the Potomac finally appeared ready to
move.
finally

Amidst growing pressure to begin a campaign, which
led President Lincoln to issue General War Order No.

1 ordering all
movement"

"Land and Naval

Forces"

to begin a "general

on February 22, McClellan revealed his plan for a

campaign that he b el ie ve d w ould end the war.

It Involved

transporting his army via ship up the Rappahannock River and
landing at Urbanna, Virginia.

McClellan argued that this

w ou ld put the Union army between General

Joseph Eggleston

Johnston's army which w as entrenched near Centerville,
Virginia,
withdraw.

and Richmond,

and would force Johnston to

McClellan believed that he w o ul d then be able to

either capture Rich mo nd before Johnston could react, or be
in the position to meet Johnston's army out

in the open at a

place of his own choo si ng rather than havin g to attack
Johnston's strong defensive position.

President Lincoln

opposed this plan because of his fear that the movement
would expose Washington to a swift Confederate offensive,
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but he ultimately agreed to it provided McClellan
enough forces to keep the capital

leave

"entirely secure."20

President Lincoln gave McClellan final

approval

for his

campaign on March 8; but that was not the only thing of
importance which took place that day, especially as far as
Dahlgren's future was concerned.

For months,

rumors had

circulated throughout the North that the Confederacy had
raised the M e r r i m a c k . which had been scuttled when the
Gosport Navy Ya rd was abandoned in April,

1861, and had been

w o r k i n g on converting it into an ironclad vessel.
rumors were true.

The

On what ranks among the most successful

shakedown cruises of any warship

in history,

the M e r r i m a c k .

newly rechristened C.S.S. V i r g i n i a , steamed from its berth
on the Elizabeth River
warship,

into Hampton Roads.

captained by Franklin Buchanan,

The Confederate

the former

commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, he aded straight for
the Union fleet of wooden w ar ships that

lay at anchor.

The

VIrginia was slow, deep in draft, and extraordinarily
cumbersome, but the Union's wooden ships were no match for
the

iron-plated vessel.

fleet was in shambles.

W ithin a matter of h ours the Union
Of the five major Union shlps-of-war

which guarded the entrance to Hampton Roads, Cumber 1and was
sunk, Congress lay burning and woul d explode and sink
shortly, Minnesota was run aground.

Only the coming

darkness and the falling tide saved the Roanoke and S t .
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L a w r e n c e . both of which had taken refuge under the guns of
Fort Monroe.21
New s of the VIraln ia's dramatic success reached
Washington by early the next morning, Sunday, March 9.
President Lincoln immediately asked for all of his Cabinet
members to assemble at the White House.

Secretary of War

Edwin Stanton, recently appointed to replace Cameron who
resigned admidst controversy,
first to arrive.

and Welles were among the

The two Cabinet members proceeded to

engage in a heated argument as Stanton predicted that the
Confederate warship was probably just then on its way up the
Potomac River to bombard the Capitol, before proceeding on
to destroy New York and Boston.
prediction,

Welles dismissed Stanton's

telling everyone that the vessel

drew too much

water to reach Washington and w a s too unseaworthy to venture
out on the open ocean.
the President,

Furthermore, Welles told Stanton and

the Union's own ironclad had just reached

Hampton Roads and was probably already well on its way to
destroying the V i r g i n i a .

But Welles's description of the

Union's two-gun Mon 1tor did little to allay anyone's
concern,

especially Stanton's, and the deep sense of

foreboding was only amplified by the inorportune failure of
the Washington-Fortress Monroe telegraph

line which broke

down that morning.22
Perhaps growing tired of

listening to Welles and

Stanton argue, or wanting to hear a professional navy
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officer's opinion, Lincoln called for his carriage and along
wit h Senator Orville Hickman Browning, he headed for the
Washington Navy Yard to see Dahlgren.
Sunday morning,

Although

It was a

the President found him In his office, when,

Dahlgren recorded somewhat apologetically
"he should have been

In church."

Dahlgren that he had "frightful

in his Journal,

The President told
news," as he recited the

events of the previous day's catastrophe

in Hampton Roads.

Moreover, Lincoln wond er ed If the Virginia "might not have a
visit here which would rather cap the climax."23
Lincoln probably hoped that Dahlgren would confirm
Welles 's assurances that Washington was safe from attack
from the Confederate

ironclad.

Dahlgren certainly w as in

the position to offer as much of a positive assurance as
anybody could.

Only two days earlier, Assistant Secretary

of the Navy Gustavus Fox h ad telegraphed and asked Dahlgren
what was the "greatest draft which can be brought up"
Washington?

to

In response to Fox's query one of Dahlgren's

assistants Informed the Navy Department that twenty-two feet
was the maximum.

The Merrimack was originally designed to

draw no more than twenty-three feet of water, but when
w as built
Inches.
with

It

in 1854 it actually drew twenty-three feet, nine
This had led to a great public controversy because

this deep a draft the vessel could not enter more than

ninety percent of the ports in the United States,
Washington.

including

While one could not be absolutely certain how
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much water the rebuilt vessel drew, one could be fairly
confident that replacing the upper portions of the vessel
with an ironplated casemate had not improved its draft by
almost two feet.
assurances.
comfort:

Dahlgren, however, did not give any

Instead, he recalled,

"I could give but

little

such a thing might be p r e v e n t e d .11 he told the

President,

"but not met."

Instead of assurances,

"If the

Merrimactkl entered the [Potomac] river," Dahlgren told
Lincoln,

"it must be blockedC,]

that w a s about all which

could be done at the present."2-4
While Dahlgren had not given the assurances that he had
probably could have, his suggestion that something could be
done to prevent the Virginia from attacking Washington
apparently h ad somewhat of a calming effect on the
President.

As they rode up to the White House from the navy

yard, Dahlgren noted that Lincoln "was in his usual
suggestive mood;"

though as he followed him inside the White

House, he also noted,
is."

"poor gentleman, h ow thin & w as te d he

While the President had been to see Dahlgren, many

more people had arrived at the White House and the earlier
discussion w a s renewed in its full vigor.
Dahlgren recalled,

"There was,"

"a hasty and very promiscuous emission of

opinion from everyone without much regard to rank[,3 and
some lnterCesting]

talking which

[was] rather confused."

Among the more recent arrivals w as McClellan who worried
what the Virginia's presence meant to h is proposed campaign.
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As

long as the Confederate ironclad remained unchecked,

transporting his army by water was out of the question.
Stanton wanted to cancel

the campaign immediately, stating

bitterly that it should never have been approved in the
first place.

At some point during the discussion Dahlgren

renewed his earlier proposal
channel.

to block the Potomac River ship

This drew the enthusiastic approval

and because Welles had momentarily
conduct some related business,
Dahlgren,

of Stanton,

left the me et i ng to

the President directed

Quartermaster-General

Montgomery Meigs, who had

been called in to provide advice from the army's
perspective,

and McClellan to make the necessary

arrangements.
of war

The three officers, along with the secretary

left the m eeting and proceeded to arrange for the

filling of a number of river barges with stone so that they
c ou ld be sunk in the Potomac ship channel.
afternoon,

Later that

Dahlgren took both Stanton and Seward down the

Potomac and advised them on the best spot to sink the
barges.

Dahlgren also arranged for erecting batteries at a

number of spots along the river.

At about 9 p.m., Dahlgren

telegraphed Lincoln "that all the measures were
& ready for

u s e .

in progress

"25

By the time that Dahlgren

informed Lincoln that he

c ou ld obstruct the Potomac River whenever he ordered,

the

situation

The

in Hampton Roads had changed dramatically.

Virginia had been affecting Union naval policy since the
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previous summer.

As soon as the first rumors reached

Washington that the Confederacy was converting the wooden
Merrimack

into an ironclad, Welles had asked for a special

appropriation so that the navy could initiate
ironclad building program.

In August

its own

1861, Lincoln had

signed a b i 11 authorizing the construction of three
experimental

ironclads, resulting in the construction of the

Moni t o r . G a l e n a . and New Ir onsides.

The M o n i t o r , designed

by John Ericsson and built at the Continental
Greenpoint,

Brooklyn, was the first of the three built,

after extremely

and

limited trials the vessel was taken under

tow from New York to Hampton Roads on March 6.
frightful

Ironworks in

voyage,

After a

the strange looking little craft arrived

in Hampton Roads on the night of March 8, Just as the
Congress exploded and sunk.

When the Virginia ventured down

the James River to complete the grisly task it had begun the
day before,

the Mon 1tor lay waiting; and during the morning

hours of March 9, the Union and Confederate ironclads fought
their historic stalemate.26
The telegraph

link between Washington and Fort Monroe

was reestablished by the evening of March 9, and the first
reports detailing the battle between the two ironclads,
while sketchy, provided enough details to assure everyone in
Washington that the Virginia wo ul d not be seen steaming up
the Potomac that night.

Welles felt vindicated by the

success of the Mon 1tor in checking the V i r g i n i a , and the
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next day when everyone again gathered at the White House he
made his feelings known.

He was extremely upset about the

p lans that had been put

Into motion to sink obstructions In

the Potomac River.

He had not been a party to this

operation and he only became aware of It when Dahlgren
Informed him along with the President that the river barges
c ould be sunk at any time.

This had led Welles to "rouse"

Dahlgren at 2 a.m., and he ordered him to "suspend further
operations for blocking the channel."

W e l le s demanded to

know w ho had ordered obstructing the river,

and he pointed

out that this ran counter to what the navy h ad been trying
to do since the beginning of the war, namely to keep the
Potomac River open for navigation.

Somewhat sheepishly,

Lincoln admitted that he had approved Stanton's desire to
carry out the operation, believing "no h a r m w oul d come of
it,

if it did no good."

Lincoln's admission was amazingly

similar to the one that he made regarding Seward's detaching
the Powhatan from the Fort Sumter expedition

in April

1861;

but Welles, rather than expressing anger at the President,
appeared most upset with Stanton, which w a s undoubtedly the
result of the latter's dismissal

of Welles's assurances the

previ ou s day.27
Besides being furious at Stanton, Wel le s was also
extremely disappointed with both Dahlgren and Meigs.

Both

officers had been called in to provide military advice
during the crisis, and Welles felt that they had failed.
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"Dahlgren and Meigs were both

Intelligent officers and In

their specialties among the first of their respective
professions," Welles recorded in the diary that he kept,
"but neither of them was end owe d with the fighting qualities
of Farragut or Sheridan, and in that time of general
without

information or facts,

they were not the men to allay

panic or tranquillize the government officials.
Welles continued with his criticism,
careful
it.”

They were,"

"prudent, cautious men,

to avoid danger and provide the means to escape from

Moreover, Welles noted,

"powerless"
Stanton

alarm,

the two officers, h ad proven

during the crisis "and in full sympathy with

in all his fears and predictions."

Welles made one

final observation about Dahlgren: he had become so
"attentive"
"courtier"

to the President,

that he behaved more

like a

than a military adviso r. 28

The observations about his character could not have
come at a worse time for Dahlgren.

The only serious

casualty on the Union ironclad w as its commanding officer,
Lieutenant John Lorimer Worden, w ho was temporarily blinded
when a shell

from the Virginia struck the Mon 1t o r 7s pilot

house while Worden w as looking out of it.

The

ever-ambitious Dahlgren, be lieving that the war w a s rapidly
drawing to an end and knowing that the only sure route to
the rank of admiral was for "distinguished conduct
battle,"

in

asked Welles that he be allowed to "take command of

the M o n i to r ."29
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Welle s refused his request, which w as not surprising
after Dahlgren's performance on March 9.

Dahlgren probably

did not help his cause any with W e ll es when he engaged in a
game of I-told-you-so with Welles.
reached the North

When the first rumors

in late January that the Virginia was

about to attack the Hampton Roads Squadron,

Dahlgren had

submitted a m emorandum detailing a list of things which
could be done to prevent this from occurring.
suggestions were:

Among his

obstructing the Elizabeth River channel;

erecting a floating battery within range of the
obstructions; preparing some vessels as rams,

including

suspending heavy anchors from their yard arms to drop on top
of the V i r g i n i a ; and finally, he suggested that the best way
to neutralize the Confederate

ironclad w a s to launch a land

attack on Norfolk, which he argued w ou ld force the
Confederates to abandon both the navy base and the v e s se l .
While there w as merit

in some of Dahlgren's proposals,

it is

ha r d to believe that reminding Welles about them now,
especially

in front of the President, won him any gratitude

from Welles.

Fortunately for Welles, he had a graceful way

to refuse Dahlgren's repeated requests to command the
Mon 1t o r .

He simply told him that his work

in the ordnance

department w a s too important to give h im duty afloat.313
As if not securing command afloat w as not b ad enough,
in the aftermath of the historic battle between the Mon 1tor
and V i r g i n i a . Dahlgren also found himself

in the middle of
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an ordnance controversy.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Fox had gone to Hampton Roads as soon as he heard that the
Confederate Ironclad might attack.

Fox witnessed the battle

between the two ironclads from the deck of a nearby vessel.
As he w atched he could see the pro jectiles from each ship
bounce off the sides of the other, apparently doing no harm.
In reality,

the shots were not as harmless as they appeared,

especially the Mon itor^s against the V i r g i n i a .

The iron

plating of the Confederate Ironclad h a d been cracked in a
number of places and after the battle the vessel went
dry dock for repairs and modifications,
April

4.

time.

into

not emerging until

Of course Fox had no way of knowing this at the

He wondered what could be done to insure that the

Moni tor would destroy the Virginia

in the event there was

another battle, which everyone anticipated.

The Monltor's

armament consisted of two XI-inch Dahlgren guns, which were
capable of firing both explosive shells and solid-shot.

The

136 pound shells the gun fired were intended primarily for
use against wooden vessels, while the 170 pound cast-iron
solid-shot were

intended for b at tering solid targets, such

as masonry forts, or in this case,
the V i r g i n i a .

the iron-plated sides of

Besides the standard cast-iron shot the

Mon 1tor also carried a supply of heavier, and somewhat
harder,
apparent

185 pound wrought-iron solid-shot.

Despite the

ineffectiveness of the lighter shot, Worden had

refrained from using the heavier projectiles since he had
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received a directive from the ordnance department ordering
not to because

it was not known whether the guns could

w ithstand the heavier projectiles without bursting.

Shortly

after the battle, Fox wired Dahlgren and asked him for
permission to use the wrought-iron shot, stating,
only thing that will

"It is the

settle the M e rr i ma c Ck ] ."31

Despite Fox's emphatic suggestion that only the
wrought-iron shot could insure the Moni tor's victory,
Dahlgren refused to approve their use, telling him that they
were "dangerous to the gun."
come of this except that

Nothing would have probably

in the aftermath of the battle, a

number of newspapers printed articles that
information about the Union

included

ironclad's wrought-iron shot.

Much was made about the effort that had been taken to
fabricate the special projectiles, and how each cost
forty-seven dollars.
article

Dahlgren took special

in the New York H e r a l d .

offense at an

While aimed primarily at

Welles's administration of the Navy Department,
reporter suggested that

the Herald

if Worden had been allowed to use

the heavier wrought-iron shot,

the Virginia would have been

s u n k .32
Always sensitive to criticism of any kind, Dahlgren
prepared a long written statement to rebut the newspaper
stories.

But Lincoln, who m Dahlgren asked to read and

comment on his statement before he sent it out for
publication,

counseled Dahlgren not to send it, telling him,
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"too much attention w ould be drawn to whatever ...Che]
wrote."

The President w as right.

Dahlgren might logically

argue that the danger of bursti ng a gun inside the turret of
the Moni tor outweighed the possible advantages of using the
heavier wrought-iron shot.

The public, however, did not

want to hear logical arguments,

they w a n t e d to see the

Virginia sent to the bottom of the Chesapeake Bay.

Heeding

the President's advice, Dahlgren did not publish his
rebuttal.33
The ordnance controversy did not end there.

Fox's

request to use the wrought-iron shot had only been a stopgap
measure

in his mind.

He also had a long term solution.

From his vantage point,

the battle between the Monitor and

Virginia demonstrated that the Union
clearly

inadequate.

Ironclad's armament was

As chance w o ul d have it, as Fox landed

at Fort Monroe, he just happened to see a 1 5 - inch bore gun
lying on the ground.
of Ericsson's vessel

Having not supported the construction
initially,

Fox did a quick about face.

In the same telegram in which he p u sh ed Dahlgren for
permission to use the wrought-iron shot, he also told him,
"we must have more of these boats,"
guns,

they must be armed with

must," he Implored Dahlgren,
once to make

[15-inch guns]

a n d instead of XI-inch

"fifteen

inch Guns."

"You

"go ahead with your furnaces at
... to stand solid shot."34

The reaction in the Navy Department to the battle
between the Mon itor and Vi r g l n 1a has been aptly described by
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one historian as "Monitor Mania."

Fox became especially

enthusiatic about the v e s s e l , and he boasted to a friend
shortly afterwards,
vessels,

"We have about $25,000,000 for iron

thanks to our disaster at Old Point."

Even before

C ongress ha d officially appropriated these funds, the Navy
Department h ad decided to build more monitors.
it informed Dahlgren that
vessels

On March 17,

it required "for the class of

like the 'Monitor' at least 20 15-inch guns; and for

another class at

least 10 of 20 inches diameter;" and that

Dahlgren needed to produce them "in the least possible

tlme."35
Dahlgren did not have any inherent objections with the
idea of a fifteen
W e ll es

inch gun.

In his January 31 memorandum to

in which he listed way s to combat the Confederate

ironclad, Dahlgren had himself proposed using a " 1 5 in gun on
a Raft properly plated."

But now he listed a series of

objections about manufacturing more fifteen

inch guns.

The

15-inch gun that Dahlgren had recommended using was the same
gun that Fox had seen.
yet made.

Designed by Dahlgren's army counterpart, Major

Thomas J. Rodman,
total

It was also the only gun of its type

it had only been fired using shells, a

of 504 rounds.

In great contrast to his own

arguments more than a decade earlier to adopt his IX-inch
and X l-i nc h guns before even one had been cast, Dahlgren
argued it w a s a mistake to order full-scale production of a
weapon that h ad not fully proven

its endurance.

Dahlgren
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also detailed some other concerns against casting
fifteen-inch guns at this time, but all of his technical
reasons were secondary to his main argument.
despatch," he

told the secretary

impossible to

fabricate the first 15-lnch gun

"Using all

of the navy, "it
in

would be
less than

seventy or eighty days, whilst the present urgent necessity
must pass away in the third of that time, and cannot arise
again for a considerably
course,

longer period — having reference, of

to foreign nations."

In other words, Dahlgren

belie ve d that the war would be over before the first 15-inch
gun could be ready, and it was unlikely that the guns would
be needed in a war against a foreign nation anytime

in the

forseeable future.
Welles did not share Dahlgren's optimism about the war
rapidly drawing to an end, and so despite his ordnance
expert's continued protests,

the navy secretary ordered

production of

the guns.

foundry

enough to cast the guns itself,- the main thing

large

Because the navy did not have a

that Dahlgren had to do was to design them.

He completed

his drafts in early April; and when he submitted his plans,
he was he d his hands of the 15-inch gun, telling Welles that
he w oul d not bear any responsibility for any accidents that
might occur with them.S’?
Even as he argued with his superiors in the Navy
Department about the proper armament for future monitors, a
disgruntled Dahlgren remained convinced the war would be
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over soon.

"CElvents," he recorded In his journal

9, "are hastening rapidly to a consummation."
northerners shared Dahlgren's optimism.

on April

Many

Stanton was so

confident that he actually shut down all of the North's
recruiting offices.

From its earliest moments, however,

McClellan's campaign developed problems.
of

His original plan

landing at Urbanna, which lay on the south side of the

Rappahannock River, was thwarted by Johnston's decision to
w it hd ra w his forces to below the Rappahannock.

Then,

the

appearance of the Virginia almost destroyed McClellan's
"worst coming to the worst" contingency plan of landing at
Fort Monroe which lay at the tip of the James-York Peninsula
and marchi ng on Richmond from there.
timely arrival

While the Mon itor's

in Hampton Roads allowed McClellan to proceed

with this plan, as soon as Union forces met slight
resistance near Yorktown, he decided to establish siege
lines rather than to attack the Confederate

lines

direct 1y .38
McClellan's decision became the center of a storm of
controversy.

He maintained that he did not possess an

adequate force in the face of greatly superior numbers.

He

w a s especially critical of President Lincoln's decision to
w i t h h o l d about one-third the number of troops that he had
called for in his original plan.

The President withheld

these troops because his approval

of the campaign had been

conditional

on there being a sufficient force left to defend
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Washington.

Unfortunately,

some calculation m is t ak e s in

McClellan's report of the number of troops he

left behind,

an over secretive McClellan w h o refused to pr ovide civilians
the details of his plans,

including those for the defense of

the capital, and an overly worried President w ho became
almost obsessed that the Confederates were about to attack
Washington,

led to the President's decision to w ith ho ld some

of McClellan's troops, primarily McDowell's c or ps .39
McClellan subsequently came to view and portray
Lincoln's decision as part of a conspiracy to destroy him.
The general, however, was not the only one speaki ng about
conspiracies.

While Lincoln had never liked McClellan's

plan of operations,
Postmaster-General

the President's Cabinet, ex cepting
Montgomery Blair, and numerous prominent

Radical Republicans were downright hostile to both the
Democratic McClellan and his plans.

The complaints against

h i m had begun in the fall, and had really p i ck ed up momentum
with the creation of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of
the War established with the opening of the Congressional
session

in December 1861.

By April

McClellan wa s reaching a crescendo.

1862, c r iti ci sm of
Now,

the complaints

about his lack of aggressiveness escalated into charges that
McClellan w as a traitor and that his campaign w a s a
deliberate attempt to expose Washington to an enemy
assault.40
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Dahlgren's command of the Washington Navy Y ar d and his
Important political
the controversy.

contacts gave him a bird's eye view of

Ferrying Lincoln and his Cabinet back and

forth between Washington and the front

lines where they met

frequently with their military commanders,

Dahlgren had the

opportunity to hear, and even to participate
the debate about McClellan.

in to a degree,

On one trip Dahlgren made with

the President, he got to see firsthand the partisan nature
of the debate.
McDowell

After being retained in northern Virginia,

had slowly advanced toward Richmond via Manassas

and Fredericksburg, which w a s the
w a n t e d McClellan to take.
Stanton,

line that Lincoln had

The President,

along with

Chase, and Dahlgren, met with McDowell

Creek on April
McClellan.

19.

near Aqula

Dahlgren had also begun to criticize

He believed that

the general had made a mistake

by m o v i n g up the Peninsula without first taking the
Confederate batteries at Gloucester Point on the York River,
Just opposite Yorktown.

Dahlgren now believed that the

Union's best hope for success w as to reinforce McDowell
that he h ad "100,000 men here
straight down to Richmond."
McDowell

so

in front and [to] move
Dahlgren privately told

that he had been p re s si n g this plan on "the

President for ten days."

The main p roblem with this idea

w a s where to secure the n e ed ed troops?
s t ron g supporter of McDowell
McClellan,

as well

suggested that General

Chase, w ho w a s a

as an opponent of

John C. Fremont and his
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army be brought east.
Republicans.

Fremont wa s a darling of the Radical

The Pathfinder had been the first Republican

nominee for president.

At the start of the war he was

placed in command of the Union forces in the West.
outset, however, he was m i re d in controversy.
with the professional

From the

He clashed

soldiers under his command and he

prove d an incredibly inept military

leader.

More important,

one of his first acts was to issue a proclamation that
included a provision which freed all
w ho resisted the government.

the slaves of persons

Radicals cheered the act; but

Lincoln, who was trying desperately to maintain the loyalty
of the border slave states w a s aghast.

He quickly rescinded

Fremont's proclamation and shortly afterward removed him
from command.

But the rise of the Radical Republicans in

the winter of 1861-1862 forced Lincoln to reappoint Fremont,
and he placed him in charge of the Mountain Department,
which w a s created Just for h im and partially supplied with
some troops originally promised to McClellan.

Lincoln's

appointment of Fremont w a s a clearcut effort to assuage the
Radical

Republicans, but he wo u ld not bring him east.

President reacted strongly to Chase's suggestion.
not do it, "there is the political

trouble."

The

He would

Part of the

pr ob le m w a s that Fremont outranked McDowell, and thus would
then be

in command of M cDowell's troops.

Chase countered

that the President had the authority to place McDowell ahead
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of Fremont.

But the President said that he could not do It,

"there would be an outcry."41
Chase did not give up In his attempt to do something
about McClellan.
privately.

Two days later, he approached Dahlgren

He tried to convince the navy officer that the

President was "indecisive between McCElellan]— who
representCedD

...

the Demofcrat] w i n g and Fremont who s tood for

the R e p u b E 1 icanls."

The obvious answer, according to Chase,

was to give the President an alternative.

Since Dahlgren

himself had been arguing to reinforce McDowell, he asked
Dahlgren to meet with him the following morning and go to
the White House to press on President Lincoln the need to
make McDowell's force the main body attacking Richmond.
While this was exactly the kind of political

intrigue that

Dahlgren excelled at when it came to promoting his own
interests, he "thought

Ehe] better not" assist someone

e ls e. 4^
Chase's attempt to use Dahlgren dramatically
illustrates the level of Influence that people around
Washington had come to believe that Dahlgren had with the
President.

The entire affair, however, also shows the

tightrope that Lincoln was w al ki ng between the Radical
Republicans, and the moderates and conservatives both
party and in the North as a whole.

in his

The President tried

desperately to convince McClellan to advance.

But no amount

of cajoling was about to force McClellan to move before he
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was ready.

In four days his estimate of the enemy's

strength had risen from 15,000 to "not
thousand."

Eventually, preparations for his siege stretched

on for more than four weeks.

Then, Just before McClellan

said his siege w a s ready to begin,
abandoned their
fired,

lines.

"Our

the Confederates

This victory, with hardly a shot

"satisfied" McClellan

campaign.

less than one hundred

"of the correctness" of his

success," he wrote to Washington, "is

brilliant & you may rest assured that
the greatest

its effects will be of

importance."43

After the Confederate withdrawal

Dahlgren quickly

reappraised McClellan.

His "strategy seems ... conclusive.

He forced the Confeds.

to leave Manassas without a blo w— and

now to abandon their formidable lines at Yorktown— But the
battle

Impen ds .... they must now accept battle or give up

their Capital."
Repubs,

Dahlgren also noted, however,

are persistent

...

"The extreme

in their attacks on McCllellanl

as if nothing but a battle would content them— in reality
they w o u l d dismount McCClellan]— w h o will however be safe
enough if he reaches Richmond wlth battle or w i t h o u t ,"44
Excepting the mood of the Radical Republicans,
North w a s exuberant.

The Confederate withdrawal

the

from

Yorktown came on the heels of a number of other Confederate
losses,

including the surrender of New Orleans, and at

Shiloh.

The evacuation of Yorktown also made Norfolk

untenable for the Confedracy and they evacuated that city
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shortly afterward.

This led to the loss of the V i r gi n ia ,

because efforts to reduce the Ironclad's draft sufficiently
to allow it to be taken up the James River to Richmond were
unsuccessful

and the vessel w as thus d e st roye d rather than

to allow it to fall

into Union hands.

Official Washington

seemed on the move to the Pe ninsula to watch firsthand what
they believed was the end of the war.

While Dahlgren was

not at the navy yard on May 6 when the President,

along with

Stanton and Chase sailed for the Peninsula, he did take
Welles, Seward, Attorney-General
"guests and ladies"

Edward Bates,

and their

to see McClellan a few days later.

Ironically, while McClellan claimed he w a s too busy to meet
with the President,

as soon as the General

most recent arrivals from Washington,
there was a long talk."

learned of the

he "came on board and

McClellan also arranged for the

party to go ashore and view "the troops at evens parade."
While Dahlgren only had the warmest de scriptions for
McClellan's hospitality,
view of the visit.

the General

had a very different

"We h ad quite a visitation yesterday,"

he wrote to Mary Ellen McClellan,

"in the shape of Secy.

Seward, Gideon Welles, Mr. Bates, Fred Seward, Dahlgren,"
and some others.

"I went on b oard their b o a t — then had some

ambulances harnessed up 8. took them around c a m p — w as very
g l a d when I got thro' with them— such visit s are always a
nuisance."

The next day Dahlgren took the party to Norfolk.

On the 16th, they went up the James.

On the way up river
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they passed the sunken hulks of the Congress and Cu mb er la nd .
As they mo ve d further up the river they encountered some of
the vessels which had m oved on Richmond the previous day,
only to be turned back at Drewry's Bluff.
that up until

this point,

buoyant spirits."
changed this.

Dahlgren noted

"Our party has been in most

But news of the rebuff at Drewry's Bluff

"Curious,"

Dahlgren wrote

in his Journal,

"to

see how they were quelled by a little reverse and Mr. Seward
began to remember reasons for returning."45
On May 22, after Dahlgren arrived back
he received orders to prepare a vessel

in Washington,

for that evening.

To

Dahlgren's surprise his passenger w as the President.
Lincoln,

now comfortable about the security of the capital,

had reversed his decision about McDowell's corps.
wanted McDowell

He now

to cooperate with McClellan by moving

simultaneously with the Union army on the Peninsula.

But

before McDowell moved, Lincoln w a nt ed to confer with him.46
Even before McDowell moved,
decision again.

the President reversed his

The reason for the sudden reversal was

General Thomas "Stonewall"
Shenandoah Valley.

Jackson's activities in the

After evacuating Yorktown, Confederate

forces fought a brief delaying action near Virginia's
colonial

capital

of Williamsburg, before eventually falling

back behind the Chickahomlny River,
obstruction before Richmond,
west.

the last natural

less than ten miles to the

McClellan slowly moved his forces up the Peninsula

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123
and as he did before Yorktown, he began preparations for a
siege.

The Confederate leadership did not want to allow

McClellan to utilize the superior force and artillery he had
at his disposal

to lay siege to their capital

because they

realized this was a battle they were destined to lose.
McClellan was beginning his methodical

preparations,

As

General

Robert E. Lee, who had been brought to Richmond by President
Jefferson Davis to serve as his military advisor,
recommended that Jackson begin an offensive to try to keep
the Union from shifting forces from northern Virginia to the
R i chm on d area.4?
Jackson's "Valley Campaign" had been under way since
early May, but

it really began to heat up on the same day

that Lincoln met with McDowell, May 23.

On that day,

Jackson defeated a portion of General Nathaniel Prentiss
Banks's force at Front R o y a l , Virginia.
L in coln's political

Banks, another of

generals and w ho proved as militarily

inept as Fremont, h ad been assuring Washington that Jackson
p ose d no threat.

Two days later, Jackson's army won another

victory at W i nc he ste r. 48
When Dahlgren,

the President, and Stanton, had returned

from their secret visit to Fredericksburg in the early
m o r n i n g hours of May 24, there was an
w a i t i n g at the dock for the President.

important message
More than likely it

was a report of the battle at Front Royal.

Lincoln

immediately canceled McDowell's move and ordered the
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divisions that had Just rejoined his army from the
Shenandoah Valley,

to return posthaste.

The battle at

Winchester the next day really threw Washington
panic.

After this battle,

into a

Banks and the remnants of his

shattered force retreated north to Harper's Ferry, which
seemed Jackson's next target.

Harper's Ferry sat along the

Potomac River and was Just a short march from the capital.
It suddenly appeared to the President that Washington could
very soon be under attack.49
While Jackson's campaign was having tremendous impact
upon Union military strategy,
to Dahlgren.
battle

it also looked 1 ike a godsend

Thoughts of his need to distinguish himself

in

if he was going to receive consideration for

promotion was never far from his thoughts.
w as another chance.

Suddenly, here

On May 25, orders arrived at the

Washington Navy Yard asking that Dahlgren send all his
available heavy cannon to Harper's F e r r ? .

Dahlgren

immediately went to see Stanton and volunteered to go along
with the guns, and to command the artillery there.
agreed to the proposal,

Stanton

telling Dahlgren that he wo ul d make

him "Chief of Artillery."

There was one condition, Stanton

told Dahlgren that he could go provided that Welles agreed.
While Dahlgren had not pursued an earlier offer to take a
land command,
desperate.

this time was different; he w as getting

Dahlgren and Stanton went

in search of Welles;

but when they found him, he predictably refused.

Dahlgren
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did not give up, and he asked that they go and ask the
President.

The trio of men now went off to look for

Lincoln, wh om they found In the War Department, undoubtedly
w ait in g for news from Harper's Ferry.
to support Dahlgren, but

The President wanted

in the face of determined

opposition from both Welles and Fox, w h o again renewed their
argument that Dahlgren was more

important

In Washington, he

would not overrule his navy dep ar tm en t. 50
While Dahlgren may not have gotten what he want ed for
himself,

the crisis at Harper's Ferry w a s not a total

for the Dahlgren family.

loss

After not b ei n g allowed to go to

Harper's Ferry himself, Dahlgren sent his son Ulrlc Dahlgren
along with the cannon.

Having retu rn ed to the North at the

start of the war, Ulric had begun the study of law in
Philadelphia.

In late April, he became his father's

assistant at the Washington Navy Yard.

Ulric Dahlgren came

back to Washington on May 29 in order to gather needed
ordnance supplies for the guns Just sent to Harper's Ferry.
Rather than sending his son right back, Dahlgren

instead

took him to see the President to give him a firsthand report
of the situation there.

Besides w a n t in g to give the

President a fresh report,

the elder Dahlgren had another

motive.

that his son needed an official

"position

He gave "a hint"

... to give him authority."

de sired effect.

The hint h ad the

Fox offered to make Ulric Dahlgren an

"Act.ting] Master's A p p. t r e n t i c ] ."

Stanton did the navy
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offer one better, and he offered to make Ulric a captain.
Despite his more than thirty years of service
John Dahlgren never even hesitated.
the best,"

in the navy,

The latter offer "was

the career navy officer noted,

"when we left the

W ar D e p .tartment3 Ully w as a Capt.tain]— not hav in g had the
most remote

idea of

it when he entered."51

If Dahlgren felt any parental

concern about his son's

r et urning to Harper's Ferry the following day, he did not
express it.

Nor, as events quickly demonstrated, did

Dahlgren have much need for concern.

Jackson's move toward

Harper's Ferry w as exactly what both General McDowell

and

General

it

McClellan tried to convince President Lincoln

was, a feint to draw attention and resources from the front
near Richmond.52
This became obvious to everyone,

including the

President, on May 31. Johnston suddenly

launched a major

attack against McClellan's forces on the Peninsula.
Although the battle at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks was
militarily

inconclusive,

it h ad very important results.

The

Confederate attack took McClellan completely by surprise and
convinced him more than ever of the need to be fully
prepa re d for his own offensive.

After the battle, he

returned with renewed vigor to his ever methodical
preparations to place Richmond under siege.5 ^
There w as at least one other significant consequence as
a result of the Battle of Seven Pines.

Johnston was
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seriously wounded.

His replacement was General

McClellan could not be unhappy with this.

Lee.

About a month

earlier he had characterized the new commanding general: he
“ is too cautious & weak under grave responsibility,"
"likely to be timid and irresolute in action."
could have been further from the truth.

Nothing

As McClellan

continued with his seemingly endless preparations,
quickly prepared his own plan.

and

Lee

On June 26, on what was the

second day of what wo ul d become known as the Seven Days
Battles, Lee's forces, which now included Jackson who had
managed to avoid the three Union armies trying to trap him
in the Shenandoah Valley,
the Union army.

attacked as Lee tried to detroy

Over the next six days the opposing armies

fought, first at Beaver Dam Creek,

then Gaines's Mill,

followed by Savage's Station and Frayser's Farm,

and

finally, at Malvern Hill.5,4
All allusions that the war w as coming to an end came
crashing down with the Seven Days' Battles.

After Gaines's

Mill, McClellan retreated to Harrison's Landing on the James
River.

President Lincoln told McClellan,

all events."

"save the Army at

Even when the fighting on the Peninsula was

not renewed after July 1, saving the Army of the Potomac
remained paramount

in the President's mind.

Early on the

mo rning of July 5, Lincoln sent w o rd that he w a nt e d to see
Dahlgren.55
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Dahlgren received the President's message at about 9
a.m.

His optimism had been shattered by the Seven Days'

Battles.

No longer boldly predicting the end of the war, he

now fretted that Union forces everywhere were about to be
overrun.

Dahlgren dropped his work and rushed from the navy

yard.56
Entering the War Department, Dahlgren sensed that the
President was "anxious."

Lincoln told Dahlgren that the

most pressing concern was keeping the James River open and
he asked him "If It could be donet?]"
could not believe his ears.
the President,
8. [give]

"if [you]

Dahlgren probably

"I w ou ld guarantee

... w ould send me

it," he told

in command there

... me the m eans."57

After months of listening to his generals give him
every manner of ambivalent answer, Lincoln was more than
glad to hear this kind of decisive talk.

Lincoln and

Dahlgren went over to see the secretary of the navy.
President went

into Welles's office by himself and spoke to

h im for a few minutes, and then left.
Dahlgren

in.

The

W e lle s then called

Immediately, Dahlgren recalled,

the secretary

" o bj e ct ed . ...said I could not be spared— the ordnance would
not go on without m e — my services were mor e
I was."

important where

Dahlgren had heard this same argument before.

He

pl ea d ed with Welles to give him this chance to serve afloat.
Fox, who had joined the meeting, pointed out to Dahlgren
that

if his request were honored the department would have
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to find two men to replace him, one as the commandant of the
Washington Navy Yard, a nd another to take over the direction
of ordnance experiments.

Dahlgren shot back,

111 Cam]

...

wi ll i ng to give up both for the command in the James River."
But Fox had not po in ted out Dahlgren's dual

role to ask him

if he was w illing to give up both Jobs; rather,

it was Fox's

way of seconding W ell es 's assertion that Dahlgren was too
valuable where he was to send him out to sea.5B
Despondent, but not yet without hope, Dahlgren
W elle s' s office.
President.

left

He headed straight back to see the

He tried in vain to convince Lincoln to overrule

Welles; but reluctantly,

Lincoln told Dahlgren, he "did not

see how it could be" done.

Someone else w o ul d have to get

the command.59
As had been the case when Dahlgren tried to secure
command afloat before, Welles never h ad any
favoring his request.
navy officer belonged.
each other again.
afloat.

Intentions of

He believed he knew exactly where the
That evening Dahlgren and Welles saw

They talked, but not about service

Earlier that day President Lincoln had signed the

Navy Reorganization Bill, which h ad finally made

it through

Congress.

The bill had passed with Dahlgren's long desired

amendment,

a separate Bureau of Ordnance.

Heading the

navy's ordnance w as what Welles had been pressing on
Dahlgren now for almost a year.
w o u l d take the post.

Wel le s as ke d Dahlgren if he

Dahlgren knew that once

installed as a
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bureau chief the likllhood of b e in g offered a fleet command
w ould be almost non-existent;

now, however, rather than

refusing the position, he responded in the tones of a
defeated man.
the navy,

"I

would leave that," he told the secretary of

"to the De pa rtCment].1,60

Dahlgren's answer sounded like that of a man who had
given up the fight.

Less than two weeks later he was

officially appointed to head the Bureau of Ordnance.
journal

In his

entry recording his feelings about being named a

bureau chief, he tried to make the best of it, noting that
"being [only] a Commander

in the Navy I have been Commandant

of Yard and Chief of Bureau, which no other officer of that
rank had done."

No matter how he painted it, however, b eing

named chief of ordnance mark ed a defeat

in his effort to

secure duty afloat and a coveted promotion to rear-admiral.
And it quite possibly was a fatal

one, as Dahlgren

recognized when he wrote about Welle s denying him the James
River Squadron:

"it was perhaps my

last chance for a

flag."6 !

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes to Chapter III
1Dahlgren quote in, Dahlgren, August 18, September 12,
1861, Journal Entries, Vol. 7, JADSU; Dahlgren to Welles,
August 20, 1861, NARG 45 — Entry 34; Dahlgren to Welles,
August 22, 1861, Ibid.
^ J a m e s M. McPherson, Battle Crv of Freedom: The Civil
War Era (New York and Oxford, 1988), pp. 348-49.

3McClellan, quoted in, Peter Parish, The American Civil
War (New York, 1975), p. 164; McPherson, Battle Crv of
Ere.sdprn, PP. 348-49; Russell, Mv Diarv North and S o u t h , pp.
290, 302.
^Dahlgren, September 26, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7,
JADSU; the withdrawal of the Confederate forces led to a
major embarassment for McClellan.
When Union forces
occupied the Confederate position on Munson's Hill, instead
of finding large cannon, they found logs cut and painted to
look like cannon.
These "cannon" were quickly dubbed
"Quaker guns."
See, McPherson, Battle Crv of F r e e d o m , pp.
361-62.
8For Dahlgren's early criticism of McClellan, see,
Dahlgren, September 12, 15, October 4, 1861, Journal
Entries, Vol. 7, JADSU, underline in the original; McClellan
to Dahlgren, October 4, 1861, JADLC, Dahlgren endorsed this
letter, "The genteral] got down about 9 and staid till 11
pm;" John Dahlgren to Ulric Dahlgren, October 5, 1861, Ibid.
^Dahlgren, October 13, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 7,
JADSU; Dahlgren, October 14, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol. 8,
Ibid.; John Dahlgren to Ulric Dahlgren, October 17, 1861,
JADLC.
^Dahlgren,
JADSU.

October 14, 1861, Journal

Entry, Vol. 8,

8McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, October 13, 1861,
in Stephen W. Sears, e d . , The Civil W ar Papers of George B.
McClellan: Selected Correspondence. 1860-1865 (New York,
1989), p. 107; Scott to Cameron, August 9, 1861, Col 1ected
W o r k s . V, n., pp. 10-11; Lincoln to McClellan, November 1,
1861, Col 1ected W o r k s . V, pp. 9-10; Lincoln to Scott,
November 1, 1861, Col 1ected W o r k s . V, pp. 10-11;
McClellan
131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

first arrived In Washington on July 26, and while he and
Dahlgren both attended the same party on at least one
occassion, Dahlgren gave no indication that he ever met the
general before October 4, and his reaction to McClelIan's
October 4th visit suggests it was the first time he met him.
After their October 4 meeting, Dahlgren and McClellan met
three more times before Scott's resignation, see, Dahlgren,
October 14, 21, 24, November 1, 1861, Journal Entries, Vol.
8, JADSU, Dahlgren quote in November 1 entry.
9Dahlgren first renewed his request for promotion on
August 5, see, Dahlgren, August 5, 1861, Journal Entry, Vol.
7, JADSU; for the details of some of Dahlgren's Potomac
River trips, see, Dahlgren September, 15, 1861, Journal
Entry, Ibid.; Dahlgren, October 19, November 15, 26,
December 27, 1861, Journal Entries, Vol. 8, Ibid.; September
14, October 19, November 15, 23, December 27, 1861, Miers,
ed., Lincoln Dav bv D a v . Ill, pp. 66, 72, 77-78, 85; the day
after Scott resigned, McClellan wrote, "'I cannot move
without more means....It now begins to look as if we are
condemned to a wint er of inactivity;'" McClellan, quoted in,
McPherson, Battle Crv of F r e e d o m , p. 363;
10Dahlgren, November 15,
JADSU.

1862, Journal

Entry, Vol. 8,

* * Pa u 11i n , Naval Administration. 1775-1911. pp.
299-300; Senator J ames Grimes, S. Bill No. 82, "to promote
the efficiency of the Navy," December 9, 1861, C o n g re s s1onal
G 1 o b e . Vol. 32, p t . 1, p. 26; for debate on S. Bill No. 82,
see, December 12, 1861, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, pt. 1,
pp. 71-75; there w as a provision in the bill which allowed
officers to be exempted from the mandatory retirement.
12Dah lgren, December 19, 24, 1861, Journal Entries,
Vol. 8, JADSU, Dahlgren quote in December 19 entry; December
18, 1861, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 125;
December 20, 1861, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, p t . 1, p.
153; December 21, 1861, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, p t . 1,
p. 160; Pauli in, Naval Administration. 1775-1911. pp.
300-01.
13Dahlgren w ou ld also have his hand in this other
legislation and it will be detailed below.
14Paullin, Naval. Administration. 1775-1911. pp. 259-63;
Dahlgren to Hale, March 24, 1862, JADLC; Grimes, March 20,
1862, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, p t . 2, p. 1298; "An Act
to reorganize the Navy Department," Approved July 5, 1862,
Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, Appendix, p. 388.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133

*8Sedgewick, "An Act to Establish and Equalize the
Grade of Line Officers of the United States Navy," February
18, 1862, Congressional G l o b e . Vol. 32, p t . 1, p. 874;
Pauli in, Naval Administration. 17 75 - 19 11 . pp. 300-01.
16Dahlgren to Charles B. Sedgewick, February 26, 1862,
JADLC, underline in the original; Dahlgren to William Kelly,
May 25, 1862, Ibid.; when Sedgewick introduced the bill the
new rank was called flag officer, but as the bill was
debated this w as changed to admiral; for simplicity's sake I
will always refer to the rank as admiral.
17Debate on H.R. 280, "To Equalize the Grade of Line
Officers," can be followed in Congressional G l o b e . 32, pts.
1-4; for the specific incident involving Congressman Phelps,
see, June 16, 1862, Congressional Globe 32, p t . 3, pp.
2740-44; Dahlgren to Phelps, June 3, 1862, JADLC; Dahlgren
to Sedgewick, February 26, 1862, Ibid.
18Milligan, “Andrew Foote," in, ed. Bradford,
Captains
of the Old Steam N a v v . pp. 128-33; for the most recent
account and analysis of the Henry and Done Ison campaign,
see, Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Forts Henry and Done Ison?
The_Kev to the Confederate Heartland (Knoxville, Tennessee,
1987).
19Milligan, "Andrew Foote," in, ed. Bradford,
Captains
of the Old S team N a v v . pp. 128-33; John Dahlgren to Ulric
Dahlgren, March 11, 1862, JADLC.
20Parish, The Civil W a r , pp. 163-67, 173-75; McPherson,
Battle Crv of F r e e d o m , p. 423; the tension between Lincoln
and McClellan can be followed in Lincoln's correspondence,
see, Lincoln, President's General War Order No. 1, January
27, 1862, Col 1ected W o r k s . V, pp. 111-12; Lincoln,
President's Special War Order No. 1, January 31, 1862,
Ibid., p. 115; Lincoln to McClellan, February 3, 1862,
Ibid., pp. 118-19; McClellan to Stanton, January 31, 1862,
Ibid., n. pp. 119-25; Lincoln to McClellan, February 8,
1862, Ibid., p. 130; Lincoln, President's General War Order
No. 2, March 8, 1862, Ibid., pp. 149-50; Lincoln,
President's General War Order No. 3, March 8, 1862, Ibid.,
p. 151.
21Virgil Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea 3 vols.
(New York, 1960), I, pp. 412-28.
22 Gideon Welles, Di_ary__ of Gideon Welles: Secretary of
the ..Navy Under Lincoln and J o h n so n . 3 vols., ed. Howard K.
Beale (New York, 1960), I, pp. 62-63, hereafter cited as
We I Leg Pi ar.y ; Niven, Gideon Wei l e s . pp. 404-06.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

23 D a h 1gren, March 9, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 8,
JADSU; Lincoln quoted in Ibid., underline in the original;
Niven, Gideon Wei 1e s . pp. 404-06.
24D a h 1gren, March 9, 1862, Journal Entry, V o l . 8,
JADSU; Fox to Dahlgren, March 7, 1862, NARG45-Entry 34;
Parker to Fox, March 7, 1862, Ibid.; C a n n e y , The Old Steam
N a v v . pp. 46-50; even though the Confederates h ad
rechris te ne d the M e r r i m a c k . most northerners continued to
refer to it by its former name.
25Dah lgren, March 9, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 8,
JADSU; Dahlgren to Lincoln, 3 p.m., March 9, 1862, Telegram,
JADLC; Dahlgren to Lincoln, 9 p.m., March 9, 1862, Telegram,
Ibi d.
26Niven, Gideon Wei 1e s . pp. 365-69; Jones, The Civil
War, at S e a . I, pp. 429-37; Wi ll i am C. Davis, Duel Between
the First Ironclads (Baton Rouge, 1981).
2 7 D a h 1gren to Welles, 9 p.m. March 9, Telegr am
N ARG45-Entry 34; Dahlgren to Welles, March 10, 1862, Ibid.;
Dahlgren, March 10, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 8, JADSU;
Welles, W e i le s D i a r v . Vol. I, pp. 61-69, Lincoln quoted in
Ibid.; Niven, Gideon We 11e s . pp. 404-08.
28Welles, Weil es D i a r v . I, pp. 62-64.
29 Clarence Edward Macartney, "Worden," in, M r .
Li ncoln's A d m i r a l s . (New York, 1956), pp. 172-99; Dahlgren,
March 13, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 8, JADSU.
3 0 Dahlgren to Navy Department, January 31, 1862,
N A R G 4 5 — Entry 34; Dahlgren, March 13, 1862, Journal Entry,
Vol. 8, JADSU.
31F o x to Dahlgren, March 11, 1862, JADLC; Dahlgren to
Fox, March 17, 1862, NARG4 5— Entry 34.
32 Davis, Duel Between the First Iro nc la ds , p. 145;
Jones, The Civil War at S e a . II, p. 8; Dahlgren, March 16,
1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 8, JADSU; there w as also a
c ontroversy over the size of the charge used in the
Moni tor's guns.
Commander S. Dana Greene, w h o w a s the
executive officer on the Union Ironclad, w an te d to use a
double charge to Increase the velocity of the projectiles,
but di re ct io ns from the ordnance bureau did not al low it.
Later experiments showed that the Xl-inch guns could
w i t h s t a n d the heavier charge.
See, S. Dana Greene, "In the
'Monitor' Turret," in, Ba tt le s and Leaders of the Civil W a r .
4 vols. (New York, 1884-1887), I, pp. 719-29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135

33Dah Igren, March 16,
JADSU.

1862, Journal

Entry, Vol. 8,

34William N. Fowler, Under Two Flags: The American Navv
In the Civil War (New York, 1990), pp. 84-93; Bern Anderson,
Bv .Sea .and_Bv River: The Naval History of the Civil War (New
York, 1962), pp. 78-79; Jones, The Civil War at S e a . II, pp.
6-14; Fox to Dahlgren, March 11, 1662, JADLC.
35N1 v e n , Gideon W e i l e s . p. 423; Fox to DuPont, April 3,
1862, in, Gustavus Vasa Fox, Confidential Correspondence of
Gus-t.avus Vasa Fox: Assistant Secretary of the Navv.
1861-1865. 2 vols., ed. Robert Means Thompson and Richard
Wainwright (New York, 1918-1919; reprint edition, New York,
1972), I, pp. 114-15, hereafter cited as, Fox
C or respondence; Welles to Ordnance Bureau, March 17, 1862,
excerpt in, U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Report 121, 38th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct
of the War, Hearings on Heavy Ordnance, p. 127, hereafter
cited as, "Heavy Ordnance."
36Dahlgren to Navy Department, January 31, 1862,
NARG45-Entry 34; Dahlgren to Harwood, March 19, 1862, JADLC;
an excerpt of this report is also in, "Heavy Ordnance," p.
128; a number of historians have suggested that Dahl gr en /s
primary objection to the fifteen-inch gun was that it was
designed by Rodman.
The two ordnance specialists used
different methods to cast their guns.
Dahlgren cast his
guns as a solid cylinder, boring out the muzzle and lathing
the outside of the gun to its final dimensions.
Rodman cast
his guns hollow, cooling the gun from the inside with water.
Each believed his meth od was superior for creating durable
guns and they argued about this continuously through the
1850s and early 1860s.
But by the early 1860s most ordnance
makers were coming to believe that Rodman's method was
superior for large guns.
Even Dahlgren appeared to give
support to this because as he argued against the immediate
production of 15-lnch guns he proposed using a modified
version of his Xl-lnch guns for the new monitors, cast on
Rodman's hollow casting principle, and reinforced with a
wrought-iron band shrunk over the breech like that used on
some other guns.
Thus it appears that Dahlgren's belief
that the war was coming to an end was his primary objection
to casting additional 15-inch guns at this time. See
Dahlgren to Harwood, March 19, 1862, Ibid.; for the
technical details of Dahlgren's and Rodman's casting
methods, see, Tucker, Arming the F l e e t , pp. 68-71, 218-21;
for contemporary support of Rodman's casting method over
Dahlgren's, see, Alexander L. Holley, A Treatise on Ordnance
and A r m o r . (New York, 1865); for a different perspective on

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136

this controversy, see, Schneller,
Innovator," pp. 290-302.

"The Contentious

37Harwood to Dahlgren, March 20, 1862, excerpt in,
"Heavy Ordnance," p. 128; Dahlgren to Harwood, March 26,
1862, excerpt in, Ibid.; Harwood to Dahlgren, April 4, 1862,
excerpt in, Ibid.; Dahlgren to Harwood, April 7, 1862,
excerpt in, Ibid., pp. 128-29; Dahlgren to Fox, May 8, 1862,
NARG4 5— Entry 34; since the Navy itself did not have the
capacity to cast 15-inch guns, it contracted with the Fort
Pitt foundry, which had cast Rodman's 15-inch gun.
38Dah lgren, April 9, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 9,
J A D S U ; Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClel Ian:. The Young
Napoleon (New York, 1988), pp. 174-75, 180; McClellan to
Stanton, January 31, 1862, in, Sears, The Civil War Papers
of M c C l e l la n . p. 168; Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston:
A Civil War Biography (New York, 1992), pp. 143-46.
39Sears, Y oung N a p o l e o n , pp. 168-75; McClellan to
Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, April 1, 1862, in, Civil
War Papers of M cC le l la n , pp. 222-23; besides McDowell's men,
Lincoln withheld Blenker's division, about 10,000 men,
see,
Lincoln to McClellan, March 31, 1862, in, Col 1ected W o r k s .
V, pp. 175-76; McClellan expressed his "regret" at this, but
also wrote to the President, "I fully appreciate, however,
the circumstances of the case, 8. hasten to assure you that I
cheerfully acquiesce in your decision without any
reservation." See, McClellan to Lincoln, March 31, 1862, in,
Sears, Civil War Papers of M c C l e l l a n , pp. 219-20.
40Sears, Young N a p o l e o n , pp. 175-78; T. Harry Williams,
Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison, Wisconsin, 1941), pp.
77-140; Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans:
Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice (New York, 1969), pp.
180-96; Elbert B. Smith, Francis Preston Blair (New York,
1980), pp. 324-26; at the heart of the Radical Republicans
attack on McClellan w as his political party affiliation.
As
a Democrat he was immediately suspect.
Adding to the
opposition by Radical Rebublicans to McClellan were the
numerous statements he made against tying the war to
slavery; this, coupled with his military decisions sealed
his fate with the Radical Republicans.
4 *The entire discussion about bringi ng Fremont east is
in, Dahlgren, April 19, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 9, JADSU;
for additional details, see, Williams, Lincoln and the
RasUgala, pp. 38-42, 48-50, 105-09; Trefousse, The Radical
R e p u b 1 leans, pp. 175-77, 192; Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P.
Chase: A Life in Politics (Kent, Ohio, 1987), pp. 175-76;
McPherson, Battle Crv of F r e e d o m . 424-25.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

4 3Dahlgren, April
JADSU.

22,

1862, Journal

Entry, Vol. 9,

43T r e f o u s s e , Radical R e p u b l i c a n s . pp. 192-93; McClellan
to Stanton, April 4, 1862, in, Sears, Civil War Papers of
McClel 1a n . p. 227, McClellan to Stanton, April
7, 1862, in,
Ibid., pp. 232-33; McClellan to Lincoln, April
7, 1862, in,
Ibid., pp. 233-34; McClellan to Stanton, May 4, 1862, in,
Ibid., p. 254; see also, Lincoln to McClellan, April 6,
1862, in, Col 1ected W o r k s . V, p. 182; Lincoln to McClellan,
April 9, 1862, in, Ibid., pp. 184-85.
44Dah)gren, May 5, 1862, Journal
underline in the original.

Entry, Vol.

9, JADSU,

45Dahlgren, May 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1862, Journal
Entries, Ibid.; Sears, Young N a p o l e o n , p. 185; McClellan to
Mary Ellen McClellan, May 15, 1862, in, Sears, Civil War
Eagers of M c C l e l l a n , p. 267.
46Dahlgren, May 22, 23, 24,
9, JADSU.

1862, Journal

Entries, Vol.

47Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A B i o g r a p h y . 4
v o 1s . (New York, 1934-1935), II, pp. 30-40.
4®A portrait of Jackson and the “Valley Campaign" can
be followed in the recent biographies of the general, see,
John Bowers, Stonewall Jackson: Portrait of a Soldier (New
York, 1989); Byron Farwell, Stonewall: A Biography of
General Thomas J. Jackson (New York, 1992); Bevin Alexander,
Lost Victories: The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson
(New York, 1992).
4^Dahlgren, May 24, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 9, JADSU;
Lincoln to McDowell, May 24, 1862, Collected W o r k s . V, pp.
232-33; Lincoln to McDowell, May 24, 1862, Ibid., p. 233;
Lincoln to McClellan, May 24, 1862, Ibid., p. 232.
^ D a h l g r e n ,

May 25,

1862, Journal

Entry, Vol. 9, JADSU.

5 1 Dahlgren, April 26, May 29, 1862, Journal

Entries,

Ibid.
5 3 Dahlgren, May 30, 1862, Journal Entry, Ibid.;
McDowell to Stanton, May 24, 1862, in, Collected W o r k s . V,
n. p. 233; McDowell to Lincoln, May 24, 1862, Ibid.;
McClellan to Lincoln, May 28, 1862, Ibid., n., p. 244.
5 3 For recent accounts of this battle from the
perspective of the respective generals in charge, see,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

Sears, Yo un g N a p o l e o n , pp.
J o h n s t o n , pp. 140-74.

168-248; Symonds, Joseph E.

54McClellan to Lincoln, April 20, 1862, in Sears, Civil
War Papers of M c C l e l l a n , pp. 244-45; for an analysis of
Lee's strategy in the Seven Days' Battles, see, Freeman, R.
E. L e e . II, pp. 108-250.
^ L i n c o l n to McClellan, July 1, 1862, Col 1ected W o r k s .
V, p. 298; Dahlgren, July 5, 1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 9,
JADSU.
56 Dahlgren,
Entries, Ibid.
57 Dahlgren,

June 29, July 2, 3, 5, 1862, Journal

July 5, 1862, Journal

Entry,

Ibid.

5 8 Ibid.
5 9 Ibi d.
60 Dahlgren, July 5, 1862, Journal Entry, Ibid.; a few
days after this, Dahlgren thought better of his answer and
he tried to withdraw his nomination.
In describing the
position, Dahlgren stated, "however useful!, it] is still to
be considered as inferior" to command afloat.
Welles,
however, already had the answer that he want ed from
Dahlgren, and he refused to withdraw his nomination. See,
Dahlgren to Welles, July 12, 1862, JADLC; Dahlgren, July 11,
1862, Journal Entry, Vol. 9, JADSU.
6 1Dahlgren, July 5, 21, 1862, Journal

Entries,

Ibid.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter IV
The Failed Coup
"I ask for no addition to my present rank,
... that of Captain is quite sufficient."
Dahlgren was not the only one to receive a setback
during the summer of 1862.

The Union's military prospects,

which seemed so promising in the spring, had changed
dramatically by mid-summer.

McClellan's failed Peninsula

Campaign was Just one part of the turnaround.

General

John

Pope, who had been brought to the East after building a
reputation as a bold, aggressive fighter in the West, proved
an utter failure.

Pope became the second Union general

suffer a defeat along the banks of Bull Run.
Union forces under Grant
Carlos Buell
campaigns.

to

In the West,

in Mississippi and General

Don

in Kentucky, bogged down in their respective
The navy had its string of seemingly

uninterrupted successes broken during the summer when
Farragut failed to capture Vicksburg.

After his successes

against McClellan and Pope, Lee marched the Army of Northern
Virginia into Maryland,

throwing Washington and the rest of

the North into its most

intense panic yet.

Where Lee was

and what were his intentions were unknown, which only added
139
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to the disquietude which enveloped the North.
Department had a solution to these problemst
Charleston, South Carolina.

But the Navy
to capture

This campaign woul d have

enormous implications for Dahlgren and in order to
understand them fully it is necessary to follow in some
detail

the Navy Department's policy toward Charleston since

the start of the war.
During the Civil War the Union navy w as administered
essentially by a two-man team.
Welles,

At the top was Gideon

the secretary of the navy.

political

appointment.

Welles was a classic

The former Jacksonlan-Democrat from

Connecticut made a perfect addition to the Cabinet
Lincoln's effort to achieve geographical
balance.

in

and political

That We lles had administrative experience

in the

Navy Department as the Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and
Clothing during the Polk presidency was all
Intelligent,

the better.

efficient, hard-working, Welles pr oved to be,

in the estimation of naval historians,

"one of the ablest

Secretaries in ... CU. S. Navy] history."

This historical

Judgement, however, comes with the benefit of viewing Welles
long after his tenure

in command h ad ended.

His

contemporaries had no such vantage point from which to Judge
him, and at the outset of the Civil War few people believed
that the long-time Journalist from Hartford was up to the
task of administering the Navy Department.1
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The other half of the naval administrative team was
Gustavus Vasa Fox.

Like Welles's, his route to the Navy

Department also requires explanation.

Fox was the

superintendent of a ml 11 in Lowell, Massachusetts, when

in

early January 1861 he h ea r d about the first expedition to
relieve Fort Sumter.

A former navy officer, he rushed to

N ew York and visited Marshall Roberts, president of the
steamship company which owned the Star of the W e s t , the
vessel

that the government chartered for the expedition.

Fox knew Roberts from his navy duty.

He asked Roberts to

allow him to lead the operation, but Roberts told him that a
commander had already been assigned.

But when the Star of

the West was driven off by cannon fire on January 9,
Fox had another opportunity to offer the federal
h is services.

1861,

government

While most of Lincoln's advisors were

counselling the President to evacuate Fort Sumter, Fox was
telling Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, his
brother-in-law,
Sumter.

that he had a foolproof plan to reinforce

Blair brought Fox to Washington;

he heard and placed Fox
resupply Fort Sumter.
Charleston

Lincoln

liked what

in charge of the operation to
But Fox's expedition arrived off

in the early m o r n in g hours of April

12, Just

in

time to witness the bombardment of Fort Sumter.2
Despite the failure, Lincoln thought highly of Fox.
The President told him,
that the failure

"I most cheerfully and truly declare

... has not

lowered you a particle, while
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the qualities you developed in the effort have greatly
h eightened you,
commission

in my estimation."

in the navy.

Lincoln offered Fox a

Neither Fox nor P ostmaster General

Blair thought that a command at sea was a good thing,
"especially,"

Fox told his wife,

one only of blockade."

“as the naval war will be

Rather than being lost somewhere on

blockade duty, Blair suggested an administrative spot
Navy Department.

Unlike today's bureaucratic giant,

in the
the

pre-Civil War Navy Department consisted of the secretary of
the navy, a chief clerk, and a handful
draughtsman,

and messengers.

of assistant clerks,

The obvious position for Fox

was the department's second highest post of chief clerk
which was more

like that of assistant secretary than it was

a clerk's position, but W e l le s had already selected someone
else for the Job.

A compromise proposed by Blair was w o rk ed

out by creating a new post

in the department,

assistant secretary of the navy,

that of

to be given to Fox.

Besides being an obvious reward to Fox, this arrangement,
ac co rd in g to Welles 's biographer John Niven, was designed to
split duties in the Navy Department.
"supervise office management, official

Well es wo ul d
correspondence, and

routine a d m i n i st r at i on .. ..Fox w o ul d have primary
responsibility for professional m at te r s— operational
planning, communication with squadron commanders, direct
supervision of fleet movements,

and the blockade."

In other
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words,

Fox as assistant secretary of the navy was the

driving force behind Union naval

strategy.®

Despite exhortations to "starve, drown, burn,
shoot the traitors" of Charleston,

[and!

the necessity of

establishing the blockade precluded Fox from ordering an
attack against Charleston

in the early part of the war.

This did not mean than Fox forgot about Charleston
altogether.

In the spring of 1861, Fox had organized a

b oard of officers to help him develop a plan for blockading
the Confederacy.

Among the board's recommendations was a

suggestion to block access to North Carolina's inland waters
by sinking s tone-filled hulks In the passes through the
Outer Banks.

Fox seized on the idea and proposed to do the

same thing in the shipping channels of some of the
Confederacy's major ports.

Not surprisingly,

the first port

he su ggested w as Charleston.4
There were sound reasons for not attempting to obstruct
Charleston's ship channels.
North Carolina had mi l d tidal

While the inland waters of
fluctuations and currents, at

Charleston both the tides and currents were exceedingly
strong.

Most naval

experts believed that either the vessels

w ould be w a s h e d away, or new channels w o ul d form.
Samuel

Captain

Francis DuPont, who was in command of the Union's

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, c onsidered the operation
"a thorn

in the flesh," an "elephant,"

that he wanted to

"dispose of so soon as I can find means."

But no matter how
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he felt privately, he admitted that the plan "was a hobby of
Fox's which nothing could put out of his head."®
The question of probable success was not the only
concern that people had about the operation.
modern mind,

Perhaps the

long tempered by the concept of total war,

views the permanent blocking of a harbor with obstructions
as within the rules of war, but the same could not be said
of military
were aghast.
officer

leaders in the mid-nineteenth century.
Captain Charles Henry Davis,

Many

the Union navy

in charge of sinking the "stone fleet," as it was

called, decried his participation,

"Ctlhls is disagreeable

duty, and one of the last I should have selected."®
General Lee,

in charge of establishing the Confederate

defenses along the south Atlantic coast at the time,
bristled at the Union operation.
noted,

"The achievement,

Reporting the event Lee

so unworthy any nation,

is the

abortive expression of the malice & revenge of a people
which they wish to perpetuate by rendering more memorable a
day hateful

in their calendar."7

The Northern press viewed the "stone fleet" very
differently.

Rather than objects of scorn,

the old battered

wh al i ng ships used in the operation were the "mediums"

of

"righteous retribution" which had finally begun against this
most detested of southern cities.®
Even though Fox had wanted to attack Charleston since
the first days of the war, he believed that

it w ou l d require
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a large combined navy and army expedition.

Fox's thinking

changed with the success of the Mon 1tor In March 1862.

The

Ironclad had, according to Fox, eliminated the need for army
cooperation.

"[Slo soon as the Merimacik]

Fox told Captain DuPont,
Galena,

is disposed of,"

"We can give you the Monitor and

... the former can go up to Charleston and return

perfect s a f e t y . ...What do you say to it," he asked,
what should you require besides these vessels?"

in

"and

He could

s end DuPont at least another "dozen vessels," but with the
Mon itor these should not be necessary.

He assured DuPont

that with the Mon 1tor he could strike the war's "crowning
act of retribution."9
Fox believed that DuPont was the perfect man for the
job.

Probably the most distinguished officer in the navy at

the beginning of the Civil War, DuPont had become one of
Fox's most

Important advisors,

blockade board.

including heading the

Not surprisingly, when Fox assigned

commanders to the separate squadrons which the blockade
board h ad recommended as the best way to Implement the
blockade, Fox gave DuPont command of the South Atlantic
B lockading Squadron, which

Included Charleston.

His command

to date gave Fox only more reason to believe that DuPont
w ou l d now capture Charleston.

In November 1861, he had

captured Port Royal, South Carolina, which now served as the
Union's major base of operations on the southern Atlantic
coast.

But Just as important to Fox, DuPont had the proper
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views about the Civil War and South Carolina.

Never an

anti-slavery advocate before the war, DuPont changed his
m i nd once he landed on the southern coast.

Writ ing to a

friend after his first visit to a plantation, he wrote:
may God forgive me for the word s I have ever
uttered in its t sl av er y/s] defense as intertwined
in our Constitution.
I have been a sturdy
conservative on this question, defended It over
the world, a rgued for it as patriarchal in its
tendencies, which I b el ie ve d it to be in the old
cotton states, p articularly in this [South
Carolina]; the condition of the slaves w as far in
advance of the race in Africa, etc.
Oh my! What a
delusion— there are no swine in Massachusetts not
better cared for.
The Dahomeys and Congos are
better o ff — these cotton lords who have been
boasting of their wealth and power, ... have never
spent a dollar in a me li or ati ng the condition of
these people physically.
DuPont wa nte d to return the southern states to the Union,
and "hopeCd it] not far off now."
be the exception," he noted grimly,
dealt with as Cromwell

But South Carolina "will
"and she will have to be

r e com me nd ed as the only true policy

for Ireland."1°
From the time that he began to consider operations
against Charleston,

DuPont b el ie ve d that it wou ld require a

combined navy and army operation to take the city.

A sailor

from the "Old Navy," he w a s not as enthralled with the
Moni tor as w as Fox.
m is le d by other naval

DuPont also worried that Fox had been
victories, especially Fa rr a gu t /s

running past forts St. Philip a nd Jackson at the mouth of
the Mississippi, which allo we d h im to take New Orleans.
"Think coolly and dispassionately on the maln
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object— remember there is no running the gauntlet, night or
day,— no bombardment of a week to fatigue and
demoralize— the defenses of Mississippi
comparison."

the merest sham in

Charleston's harbor was ringed with batteries,

he reminded Fox, and the vessels w ould always be under fire,
as if "in a 'cul de sac' or bog.
this,"

DuPont told Fox,

I merely allude to a l 1

"that your own

Intelligent and

brave mi nd may not be carried away by a superficial
recent events, where the results have beenC,]

view of

thank God for

his mercies, so great that the difficulties have been
naturally overrated.
he closed,
do ours,

"that

I only have to add on this subject,"

if the enemy do their duty as we expect to

then it must be a 'do or die' w o r k . " 11

With his new found confidence in the Mon it o r . Fox had
no intention of ma ki n g the attack on Charleston a Joint
navy-army operation.

When he received DuPont's letter, Fox

immediately responded that while a navy-only assault "may be
Impossible,
the navy.
army,

... the crowning act of this war ought to be by
I feel," showing incredible bitterness toward the

“that my duties are two fold; first to beat our

southern friends;

second,

to beat the Army."

He concluded

by reminding DuPont of Port Royal and N e w Orleans.

In both

places, he happily noted, the army "looked on" as the navy
received the accolades.
Interservice rivalry was one thing, but even more
Important to Fox was the destruction of Charleston.

He was
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convinced the war was coming to a close,
Charleston for the closing act...."
the Moni tor was "absolutely

"which leaves

Fox assured DuPont that

impregnable,"

and with it he

could "go all over the harbor and return with

impunity."

He

then closed with his strongest statement about Charleston
yet,

"I pray you give us Charleston

... for the Fall of

Charleston is the Fall of Satan's K in g do m ." 13
As Fox implored DuPont to destroy Charleston, military
events elsewhere made this a secondary consideration.

While

in early May Fox w as positive that R ic hmond w a s about to
fall, by early July all of the Union military plans in the
East had unraveled.
Peninsula,

With McClellan's reverses on the

rather than being sent the Moni t o r . DuPont

received orders to send as many ships as he could spare to
Hampton Roads.

Fox told DuPont that the "reverse at

Richmond has forced us to pack [the] James River with
gunboats to save the army.

26 of our best craft are there."

It w as "unfortunate," Fox lamented, but a "necessity."14
Fox characterized the summer as the "Dark days" for the
North.

Despite this, Fox w as anything but pessimistic.

fact, he may have been the most optimistic person
North.

In

in the

While admittedly upset about the Union's recent

defeats, which had even brought Confederate flags within
sight of the Capitol building again, Fox showed supreme
confidence.
shall

He told DuPont,

strike the flood soon."

"we shall come out of it....we
What wa s necessary, Fox
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realized, was a military victory.
place for one, Charleston.

He also had the perfect

Thus, on September 10, orders

were sent to DuPont to report "in person"

to the Navy

Department "as soon as prac ti ca ble ." 1^
Fox was not the only person

In Washington w ho anxiously

awaited DuPont's arrival; so too did John Dahlgren.
a week of accepting the Ordnance Bureau position,
realized that he might have made a fatal mistake
effort to become an admiral.

Within

Dahlgren
in his

While he had succeeded In

getting the admiral's bill altered so that distinguished
service other than in battle also qualified an officer for
the new rank, one other significant change had been made
the bill.
Thanks"

In

Only those officers w ho received a "Vote of

for their service during the war could be considered

for promotion to admiral.

Dahlgren's friendship with

Lincoln meant that he certainly did not have to worry about
the President recommending him for this honor; but that by
Itself was not enough.

The President's recommendation was

Just that, a recommendation; and It required the approval
both houses of Congress.

of

Dahlgren did Indeed receive the

President's recommendation, but when It came before the
Senate Naval Affairs Committee

It was blocked.

Furthermore,

Dahlgren learned that the reason for this was because one
Influential committee member believed that the rank of
admiral w as Intended only for those officers who
distinguished themselves in battle.

It w a s clear to
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Dahlgren that the only sure way to win the promotion that he
so greatly coveted w as to secure a command afloat and to win
a b a t t 1e .16
As soon as Dahlgren learned that DuPont h a d been
ordered to Washington, he put a plan Into action to try to
secure his command for himself.

On October 1, 1862,

Dahlgren submitted a most remarkable request to Welles.
Sir: I am induced by circumstances to renew my
request for service afloat, In c ommand of the
forces that are to enter the harbor of Charleston,
which will probably occur very soon.
How far my antecedents Justify so great a
trust I respectfully leave to the consideration of
the Department, without remark from me.
I must
say, however, that the operation will be almost
entirely restricted to the application of the
ordnance, and in this I should be able to claim
some advantage.
There could hardly be any special exception
as regards rank, because the acti ng rear-admiral
of the Northern Atlantic Squadron (Captain Lee) is
only the fourth officer above me, and it is
understood that Commander Porter, w ho is an entire
grade b el ow me, is to command the Mississippi
Flotilla with suitable rank.
As Rear-Admiral DuPont is now about to leave
his command, I b eg leave to suggest the
opportunity as convenient; this distinguished
officer has had, and well used the occasion
offered, and would, I presume, offer no objection
to some r esp it e. 17
As reasonable as he tried to make

it appear, Dahlgren

knew his request w a s anyth in g but that; and by itself,
w o ul d never be approved by Secretary Welles.

it

But if

Dahlgren had learned anything in his mor e than thirty-five
years in the navy,

it w as h ow to promote his own

The same day that he made hi s formal

Interests.

request for command of
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the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren also wrote
to President Lincoln.

I have submitted a formal application to the Navy
Department for command of the sea forces that are
to attack the Charleston Forts.
Two officers now have Flag commands, one of
w h o m (Captain Lee) Is the fourth above me and the
other (Commander Porter) Is of a rank below mine.
I only mention the facts to show no objection can
be made to my rank and not that I question the
propriety of their appointment which I believe to
be well deserved.
The command that 1 ask for is responsible,
but not more so than that of this Yard which I
h e l d under critical circumstances, and the Bureau
of Ordnance which I now occupy.
The work to be done belongs almost entirely
to the Ordnance of our ships, and I may be
pe rm it te d some consideration on this account.
As Admiral DuPont has reaped so many laurels,
I am sure he would not object.
May I ask, if you entertain any proposition
at all, that I may be favored with an early
decision.
For Battle is only the harvest of
p r e o a r a t 1o n . and much of this remains to be done.
I ask for no addition to my present rank, In
order to perform this duty— that of Captain is
quite s u f f i c i e n t .
Wh il e similar in most respects,

there was one

significant difference between Dahlgren's letter to the
President and the one that he sent to the secretary of the
navy.

W he n w r i t in g to the President, Dahlgren made a

po inted reference to his command of the Washington Navy
Yard.

Th i s w as a not so subtle reminder to the President

that he h a d remained loyal

to the Union at a time when many

other officers were leaving it.
but

Of course,

the unstated,

implicit point he was making was that now,

in his hour
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of need, he could expect the President's loyalty, could he
no t ?19
Dahlgren's effort to try and seize command of the South
Atlantic Blockading Squadron w as carefully timed.

Planning

for the naval assault against Charleston had been under way
for more than a year and it looked like the active campaign
w ould begin shortly.

To discuss final plans, DuPont had

been ordered to Washington, and he arrived in the capital on
October 2.

Dahlgren's move coincided perfectly with

DuPont's a r r i v a l .20
One of the more notable similarities between the
letters that Dahlgren sent to Welles and Lincoln w as his
assertion that DuPont would willingly step aside to allow
him to take command.

In his two letters Dahlgren referred

to DuPont as having already "distinguished"
having "reaped so many

laurels;"

sure he w ould not object"

himself, and

therefore, he argued,

to being relieved.

"I am

This would be

very difficult for Welles and Lincoln to believe, unless of
course, DuPont suggested it himself.
set out to get DuPont to do Just that.

Amazingly,

Dahlgren

Besides the obvious

problem of personally asking DuPont to step down in favor of
himself, Dahlgren did not enjoy a close relationship with
him.

Thus it did not make sense for him to try to persuade

DuPont personally.

But they did have a mutual, and highly

respected friend, Andrew Hull Foote, and Dahlgren did not
have any problem in asking a friend to help him in his
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cause.

In a letter to Fox, DuPont recounted how Dahlgren's

effort materialized.

He told Fox:

I forgot to tell you the other day, because I
never had a chance to see you alone, that Foote
... made a most extraordinary appeal to me to give
up my command to Dahlgren.
I w as astounded, but
as to what pass ed I w l 11 reserve untii we
m e e t — simply observing that Dahlgren is a diseased
man on the subject of preferment and position.
As
I told Foote, he chose one line In the walks of
his profession while Foote and I chose another; he
w as licking cream while we were eating dirt and
living on the pay of our rank.
Now he wants all
the honors belonging to the other but without
hav in g encountered Its Joltin gs— it is a disease
and nothing else.
Dahlgren may have believed that he could convince DuPont to
step aside, but this belief may properly be described as
no th in g more than a delusion on his p a r t . 21
The full extent of Dahlgren's efforts did not reveal
themselves until

a few days after he submitted his Initial

request to Welles.

President Lincoln

a.m., on October 1, to visit General

left Washington at 6
McClellan and the Army

of the Potomac then at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and he only
returned to the capital at 10 p.m. on October 4 .
in all probability,

Therefore,

the President w a s not in a position to

k no w of Dahlgren's request any earlier than October 5.
DuPont himself did not arrive to see W e ll e s until

October 2,

so the mee ti ng between him and Foote could not have taken
place at least until

that day.22

Not yet knowing the full details of Dahlgren's actions,
W e lle s recorded his feelings about Dahlgren's request.
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“Dahlgren," he wrote,

"has asked to be assigned the special

duty for capturing Charleston, but DuPont has had that
object

In view for more than a year and made It his study.

I cannot,
Admiral

though I appreciate Dahlgren, supersede the

In this work."

Ironically,

had decided to replace Rear-Admiral

that same day Welles
Charles H. Davis, w h o

co mmanded the Mississippi Squadron, with Commander David
Dixon Porter, and Well es be li ev ed that this decision w o u l d
infuriate Dahlgren.

Furthermore, Well es believed this w ou ld

involve Lincoln because, W e ll e s noted,

"the President will

sympathize with D.tahlgrenl w h o m he regards with favor while
he has not great admiration or respect for Porter."

Perhaps

if he h ad known about Dahlgren's October 1 letter to the
President, Welle s may have h ad even sharper comments to
record in his diary.

But still, considering the audacity of

D ahlgren's letter, Welle s' s remarks are remarkably free of
passion, although he noted that Dahlgren's request ha d to be
r ej ec te d and DuPont w ou l d retain his command.2®
Welle s finally had an opportunity to see the President
at the Cabinet me et in g on October 6.
me nt io n

While Welles made no

in his diary of having discussed either Dahlgren or

the Charleston command, events during the next few days
suggest that the President had indeed broached the subject;
and during this mee tin g the two of them appeared to have
r eached a compromise on how to deal with Dahlgren.24
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T wo days later Welle s finally responded to Dahlgren's
request.

He told him that DuPont had Indeed “been called to

Washington to concert measures for this attack!;]" but,

"the

Department can not consent to deprive him of the honor of
leading and directing these forces."

All w a s not

lost for

Dahlgren, because, Welles continued,

"Your natural

desire

...

is appreciated, and if you desire it, you can have

orders to an ironclad that will

take part

ordnance officer to this special

force."

In the attack, as
W e ll es attached

one condition, Dahlgren h ad to retain his "position as Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance."25
The unlikely architect of this proposal
have been Fox.

appeared to

The assistant secretary of the navy had

twice earlier recommended that Dahlgren not be given a
command afloat.

While the ostensible reason for this was

that he considered Dahlgren too valuable as head of the
Navy's ordnance,

this was probably not the only cause.

personally detested Dahlgren.

Fox

In a letter to a friend, Fox

de cr ie d Dahlgren's past success in lobbying Congress,
noting,

"he has m ol de d all naval Legislation for ten years."

Fox also realized the possible consequences if Dahlgren went
to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron:

"If he takes

Charleston he will dictate for the rest of his life to the
Service."

Despite his misgivings, Fox was obviously willing

to risk this if it would lead to the capture of Charleston.
Fox h ad grown concerned about DuPont, who had become

less
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and less sure of the wisdom of attacking the city and the
final

straw for Fox may have been when DuPont told hi m to

"not go It half cocked about Charleston."26
Fox w a s convinced that Charleston could be easily
captu re d by a monitor or two, and the monitors contracted
for after the Virginia scare the previous spring were
s cheduled for completion that fall.

All

that was necessary,

so it seemed to Fox, was to give one of the vessels to a
bol d commander who w ould steam his way past Fort Sumter and
capture Charleston itself and he h ad two reasons to think
that Dahlgren would do Just that.
The first was obvious.
associ at ed with,

The opportunity to be

if not given the outright credit for, the

capture of Charleston, was exactly the kind of distinguished
service which would surely secure Dahlgren his coveted
promotion to admiral.
Dahlgren h ad a less obvious, but just as important an
incentive to act boldly
of the new ironclads.
Union

if he w as given the command of one
The new monitors,

like the original

ironclad, were designed to carry two Dahlgren guns.

Officially,

Dahlgren had only received praise from Welles

for m e e t in g the dramatically

increased ordnance demands

since the start of the war.

But even before the battle

between the Mon 1tor and Virginia h ad led to controversy and
c riticism of Dahlgren and his guns, people had begun to
criticize the Navy's ordnance, especially the relative lack
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of heavy rifled guns.

Rifling overcame the Inherent

weaknesses of smoothbore guns, namely
range.

It also put

Inaccuracy and short

increased strain on a gun, which made It

more susceptible to bursting.

While

It w o ul d take advances

In metallurgy and ordnance engineering not made until after
the Civil War before dependable heavy rifled ordnance pieces
would be available for w idespread use, publicity about
England's Armstrong, Whitworth,

and Blakely cannon made it

appear that dependable rifled cannon already existed by the
beginning of the war.

Partially because of the United

States Navy's conservatism, and partially because he devoted
most of his energy
shell-guns adopted,

in the 1850s to getting his smoothbore
Dahlgren h ad been slow to begin work

with rifled ordnance.

But by the

late 1850s, Dahlgren had

begun experimenting with rifling and in the early months of
the war the navy began using a series of his rifled guns.
While looking outwardly
shell-guns,

like his large smoothbore

the rifled Dahlgren guns did not demonstrate the

same endurance as his smoothbores,

a nd since the beginning

of the war a number of them h ad burst during shipboard use.
The most recent and perhaps most spectacular occurrence of
this happened Just a month before the Moni tor and Virginia
battle, during the Navy's assault on Roanoke Island.
report of the accident on the U..S.S. Hetzel

The

read:

At 5:15, rifled [Dahlgren! 80-pdr. aft, loaded
with 6 pounds of powder and solid Dahlgren shot,
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80 pounds, burst. In the act of firing, into four
principle pieces; the gun forward of the trunnions
fell on deck, one third of the breech passe d over
mastheads and fell clear of ship on s tarboard bow,
one struck on port quarter, and the fourth piece,
weigh in g about 1000 pounds, driven through the
deck and magazine, bringing upon the keelson; set
fire to the ship.
Because of this, all of the Dahlgren 80-pounder rifles, and
a number of the Dahlgren 30-pounder rifles were withdrawn
from service.

The failure of Dahlgren's rifled ordnance,

coupled with the criticism of his smoothbore guns after the
Mon 1tor failed to sink the Virginia gave Dahlgren great
incentive to see that the new monitors were a success
because their success would also serve as a vindication for
his smoothbore shell-guns and his ideas about ordnance

in

g e n e r a l .27
Maybe because

it had been his idea in the first place,

Fox w as accorded the unenviable task of Informing DuPont
what the Navy Department had decided to do with Dahlgren.
He wrote unofficially to DuPont, who, after me et i ng with
Welles and Fox
Wilmington,

in Washington, had gone to his home near

Delaware.

the war bugles,

Fox told him,

"Dahlgren frets under

and I shall advise that he either take an

ironclad with you or go as your ordnance officer:

the latter

w o ul d be more proper."

"let him

DuPont quickly shot back,

take an Ironclad a nd I shall be glad to have h i m as one of
my captains."

But as to Fox's suggestion that Dahlgren

serve as the fleet ordnance officer, DuPont stated,

"it is
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simply

Impossible— that cannot be and I want that

understood."

As DuPont finished his remarks, he must have

w on d er e d what wo ul d happen with Dahlgren.28
If DuPont w orried about the possibility of having
Dahlgren assigned to him as ordnance officer, he need not
have.

Fox never told Dahlgren that he w as behind the

secretary's proposal, and after receiving it Dahlgren
decided that he was in the driver's seat.
consideration,
possible,
initial

Dahlgren replied to the secretary, and if

showed even more audacity than he did in his

request.

"because,"

After a few days

He agreed to accept command of an ironclad

he said,

"I am wi ll in g to render any service that

the country may demand."

He did not wish to retain his

Ordnance Bureau position, however.

Dahlgren also showed

that his statement that his request for the Charleston
command h ad nothing to do with his desire for promotion was
a boldface

lie.

He told Welles that, as proferred,

r e p o n s i b i 1ity he would have
more than equal

the

in the Charleston attack was no

to that of many officers Junior to him,

which "must necessarily be attended by a sense of painful
humiliation, which the Department might well
Inflict on one whose professional

forbear to

standing has ever been

without blemish, and who during the present struggle to
maintain the Union has discharged the highest duties that a
naval

officer can render near the Government.".

Therefore,

he requested that he be allowed "to hoist the flag of a
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rear-admiral .... It will

In a measure relieve me from the

stigma that must attend my service as a captain afloat,
while a junior by a whole grade commands as a rear-admiral."
This was a last desperate attempt to salvage a de facto
command for himself.

As Dahlgren envisioned the assault,

it

w a s probable that because of the nature of the targets in
Charleston harbor DuPont w ou l d divide the ironclad fleet
Into two parts.

His hope w as that DuPont wo uld be with one

and Dahlgren would lead the other;

thus in effect, Dahlgren

w oul d have command of his own force.
Welles learned of Dahlgren's reaction to the offer to
command one of the Ironclads even before his ordnance chief
submitted his formal
furious.

answer.

Welles w as nothing less than

In his diary, he angrily wrote,

"My proposition

has not been received in the manner I expected."

Welles

also recognized that Dahlgren was in a position to cause
more problems for him than most officers because he "has his
appetite stimulated by the partiality of the President, who
does not hesitate to say to him and to me,

that he will give

h im the highest grade if I will send h im a letter to that
effect, or a letter of appointment."

Because of this,

W e l le s noted, Dahlgren "cannot be reasoned with.

He has yet

rendered no service afloat during the war, — has not been
under fire,— and is not on the direct road for professional
advancement.
knows it."

But he is a favorite with the President and
Welles then proceeded to criticize both the
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President and Secretary of War Stanton, perhaps Welles's
most detested enemy:

"The army practice of favoritism and

political partylsm cannot be pe rmitted in the Navy....I am
compelled,

therefore,

Dahlgren's promotion,
proper condition."

to stand between the President and
in order to maintain the service in

Welles concluded his long private tirade

with reference to Dahlgren's counter-offer of accepting an
Ironclad provided he receive a promotion to rear-admiral
be allowed to resign the Ordnance Bureau:

and

"This I can't

countenance or permit."30
Welles waited almost a week before he penn ed his formal
reply to Dahlgren's latest request, but even after six days
to cool down his anger still

showed.

Welles stated,

"Your

communication of the 11th Instant, placed in my hands
yesterday by yourself, has caused me both surprise and
regret."

He then proceeded to reply to each of Dahlgren's

propositions, starting with his request to replace
Rear-Admiral

Dupont and ending with his suggestion that he

resign his position in the Ordnance Beaurea.

To each

Welles's answer w as the same, the requests were simply
"inadmissible."

He then reminded Dahlgren of the

department's many favors to him.

"The honors bestowed upon

you have greatly exceeded those of any of your
contemporaries or any officer of equal grade from the
organization of the Government."

Thi s included giving him

command of the Washington Navy Y a r d and then ge tting "the
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law ... altered [so] that you might be continued in the
position which had been confided to you in a great and
trying emergency."

He did this even though he realized he

w o u l d be criticized; but he h a d endured the criticism
willingly, Welles now told Dahlgren, because "I was
satisfied of the rectitude of the course pursued and that
w hat w a s done w as for the best

Interests of the country."

In this same vein, Welles concluded by trying to call on
D ahlgren's sense of duty to the war effort and suggested,
that "in no position can you render the country so great
service as in the Ordnance Department, and in these times it
be co me s everyone to sacrifice all personal

considerations

for the good of the country."31
The bluntness of Welles's response made

it clear that

there w as no possibility of Dahlgren securing a spot

in the

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron which wo ul d allow him to
exercise

independent command.

When he finally replied to

the secretary of the navy's October 14 letter,

instead of

trying to strike some other arrangement to suit his own
desires, he tried to m e n d the rift w hich this incident had
opened between them.
Welles,

"It

He expressed his "regret,"

and told

is entirely unnecessary for me to say that my

s ervices are always subject to any disposition which may
p l ea se the Department."
He w a s also conciliatory.
Dahlgren,

A few days later, Welles responded.
He w a s "gratified," Welles told

that any "misunderstanding ... is removed."32
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During his month

long effort to seize control

of the

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren made few
references about

It In his private Journal.

the day after he sent his note of "regret"
of the navy, he made one brief comment.

On October 26,
to the secretary

"The Sec.Cretaryl

declined to let me go in a single vessel."

In light of the

facts of the case, Dahlgren's comment w as totally untrue;
but perhaps this was his way of convincing himself

that

it

was not his fault that he was still behind his desk in
Washington.
become,

His actions demonstrate how desperate he had

and no matter h ow he tried to paint his situation,

he must have recognized that he was further away from
service afloat than he had ever been.

Momentous events

would have to transpire before he would at last raise an
admiral's flag.33
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Chapter V
The Making of a Squadron Commander
"So I am at

last an Admiral

of the Republic"

Having failed in his bid to displace DuPont, Dahlgren
h a d little else to do but to devote his full attention to
his ordnance work.
solace;

Normally,

now, however,

of his failure.

all

this w o u l d have given him

it served to do w a s to remind him

This w as because he wa s work in g on the

Navy's new XV-inch guns, which he had designed for
Ericsson's new and improved monitors.

Scheduled for

completion that autumn, both the monitors and the guns were
intended for the navy's Charleston campaign.
From its outset,
nothing but headaches.

the XV-inch gun project gave Dahlgren
His failed effort to dissuade Welles

and Fox from proceeding with the project wa s followed by
problems in design, manufacture, and proof firing.
Production of the guns fell so far behind schedule that a
change in the armament of the new ironclads had to be made;
instead of carrying two XV-inch guns as originally

intended,

the improved monitors, beginning with the P a a s a 1c . the first
of

its class, were equipped with one XV-inch gun and one of
169
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Dahlgren's smaller Xl-lnch shell-guns.
matt er to the monitor's designer.

That did not really

Ericsson told Dahlgren

not to worry about the change because "I feel well convinced
that

[even] with only one of the large guns in each vessel

we shall be able to destroy all rebel craftC,]

inspire a

wh olesome dread in rebeldomt,] and prove to foreign powers
that we can punish
assurances,

intermeddling."

Despite Ericsson's

Dahlgren still wor ri ed a great deal about the

XV- in ch guns.

Not until he w as actually able to fire one of

the guns himself, which he did in mid-October,
any sign of relief, stating simply,
As chance

the gun "works w e l l . " 1

would have it, the first navy

ever m anufactured and the

did he show

XV-inch gun

Monitor arrived at the Washington

Navy Ya r d within days of each other,

the former for firing

tests and the latter for repairs, primarily to
machinery common to all of the monitors.

the delicate

This unlikely

convergence of the navy's most famous warship and the navy's
newest weapon
yard.

led to a steady stream of guests visiting the

Dahlgren usually relished these events because of the

opportunity that they p r ov id ed h i m to advance his own
interests; but

one set of visitors that came

ya rd could not

have given Dahlgren even the

pleasure.

down to the
least bit of

Before returning to his command off Charleston,

Rear-Admiral

DuPont, along wit h Assistant Secretary Fox,

vi sited to see both one of the guns and one of the vessels
that Fox w a s assuring him w o u l d enable him to capture
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Charleston easily.

Unfortunately, neither Dahlgren nor

DuPont commented upon the awkwardness of meeting so shortly
after the former's ill-fated attempt to secure the command
of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, but it is hard to
believe that both men did not have at least a few
Interesting thoughts about the situation.
comment about the XV-inch weapon, however.
wrote to his wife,

DuPont did
"The gun," he

"makes the effect upon you,

in size,

to

all other guns you have seen, great as some of these are,
that the elephant
the small

in a menagerie does,

quadrupeds.

in comparison with

They are to be on the new

m o n i t o r s ! ; 3" and with uncharacteristic optimism he
concluded,

"with a sufficient number of these vessels so

armed they would tear away,

I believe,

the walls of fort s. "2

DuPont's positive comments about the XV-inch gun was
one of the few good things associated with the project that
occur re d that fall.

Problems continued to plague almost

every aspect of the operation.

Equipment at the Fort Pitt

Foundry broke down repeatedly.

Thus the foundry's initial

assurances of the first four guns being completed by
September 1, with two guns to follow every week thereafter,
p ro ve d nothing more than a hollow promise.

The fourth gun

w a s not actually completed until October 25, almost two full
m o n t h s late.

Even when the guns were finally finished,

proble ms continued.

the

There were only three transport cars

capable of carrying the massive 42,000 pound guns, and for
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at least part of the autumn two of them were contracted to
the army quartermaster general
to the armies out west.

to carry

locomotive engines

This led Dahlgren and the ordnance

department to make extraordinary efforts to transport the
guns.

At one point Dahlgren literally had one of his

assistants chasing after one of the guns to insure its safe
transport from gun foundry to shipyard.

He implored his

subordinate to locate the whereabouts of the missing gun,
and once he did,

to catch it, and "remain with it until

reaches its destination."

it

Furthermore, he told his

assistant, he want ed daily updates about the gun's location;
and if there were any delays he was to notify Dahlgren
immediately.

Of course, efforts such as these incurred

tremendous costs, which

in the case of the XV-Inch gun sent

to Boston for the monitor Nahant resulting in shipping costs
of $3,082.66 compared to $157.43 for the XV-inch gun of the
P a t a p s c o . which was b eing built in Wilmington, Delaware.
But it was clear to Dahlgren, when

it came to anything

involved with the Charleston campaign, cost was no object.3
Fortunately for Dahlgren, he did not find himself
personally criticized for holding up the monitors, and
therefore the Charleston attack, because the ironclad
construction program experienced its own share of
difficulties.

Among the most serious problems were

Ericsson's arrangements for mounting and firing the XV-inch
gun.

The Swedish inventor's first and foremost concern was
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to make his ironclads impervious to enemy gunfire.
especially true for the turret, the most
vessel

to be struck.

po rt s sufficiently
extend outside
w oul d weaken

likely part of the

Ericsson would not enlarge the gun

to allow the

theturret wall,

it.

This was

muzzle of the XV-inch gun to
believing that doing so

The ship designer argued that

it was

possible to fire the gun while the whole of it was inside
the turret without either tearing the turret apart or
killing the gun crew.

Welles was extremely skeptical of

Ericsson's plan so he ordered Dahlgren,
Admiral

Joseph

After w at ch in g

Smith, to "witness [the] test experiment."
one of the early

tests, Dahlgren concluded in

a most extraordinary understatement,
noise."

along with Fox and

it made a "terrible

While the sound must have Indeed been horrific,

firing the gun this way created an even more immediate
problem;

the smoke from the burned powder filled the turret,

choking breath and obscuring vision.

Still, Ericsson would

not alter his opinion about enlarging the gun ports;

instead

he constructed a crude device to direct the smoke out of the
turret.

Alvah Folsom Hunter, who served on board the

monitor N a h a n t . described Ericsson's contraption.
cast-iron flange,

"A

the Inside diameter of which was an inch

larger than the bore of the gun, was bolted onto the muzzle.
As this flange was beveled to fit up against the inner curve
of the turret w a l 1, when the gun was run up to the edge of
the porthole and fired, most of the smoke from the gun
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p a s se d out through the porthole."

The so-called "smoke box"

that Ericsson built did direct much of the smoke out of the
turret, but it took w e ek s to make
reliable,

it even moderately

further delaying the P a s s a i c /s departure from New

York.4
Perclval
colleague

Drayton, Dahlgren's longtime acquaintance and

in the ordnance department for much of the 1850s,

commanded the P a s s a i c .
complex clock,

He likened the new vessel

to a

"and the least thing out of adjustment

d estr oy s the whole."

Almost as if to prove the accuracy of

h i s analogy, when all of the arrangements for the Passaic's
X V-inch gun were completed, allowing it to leave New York
and h ea d for Hampton Roads to rendevous with the Moni tor and
the other vessels being gathered for the proposed attack
against Charleston,

it became disabled by "a regular

burst-up of the boiler".

It was towed to the Washington

Navy Y ar d for repairs, arriving on December 3.

In a way,

this was a blessing; when Drayton tried the XV-inch gun
again, some of the components of Ericsson's smoke-box broke,
"which rendered it [the XV-inch gun, and the vessel,!
perfectly useless."5
As the crippled Passaic arrived at the Washington Navy
Yard, Dahlgren no longer had much to do with either the
XV -i nc h gun project or the new monitors.

By this time, most

of the problems involving the production and transportation
of the large guns had been solved.

As for the precise
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arrangements for firing the guns inside the turrets,

this

was a problem for Ericsson to deal with and w as none of
Dahlgren's concern.

Freed from a project that he really

never w an te d to be Involved with
Dahlgren seemed to have
political

in the first place,

little more to do than to watch both

and military events unfold around him.

While Dahlgren always w atched both the progress of the
war and events in Washington with great

Interest,

in the

f a l 1 of 1862 there seemed to be a superabundance of
important happenings.

In October and ear 1y - N o v e m b e r ,

Dahlgren noted that the mid- te rm elections "have gone
swimmingly with the Democrats," and "the political
are looking angrily."

elements

He boldly pr edicted that the results

w o ul d lead to a shakeup "in the Cabinet."

He w a s quite

correct to predict a change, but he looked to the wrong
j

place, at least

initially.

carried New York,

The day after the Democrats

the North's most populous state, President

Lincoln ordered Major-General
for all.

McClellan's dismissal

Dahlgren w as shocked.

once and

To remove the general

now," Dahlgren recorded in h is private Journal,

"Just

"seems

unaccountable."6
While Dahlgren may not have understood McClellan's
removal,

the general's replacement certainly did.

Major-General

Ambrose E. Burnside took com ma nd of the Army

of the Potomac and Immediately mo ve d south.

Burnside knew

exactly what was expected of him, a direct offensive against
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Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

The new commander of

the Union's most prominent army did not disappoint, at least
not

in that way.

But Burnside's frontal

assault on the

Confederate's entrenched positions near the town of
Fredericksburg w as nothing more than wanton slaughter of
obedient soldiers.^
Full details of the Union disaster at Fredericksburg
did not reach Washington until
the battle.

December 15, two days after

Almost 13,000 dead, wounded,

and missing Union

soldiers seemed the lone result of Burnside's poorly
executed campaign; and the Army of the Potomac quickly
retreated back across the Rappahannock River.

Even though

Dahlgren had heard the news of numerous other disastrous
Union defeats before, until
written about them in his
matter of factly.

this
journal

point

in the war he had

relatively calmly, almost

This time his response was different.

Perhaps this reflected his own growing personal

frustration.

Whatever the cause, he now only used harsh words to describe
the battle.

"Begins to look like a confirmed repulse.

generalship, no m i n d — but
army strongly entrenched.

No

merely a hu rling of masses upon an
And a repetition the only

r e s o u r c e ....How terrible to think of so many thousands
losing life or limb on such stupid plans!"8
After witnessing the effect that political pressures
had on the battlefield,

Dahlgren watched from closehand the

Impact that events on the battlefield had on political
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affairs.

Whereas Dahlgren did not hold either Lincoln or

his administration

in any way accountable for Burnside's

foolhardy attack, many others in the North were not nearly
so generous.

Within days of the battle,

a group of Radical

Republican Senators met and developed a plan to try to gain
control over the conduct of the war by gaining control
the President's Cabinet.

over

They felt that Seward had too much

Influence over Lincoln and that it w as the secretary of
state's conservatism on the slavery issue which kept the
President from prosecuting the war as vigorously as they
believed necessary in order to secure victory.
the senators want ed Burnside removed.

Furthermore,

They complained that

the general, w ho w as a friend of McClellan and a Democrat as
well, was no better than the former general-in-chief
himself.

The senators unveiled their plan

in a long meeting

with the President on the night of December 18 in which they
demanded both a change in the military

leadership of all the

Union armies and a reorganization of the President's
Cabinet, beginning with Seward's removal.9
News of the senators' meeting with the President
quickly became public knowledge and everyone
wondered what wo ul d happen.
Dahlgren.

This certainly

in Washington
included

On the m orning of December 19, Dahlgren heard

that Lincoln had been "asked ... to re-construct his
Cabinet.

Whereon Seward resigned."

Dahlgren understood the

connection between Fredericksburg and the rapidly
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transpiring political
political

crisis.

"And so we have the first

fruit of the ... failure of the campaign.

Probably a n ew Cabinet."

But even mo re

important, Dahlgren

asked himself, what did this mean for the administration's
"policy!!

Is it war and confiscation & emancipation or

P e a c e ? " 10
Dahlgren did not sit by passively to learn what was
transpiring.
his house,

The next day he arranged for a get-together at

the featured guests being prominent Republican

Senators John Sherman and Jacob Howard,

the latter of who m

h ad attended the mee ti ng with the President.

Unfortunately,

as far as Dahlgren was concerned, his efforts shed little
light on affairs,

and he lamented,

generally of the Cabinet

"The secret as to action

[is] well k e p t . " 11

If his guests did not provide h im any new insights, at
least Dahlgren did not have long to wait before finding out
exactly what w as going on.

On the m o r ni ng of December 22,

the President sent wo r d that he w an te d to see him.
happen ed in the preceding days.

Much had

After me et in g with the

Radical Republican senators, Lincoln demonstrated his
mastery of political
the Treasury Chase,

infighting.

He knew that Secretary of

the most outspoken supporter

in the

Cabinet of the Radical Republicans' viewpoint, was involved,
if not behind,

the move to oust Seward.

Lincoln called a

m ee ti n g of his Cabinet a nd ma ne uv e re d all of them,
Chase,

Including

to announce their support for Sewa rd verbally.

With
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this accomplished, he as ke d the senate committee back to the
W hi te House and Lincoln h a d all of his Cabinet, excepting
Sewar d w ho was not present, reaffirm their public support
for the administration as it presently stood.

The Radical

R epublican Senators sat d um bf ou nde d as Chase went along with
all

of the other Cabinet members.

Having badly

underes ti ma te d the Presi de nt 's abilities and ha vi ng been
exposed,

Chase offered to resign.

The President gleefully

took Chase's letter of resignation from the secretary of the
treasury's "reluctant" h a n d and stated triumphantly,
...

is all

trouble

I want;

"'This

this relie ve s me; my way is clear;

the

is e nd e d. ' "12

When Dahlgren arrived at the White House on the morning
of the 22nd and w as shown
W. Forney,

into the President's office, John

the prominent Ph iladelphia newspaper editor who

w a s then serving as the secretary of the Senate was pleading
wit h Lincoln not to accept Cha se 's resignation.

Then almost

as an afterthought, he also suggested that the President
s h ou l d refuse to accept Seward 's too.

Although by this

point Lincoln had decided not to accept either resignation,
he apparently did not m i n d s e ei ng Chase and his backers
w or r y a little bit more.
be such damned fools.'"
“reddened,"
goes,

He told Forney, "'why will people
Then the President's face

Dahlgren recalled, before he exclaimed,

the other must,

they must hunt in couples.'"

Forney hurriedly departed,

“ 'If one
At this

leaving Dahlgren and the
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President by themselves.

Dahlgren noted that as soon as

Forney exited, Lincoln reverted to "his usual

humor,"

suggesting that the President had enjoyed the exchange with
Forney.

The President

immediately

launched into the reason

for summoning Dahlgren, which was to conduct an impromptu
experiment with some gunpowder that someone had brought to
the White House; but after a short time, perhaps sensing
Dahlgren's inquisitiveness about what h ad Just occurred, or
not being able to get his own mind off the topic,

the

President turned the subject back to the Cabinet
controversy.

Lincoln recounted to his favorite navy officer

the visit that he had from the committee of senators from
the Caucus.
all well
Cabinet,"

The President told Dahlgren that while

it was

and good that the Senators "talk of remodelling the
the pr ob l em with this, according to Lincoln, was

that they "had thought more of their pl an s than of his
[Lincoln's] benefit."
took his leave.

When the President

finished, Dahlgren

That evening he visited the secretary of

the navy, and then afterwards, with the secretary of state.
Seward, Dahlgren noted, was as might well
high spirits,"
full

be expected "in

and by evening's end Dahlgren h ad received "a

exposition"

from the victorious side.

however, was troubled by something.

Dahlgren,

As he recorded his

thoughts he admitted that "It was certainly a great

liberty

with the Constitution for the majority of the Senate to
meddle with the President's Cabinet.

But," he wrote
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worriedly,

"what they felt to be the necessity for the

me asure has not been removed."13
As important as it was,

the President's political

victory did nothing to reverse the North's lack of recent
success on the battlefield and declining morale at home.
Dahlgren's Journal entries for late 1862, and early 1863,
show that

like so many other people in the North he had

become extremely pessimistic about the Union's military
prospects.

On Christmas day, he devoted his Journal entry

to listing and recounting the defeats that the "Armies of
the Union" had suffered since the beginning of the war.
W hile he thought that "Cwlhat
formidable army," he asked,

is left

... makes up a

"who shall head itC?3"

Events

in the new year gave Dahlgren only more reason for concern.
"In the evening," he noted In his journal

entry of January

3, "comes the news that the Monitor foundered off Cape
Hatteras."

A few days later word reached Washington that

Grant h ad failed to take Vicksburg.
On January 11, Dahlgren's journal

Worse news followed.

entry read,

"Fox sent wo r d

in the evening that the Confeds. h ad taken the [Harriet]
Lane at Galveston 8. the Westfield was blown up.

Town taken

and our troops in it....So we lose Galveston and these
vessels and are beaten at Vicksburgh [sicJ."

Dahlgren now

came to question whether or not the North would win the war.
"[The! Prospects," he noted grimly,

"(are] rather dull."

He

then proceeded once again to recount the Union's growing
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list of military setbacks.

But defeats on the battlefield

were only one area of his concern.
North's "Cfllnancial

He noted that the

condition [was] bad— [the] Army

unp ai d— in debt all around for everything— Credit so low
that $1 in gold is worth $1
anywhere."

1/2 in U.S. Notes and no loans

Dahlgren's concerns did not end there.

support for the war, he continued,
b ei ng of the people

"wanes,"

Popular

and the "Army

is more or less affected by the feeling

of the people at large."

In contrast, he concluded sadly,

"the Confeds. are victorious, savage by reason of the
Confiscation & Emancipation ActsC,] which will
m ake them homeless & penniless.
best generals,

for all

ruin them and

So they fight under the

that men can fight."14

As troubling as the progress of the war may have been
for Dahlgren, a personal matter undoubtedly gave him even
greater cause for concern.
Congressional session

With the opening of the

in December 1862, Dahlgren's thoughts

h ad once again turned to the possibility of his being
promoted to admiral.

The route to this rank, established

in the summer of 1862, w a s rather complex.

It began with an

officer receiving the President's recommendation for a vote
of thanks.

The recommendation then went to Congress, where

it required approval

of both houses.

As detailed in the

p receding chapter, Dahlgren h ad received Lincoln's
recommendation and the favorable vote from the House. The
result

in the Senate w a s different.

Grimes, believing that
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the rank of admiral

should should only be awarded to

officers who had distinguished themselves in battle,
successfully blocked a full Senate vote on Dahlgren's
recommendation by keeping debate on the issue bottled up in
committee until

the end of the Congressional

s e s si o n. 15

It appeared that Grimes w a s attempting to do the same
thing during the current session.

Elizabeth Blair Lee kept

a close watch on the Senate Navy Committee's actions because
her husband, Samuel Phillips Lee, w ho commanded the North
Atlantic Blockading Squadron, wa s also hoping for a
promotion to admiral.
husband,

On January 25,

1863, she wrote to her

"Father [Francis Preston Blair, who w as also the

father of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair,] has returned
after several

days sojourn

that no vote of thanks will
Separately & for special
Committee,"

in the City with a conviction
get throCugh] the Senate except

acts of m e r i t — The [Navy]

she continued,

"will

not report any of the names

sent up from the House now before them."
she concluded,

"This thing of Dahlgren's

This was due to,
...

it defeats the

object of ma ki ng the Ad mi ra l s. " 15
Dahlgren also saw what w as h appening and he wa n te d to
make sure that his chance for promotion was not blocked
again.

As he had done so many times in the past, he

initiated a letter w ri tin g campaign supporting his case.
One of h is letters, a sixteen page plea to Senator David
Wllmot, was classic Dahlgren.

He told the senator that he
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w is he d that he could tell him about all of the battles that
he fought and won during the war,
ironically,

"it

"but," he stated rather

is not the province of an officer of the

Navy to dictate

to the Department how he shall be employed."

Dahlgren argued

that while he may not have fought directly

in any battles,

he had still contributed to numerous Union

victories through his work

in the ordnance department; and

he cited letters that fellow officers had sent to him which
c omplimented his guns and the role that they had played in
their victories.

Nor had he avoided sea duty during the

war, he truthfully told Wilmot, rather, the "[Navy]
Department would not allow ...
post.

[him] to leave" his ordnance

Dahlgren concluded his long plea to Wilmot with an

analysis of the wording of the admiral's bill.

He pointed

out that the legislation did not stipulate that one's
distinguished service had to be rendered in battle;
therefore, he closed, he should not be "excluded by cold and
formal rules [from] that recognition which

is ... [accorded]

to o t he rs ." 17
Although there

is no direct evidence to show that

Dahlgren's efforts had any bearing on events, on January 31
the Naval Affairs Committee unexpectedly brought the
President's recommendation of a vote of thanks before the
full Senate.

The committee had made some amendments to the

House version and noted that votes of thanks had already
been requested for upwards of fifty officers, which was
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seven times as many as given In the entire history of the
United States.

This had the effect,

the committee reported,

of "rendering votes of thanks too cheap."
therefore recommended that

The committee

it would be a "wise rule"

that

votes of thanks should only be given to officers "In command
of an expedition,

or when it was a separate service!,]

the conflict of the Monitor and Merrlmac."

The report

sounded as If It wa s aimed directly at Dahlgren.
certainly not commanded an expedition.
special
that

service,

like

He had

As for rendering

the committee's wording seemed to Imply

it w a s necessary to do so In a separate command at sea.

But Dahlgren w as In for a surprise.

Only Captain James

Lardner, who had been nominated for his supporting role in
the Port Royal

campaign, had been dropped from the list;

Dahlgren's name remained.

And on January 31,

Senate approved a "Vote of Thanks"
Dahlgren,

for "Captain John A.

for distinguished service In the line of his

profession,
efficient

1863, the

Improvements in ordnance, and zealous and

labors in the ordnance branch of the se rvice."18

Dahlgren's quest did not end with the Senate's
affirmation, however.
the resolution,
House.
House;

Because Lardner had been dropped from

the amended bill had to go back to the

On February 4, the amended resolution passed in the
three days later, the President signed it.

two immediate effects.

This had

First, Dahlgren and the others were

now eligible to serve on the navy's Active List for an
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additional

ten years.

More

Important,

it also made each of

them eligible for promotion to the rank of admiral; but the
key was that they were only eligible for the promotion, they
wer e not guaranteed one.

But if a promotion was not

assured, Dahlgren certainly w as going to try to secure one
for himself.

In his Journal

came about.
House,

Dahlgren recounted how this

On one of his frequent visits to the White

"I m en tioned [to the President!

the vacancies on the

Admiral's list— that I also w as legally eligible and
reminded him of his old promise to promote me."
obviously did not feel

Dahlgren

that Lincoln received his proposition

as enthusiastically as he could have because Dahlgren ended
this entry,

"Willing e n o u g h [,] poor gentleman," which

suggested that Dahlgren did not believe that the President
w o u l d act on his request.

But Dahlgren w a s wrong.

That

same night, Lincoln met with Welles, and according to the
navy secretary the President

"expressed a wish that Captain

Dahlgren should be made an admiral."

Welles, w ho had often

cited his belief that Dahlgren did not deserve this honor,
reluctantly agreed; and on February 19, Well es nominated
Dahlgren for p r o m o t i o n . ^
Dahlgren
Foote.

learned of his nomination from his friend

Dahlgren w as estatic.

He went to see Welles to

thank him for nominating him.

Dahlgren could only have been

shocked at Welles's response.

"Told him," Welles recounted

in his diary,

"to thank the President, who had made

it a
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specialty;

that I did not advise it."

not end there.

Welle s' s lecture did

He then proc ee de d to give Dahlgren a severe

t ongue-lashing for his relationship with the President,
telling Dahlgren that

it h ad adversely affected his role as

a military a d v i s o r . 20
Dahlgren made no mention

in his journal

of Welles's

harsh comments.

Instead, he simply followed the progress of

his nomination.

Grimes,

like Welles, had apparently given

up the struggle to prevent Dahlgren from b eing promoted, and
D ahlgren's nomination quickly passed through the Senate
Naval
days

Affairs Committee for a vote before the Senate.

Two

later, February 27, the Senate confirmed Dahlgren's

nomination.

Dahlgren exclaimed:

of the Republic.

"So I am at last an Admiral

There are five above me, F a r r a g u t ,

G o l d s b o r o u g h , DuPont,

Foote, and D a v i s . ...Went

into the

P res ident's to present the new admiral & shake h a n d s . "21
Dahlgren made no m ention of how the President responded
to h is visit, but

it w o ul d not have been at all surprising

if the bulk of their conversation concerned Charleston.
January 6, W el le s h a d sent orders to Admiral

On

DuPont that he

w a s to attack and capture Charleston as soon as the five
ironclads the Navy Department w as sending him arrived.

The

ironclads, Welles told DuPont, w o u l d "enable you to enter
the harbor of Charleston and demand the surrender of all of
its defenses or suffer the consequences of a refusal."
Furthermore,

the navy secretary

informed his squadron
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commander, even though reinforcements for the Union army
were also on the way to Charleston, DuPont w a s to make no
mistake,

"Etlhe capture of this most

important port....

rests solely upon the success of the naval

force."

Since

W e lle s had issued these orders, almost every time that
Dahlgren and Lincoln spoke to each other,

the discussion

invariably came aroun d to that same topic.

Dahlgren

recognized that the President's personality h ad changed.
noted that Lincoln "never tells a Joke now,"
"always asks about Charleston.

He

and that he

Very anxious is he about

it— and his countenance shows it."22
Lincoln may have been anxious about Charleston, but Fox
w as obsessed with a ttacking the city.

The same day that the

orders for the campaign were written, Fox penned a private
note to DuPont.

Fox told DuPont that he w o ul d be the

North's "avenging arm" as he delivered "the final blow" of
the war.

"The eyes of the whole country are upon you, and

k nowing your skill
g ives victory,

and resource, and reliance upon Him who

I co mmend you to his keeping,

no misgivings

as to the re su lt ."23
DuPont certainly shared Fox's ml 1lennialist outlook
about the war

in general

and Charleston in particular, but

he did not share h is optimism about the supposed ease with
which he could capture Charleston, even with five
at his disposal.

DuPont did all

ironclads

that he could to convince

Fox to drop the idea of attacking Charleston, but Fox would
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not be deterred.

After he learned that DuPont wanted to

make the attack a Joint navy and army operation,
reminded the Admiral
Charleston.

Fox

that the navy alone was to capture

"I beg of you not to let the Army spoil

Fox Implored.

It,"

“The Immortal wreath of laurel should cluster

around your flag alone."

Then, exhibiting a level of

overconfidence which bordered on delusion, Fox suggested to
DuPont that he steam into Charleston harbor with his guns
"silent amid the [enemy's] 200 guns until you arrive at the
centre of this wicked rebellion and there demand the
surrender of the Forts, or swift destruction."24
Fox's determination to see Charleston attacked and
destroyed flew in the face of sound military planning and he
knew it.

In a letter to Commander David Dixon Porter, who

commanded the Mississippi River Squadron, Fox stated,

"[t]he

opening of that river [the Mississippi] as early as possible
is the imperative act[,]

to be considered above even the

capture of Charleston."

In a series of incredibly revealing

communications with his western commanders, however, Fox
repeatedly admitted that while he recognized the importance
of the control
war effort,
operations.

of the western waters to the Union's overall

this would take a backseat to the Charleston
When Admiral

Farragut told him that he could

not "perform the duties which I came to execute" without
ironclads,

the most that Fox offered was to send him some

after the capture of Charleston.

Even more revealing was a
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letter that Fox sent to DuPont.

After informing h im that he

had arranged to have a total of nine Ironclads sent to him,
Fox stated:
them,

"If we had more you should have every one of

that you might give us success.

To do this, my dear

Admiral, we have neglected the Gulf and fear every moment to
hear of a disaster there...."

When DuPont then complained

that the Navy Department was holding back vessels from him,
Fox spelled it out starkly:
The status is this, on the rebel side one Iron
Clad in James River (Richmond No 2) & two others
nearly ready: de fence— Sangamon alone.
Sounds of
North Carolina one [Confederate! Iron
Clad,— defence none.
Lying at Fort CaswellC,]
Cape Fear River, all ready one [Confederate]
Ironclad;— defence none.
Apalachicola river[,3
one [Confederate ironclad] under Catesby Jones;
defence none.
Nobile, five [Confederate
ironclads] under Buchanan; defence none.
The
Admirals in command of the Squadrons have placed
these facts on record against us and called for
Iron Cl ads to defend themselves but we have not
given them any.
Secretary Chase begged the
Secretary to send some of the Iron Cl ads to New
Orleans or we should lose the place and the army
of Banks; we declined.25
Fox's bleak analysis of the Union's tactical

situation

versus the Confederate navy's ironclads w a s probably his way
to spur DuPont to attack Charleston.
instead.

DuPont stalled

He had sound military reasons for b ei ng cautious.

As he pointed out, his ironclads and their crews were new
and untried;

therefore he wanted to give his ships and crews

"the fullest test of active service."

He thus ordered an
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attack against Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River, south
of Savannah.26
DuPont may or may not have had it as an ulterior motive
when ordering the attack against the Confederate fort, but
the results of the action provided h im with more ammunition
to argue against the Charleston campaign.

After three

monit or s bombarded the fort for eight hours,
been

no damage had

inflicted which "a good night's work w o u l d not repair."

Furthermore,

DuPont felt that the McAllister attack had

provid ed him with an ace up his sleeve.

Alban C. Stlmers,

the navy's chief engineer, had recently arrived at Port
Royal

to instruct DuPont and his officers on the removal

underwater o bstructions and torpedoes.

of

Stimers's primary

responsibility, however, was overseeing the monitor
construction program.

According to DuPont, he "belonged to

the [monitor] enthusiasts and,
take Charleston."

like Fox,

thought one could

But after witness in g the unsuccessful

attack on McAllister from inside the turret of the P a s s a i c .
Stimers was co nvinced that more ironclads were necessary
before attacking Charleston.

With the Chief Engineer's

conversion under fire, DuPont decided that instead of simply
forwarding his re ports of the McAllister attack to
Washington, he w o u l d have Stimers hand deliver them, because
as he cheerfully conf id ed to his wife,

" [h]e will enlighten

them more at the Department than fifty

letters from me would

d o ."2 ^
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Stlmers's surprise visit to Washington did indeed
create a sensation.

When he a r r iv e d at the Navy Department,

a m e e t in g was hastily arranged, with Welles, Fox, Lincoln,
Chase,

and Hal leek in attendance.

extremely agitated.

" CI ]t was,"

The President was
according to Lincoln,

"the

P eninsula all over again," as he disparagingly compared
DuPont to McClellan.

Welles w a s none too happy either.

He

exp re ss ed concern about the co nt inu ed talk of a combined
navy and army campaign at Charleston.
attack until

even more re inforcements could be sent, Welles

sta te d this could not be done.
Stimers,
not,

As for postponing the

"Old Welles,"

according to

"said the attack must be made whether successful

or

the people would not stand it and would 'turn us all

o u t .'1,28
Dahlgren was out of W ashington for a long stretch of
time

in March,

therefore he m i s s e d much of the controversy

that Stimers's unexpected visit created.

But even when he

r et ur ne d to the Navy Department on March 29, the fallout was
still
room,"

evident.

"Found [the] President

in Chief Clerk's

Dahlgren recorded in h is Journal,

"with Sec.Cretary]

a n d Fox.

He [Lincoln]

looks thin and very b a dl y[,] very

nervous.

Complained of ev er yt h in g — they were doing nothing

at Vick sb urg or Charleston.

DuPont was asking for one iron

c la d after another, as fast as they were built....I
h a n d at consolation," continued Dahlgren,

tried my

"without much

aval 1 ."29
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What the President did not tell Dahlgren was that he
w a n t ed to cancel

the Charleston attack altogether, but Fox

had talked him out of it.

In what w a s apparently the last

letter ever exchanged between Fox and DuPont,
secretary boasted that he had "restrained"
sending off Hunter and all

the assistant

Lincoln "from

the Iron Clads directly to New

Orleans;" although once again Fox acknowledged that "the
opening of the Mississippi

[is]

... considered the principal

object to be obtained" by the Navy.30
Thoroughly disgusted, DuPont resigned himself to attack
Charleston.

In the last days before the attack he repeated

his belief that even if he succeeded in capturing
Charleston,
the war."

it wo ul d have "nothing to do with the results of
" CTlhe rebellion," he stated,

"goes down when

those 400,000 soldiers are put down and not before."
as DuPont was concerned,

an attack only went to "the

gratification to the morbid appetite of the public"
personal

and political

As far

and the

interests and ambitions of his

civilian superiors in Washington.31
The attack on Charleston finally came on April
mon th s to prepare,

7.

With

the Confederate engineers established a

series of strong batteries to defend the entrance to
Charleston's inner harbor.

Moreover, continuous ordnance

practice allowed the gun crews to establish precise ranges,
which they marked with floating buoys.

The gunners thus

exhibited remarkable precision and in the roughly two hours
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that the Union ironclads were in range. Confederate gunners
struck the nine Union warships a total

of 520 times out of

slightly more than 2,200 shots fired.

The experimental

ironclad Keokuk suffered the most punishment.

Struck ninety

times in only thirty minutes, nineteen shots pierced the
vessel

Just at or below the water line; and in the words of

the ship's commander, the "vessel w as completely riddled."
Despite the best efforts of the vessel's crew, the Keokuk
sunk

in the mo rn in g hours, April 8.

moni to rs suffered the fatal

W hile none of the

injuries of the K eo ku k. four of

the seven lost the use of one or both guns during the
engagement and in the opinion of DuPont thirty more minutes
of action w ou ld have disabled the guns of the remaining
t h r e e .32
According to DuPont, when he ordered his vessels to
withdraw, he did so "intending to renew the attack"
following morning.

But after listening to the verbal

reports of his Ironclad commanders,
renew the attack,

the

"I determined not to

for in my Judgement,

it would have

converted a failure into a disaster, and I w l 11 only add,"
he concluded,

"that Charleston can not be taken by a purely

naval attack, and the army could give me no cooperation."33
It w ou l d take a few days for both the news of the
failed attack and of DuPont's decision not to renew
operations against Charleston to reach Washington.

As

W e l l es awaited wor d of the fate of DuPont's forces, the Navy
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Secretary's diary entries betr ay ed his lack of confidence.
On April

6, he wrote,

"Rumors are current and thick

r especting Charleston, but they are all conjectural.
movement against the place

Is expected about these days, but

there has not been time to hear of It.
a nd apprehension.
reluctantly."

I have great anxiety

Operations have gone on slowly and

Less than sanguine of the prospects, W e ll es

consoled himself.
material

"[W3e have furnished DuPont the best

of men and ships that were ever placed under the

command of any officer on this continent."
victory, he admitted,
The

A

Hopeful

"I am not without apprehensions."34

lack of news became nearly unbearable.

W e ll e s noted,

of

On April

9,

"A yearning, craving desire for tidings from

Charleston, but the day has p a ss ed without a w o r d . ...A
desperate stand will be made at Charleston, and their
defenses are formidable.
warning,

and they have improved them."

that he shared the general
"[Tlhere
such

Delay h as given them time and

northern hatred of Charleston.

is no city so culpable,

intense animosity."

Welles also showed

or against which there

is

Thi s of course explained why he

and Fox had allocated "fifty-two steamers for the work and
the most formidable ironclad force that ever went
battle."

into

Despite this, Welles conceded:

For months my confidence h a s not increased, and
now that the conflict is upon us, my disquietude
is greater still.
I have hope and trust in
DuPont, in the glorious ban d of officers that are
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with him, and in the iron bulwarks we have
furnished as well as in a righteous cause.
The
President, w h o has often a sort of intuitive
sagacity, has spoken discouraging!y of operations
at Charleston during the whole season.
DuPont's
dispatches and movements have not inspired him
w ith faith; they remind him, he says, of
McClellan.
Fox, who has mor e naval knowledge and
experience and who is better informed of
Charleston and its approaches, ... entertains not
a doubt of success.
His reliant confidence and
undoubted assurance, have encouraged and sustained
m e when doubtful.
I do not believe the monito rs
impregnable, as he does, ... but it can hardly be
otherwise than that some, probably that most of
them, will pass Sumter.3®

The first wor d of DuPont's failure reached Washington
on April

10.

Fox Interpreted the account of the brief

afternoon action gleaned from Confederate newspapers as a
p relude to 11the main attack."

He wrote to his

b rother-in-law Montgomery Blair,

"I infer that the attack

was for the purpose of obtaining full
it w o u l d have been made

In the morning.

pre pa ri ng for more serious work."
one thing,

information, otherwise
They are now

Fox was concerned about

the possibility of obstructions; but he

optimistically told Blair that "they CDuPont and his forces]
now know them and will reduce the fort.
they can attack
anchorage

the w or k?

it every day and at night retire to their

Inside of the bar.

be repaired.

The damage upon Sumter can not

The only question is, Can the ironclads stand

I believe the monitors can."

about the K e o k u k .
was probably

It is evident that

It "was a small

As for the news

experimental

injured so that they beached her.

vessel and
I see no
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reason whatever," he concluded even more optimistically than
before the battle,

"to be in the least discouraged.

contrary, my faith

in the vessels and the officers is

strengthened by these rebel

accounts."38

Welles's diary entry for April
believed Fox's interpretation.
if not what we wish,

10, suggests that he

"On the whole,

the account,

is not very discouraging.

I Judged to have been merely a reconnoissance,
pioneer the way for the grand attack."

"that the ironclads are

The movement
to feel and

Welles, however, did

not share all of his assistant's views.
continued,

On the

"Fox persists," he

Invulnerable.

I shall

not be surprised if some are damaged, perhaps disabled.
fact,

In

I have supposed that some of them wo ul d probably be

sunk, and shall be satisfied if we
Charleston.
and fail

lose several and get

I hope," he concluded,

"we shall not lose them

to get the city."37

The first official

news about the failed attack reached

Washington on the afternoon of April

12, When Commander

Alexander Rhind, w ho commanded the now sunk K e o k u k .
unexpectedly showed up at Welles's front doorstep with
DuPont's preliminary reports in hand.
Welles complained,
no details."

" [TIhey were not,"

"very full or satisfactory, — contained

He went on to disparage DuPont,

"He has no

idea of taking Charleston by the Navy ." 38
DuPont's detailed report finally reached Washington on
April 20.

After reading it, the navy secretary dejectedly
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telegraphed Fox who was then In New York:
movements or intended movements."

"No indications of

And although

it would be

ten more days before Welles stated directly that DuPont was
"no longer useful

in his present command,"

from the moment

that he received DuPont's detailed report on April 20,
Welles's private diary entries indicate that he had given up
on his commanding officer at Charleston.
DuPont's detailed report

led Welles to make an even more

important acknowledgement, however.
April

20,

The receipt of

"I am," he wrote on

"by no m eans confident that we are acting wisely

in expending so much strength and effort on Charleston."
For after all,

in Welles's own frank words,

Charleston was

"a place of no strategic importance."39
What probably upset Welles most w a s DuPont's post
battle assertion that he never advocated attacking
Charleston.

When Welles read this in one of DuPont's

letters he immediately recalled the admiral's October visit
to Washington,

especially his reaction to Dahlgren's request

that he be allowed to lead the attack.
h ow DuPont rejected any and all

Welles remembered

ideas of anyone but him

leading the attack against Charleston, claiming for himself
"the right to perf or m this great work."
As chance w ou ld have it, the same day that Welles
recalled how DuPont had earlier quashed all suggestion of
Dahlgren's leading the Charleston attack,

the ordnance

expert returned to Washington from an inspection tour of the
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navy's western posts.

Having Just recei ve d DuPont's

detailed report, Welles not surprisingly turned the
conversation to Charleston.
extremely critical

Welles, r eca ll ed Dahlgren, was

of DuPont, and Dahlgren found himself

defending the man he had attempted to supplant.

Dahlgren

tried to reason with Welles, pointi ng out that all of "the
Capts. of the Iron Cl ads wh o were chosen officers concurred
with DtuPont]," but Welles did not want to hear
Undoubtedly surprised at the anger

it.

in W el l es ' s assault on

DuPont, Dahlgren h ad to be even more shocked at what came
next.

Leaving Welles's office, Dahlgren ran

into Fox, who

immediately renewed the discussion about Charleston.

After

st at in g a similar position about DuPont as d id the
secretary,

the assistant aecretary e nded by concluding that

he w is he d that Dahlgren was "down there."

Dahlgren reacted

simply and emotionally after speaking with Fox.
wrote

in his private journal,

"I am," he

"an applicant for sea

serv i ce .
Unbeknowst to Dahlgren at the time, he w as one of at
least two applicants.
campaign

Just as they did about the Charleston

in general, Welles and Fox disagreed on w ho was

best to lead the Union forces there.
to replace DuPont w as Andrew Hull

We ll es 's first thought

Foote.

Besides being the

naval hero at Forts Henry and Done Ison, Foote and Welles
w er e boyhood friends.

But as far as Fox w as concerned,

Foote w as DuPont all over again.

While Foote had ultimately
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proven successful

on the C umberland and Tennessee rivers,

he w as best known for being an unbending stickler for
details, who w as unwilling to act until he w as completely
s at isfied that every possible preparation had been
completed.

Moreover,

since b ei ng severely w ounded during

the attack against Fort Donelson, he had been serving as a
bureau chief

in Washington;

not yet completely healed,

and his painful w oun d which had
and which restricted Foote to

m o v i n g about on crutches, a dd ed to Fox's concerns.43
The behind the scenes discussions about what to do
about the Charleston command continued from late April
through most of May.

and

The decision to replace DuPont only

became easier with time as h i s reports became more hostile
and filled with greater demands.

In mid-May he requested

that his reports detailing "every defect and weakness of the
ironclads" be published.

At DuPont's request, his political

ally Henry Winter Davis went
m ay call his dogs off."

"to see the President that he

Then DuPont demanded that Alban

S timers be court-martialed because the chief engineer openly
d is a gr ee d with him about the condition of the monitors after
the April

7 attack.

As far as Well es was concerned,

D uP on t' s actions were his way of providing "a victim.
than this," Wel le s continued,

More

"he w an ts to lay his failure

at Charleston on the I ronclads.1143
W e lle s did not want a public trial
the monitors,

of either Stimers or

at least one that he could not control,
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because as he readily admitted this would only provide
ammunition for his and the acbnlnlstratlon's enemies.
had Just

learned that his arch enemy

Hale, Chairman of the Naval
his time

in the Senate,

Committee

Welles
"John P.

... [was] occupying

... preparing for an attack on the Navy

Department."

Welles certainly did not want to provide him,

or anyone else for that matter, with additional

ammunition.

Meanwhile,

the question as what to do at Charleston also

remained.

In a mee ti ng between Welles, Lincoln, Stanton,

Hal leek, and Fox,
attack w a s made,

the army contingent stated that
it had to be led by the navy.

if an

Fox

immediately supported the idea and said he welcomed the
Navy's carrying the "brunt" of the w or k .44
Still, Well es w as less than sure.

Once again he

questioned the wisd om of attacking Charleston, admitting,
"[tlhe place has no strategic importance."
realized, however,

He also

"there is not another place our anxious

countrymen w ould so rejoice to see taken as this original
seat of the great wickedness that has befallen our country.
The moral

effect of its capture w o ul d be great."

Moreover,

it w as ha r d to argue against a renewed attack for other
reasons as well.

The ships were already there and with each

p assing day there was less need for them along the
Mississippi because both Farragut and Porter were managing
their jobs without the ironclads.

But Welles wo ul d not
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order an attack "without some change of officers."
question was, Who m to put

The

In charge?45

By late May, Well es privately admitted that he was at a
complete "loss as to his [DuPont's] successor."
have

He would

liked to have named Farragut as the replacement, but as

Welles termed It, he was "employed elsewhere."
worried about his good friend, Foote.
his diary:

He also

Welles confided to

"Had some talk with Admiral Foote respecting

Charleston.

He believes the place may be taken, but does

not express himself with confidence."

Just as troubling to

Welles w a s Foote's "great respect for DuPont, who,
will

I fear,

exercise a bad influence upon him should he be given

command."

Well es also considered Admiral

Francis Gregory,

but ruled h i m out because of age and illness.45
Finally,

there was Dahlgren.

On May 28, Dahlgren in

his usually direct way spoke to Welles about the assignment.
"He speaks of it earnestly and energetically," which were
important considerations after Welles's trouble with DuPont.
"Were it not so that his [Dahlgren's] assignment to that
command w o u l d cause dissatisfaction" with so many other
officers already upset that Dahlgren h ad been promoted to
admiral, Welle s lamented,
strongly favors him,

"I would,

let h im show his ability as an officer

in his legitimate professional
the work

as the President

duty.

He would enter upon

intelligently and with a determination to be

successful.

Whether," Welles concluded,

“he has the skill,
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power, and ability of a first-rate naval
be tested.

He has zeal, pride,

other qualities

commander

is yet to

and ambition, but there are

in which he may be deficient."

The "best

arrangement," W e ll es realized, would be to have Foote and
Dahlgren "act together."
the prestige of Foote,

This offered the combination of

thereby eliminating Welles 's concern

of opposition to the new commander, and w it h Dahlgren,
promise of a vigorous campaign,

the

easing both his and Fox's

concern of a less than active attempt to take C h ar le st on .47
Having finally made up his mind about wh om to replace
DuPont with, W e ll es acted quickly.

He immediately sent for

Foote and offered him the command of the South Atlantic
b lockading Squadron and w as relieved to learn that Foote
"really desired it."

With Foote committed to leading the

squadron, Welles next broached the subject of havi ng
Dahlgren Join him.

According to Welles,

enthusiastically to the suggestion,
well

for the country,

Foote responded

"thought

it w o ul d be

the service, and himself, were Admiral

Dahlgren associated with him."48
After nearly two years,

it finally appear ed that

Dahlgren's long struggle to secure a command at sea was
over; but was it?

Foote followed his enthusiastic approval

of Dahlgren serving alongside him with a warning.
"doubtful," believed Foote,
serve as second."
that

It was

"if D.iahlgrenl wo uld consent to

Foote w as indeed right.

Having learned

it w as b eing considered to send both Foote and himself

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

204

to Charleston, Dahlgren made a long entry
oppos in g the idea.

in h is diary

"CTlhis is o bj ec t io n al ," wrote Dahlgren,

"as it renders collision of opinion possible 8< hence
d i s s e n s i o n ....Gen,t e r a H
on the whole,

Gilmore tsicl too is called on and

it does not look like unity of action.

Foote

w a n t s to be of the party and there is a national wish to
o b 11ge him & to use m e . " 49
Welle s learned how Dahlgren felt from Fox, wh o m he had
sent to feel

out Dahlgren on the possibility of serving as

Fo ot e' s second.

Welle s probably had a hard time believing

wha t Fox h ad to say.
to go as second, but

" [NIot only w as D.tahlgrenl unwilling
... he wished to decline entirely,

u n le s s he could have command of both naval

and land forces."

W e l l e s had seen Dahlgren make outrageous demands before, but
this clearly topped them all.

The secretary of the navy

noted:

This precludes farther thought of him.
I regret
it for his own sake.
It is one of the errors of a
lifetime.
He has not seen the sea service he
ought for his rank, a nd there is a feeling towards
him, on account of his advancement, among naval
men which he h a d now opportunity to remove.
No
one questions his abilities as a skillful and
scientific ordnance officer, but some of his best
friends in h is profession doubt his capability as
a naval officer on such duty as is here proposed.
It is doubtful if he ever will have another so
good an opportunity.
Foote suggested that as Dahlgren's longtime acquaintance,
they h a d sailed together

in the mid-1840s aboard the

Cumber 1and on what w as Dahlgren's last sea service on a
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regular cruise,

that he might be able to "Induce"

to change his mind, but Welles said he "doubtCedl

Dahlgren
it.

Dahlgren," Welles continued with his analysis,
is very proud and aspiring, and will injure
himself and his professional standing in
consequence.
With undoubted talents of a certain
kind he has intense selfishness, and I am sorry to
see him on this occasion, as I have seen him on
others, regardless of the feelings and rights of
officers of greater experience, w ho have seen
vastly more sea service and who possess high naval
qualities and undoubted merit.
In a matter of
duty, such as this, he shows what is charged upon
hi m ,— that he is less devoted to the country than
to himself, that he never acts on any principle of
s e 1f-sacr if ic e ."50

Dahlgren must have also realized that this w as his last
chance to secure a command at sea, and when he met with
Wel le s and Fox a few days later on June 2, he suggested to
Wel le s that there had been a misunderstanding.

He now told

Welles that he was "willing to go Cto Charleston]
Iron clads were assigned"

if the

to h im . 51

Probably the most relieved person
Unlike so many others, he never

in the room was Fox.

lost faith

in the monitors

and he still believed that the only thing lacking at
Charleston was a commander who believed in them and was
wi ll in g to take them boldly right

into Charleston harbor.

While still finding Dahlgren personally distasteful,
combination of Dahlgren's driving personal
himself

the

ambition to wrap

in glory, coupled with his continued desire to

demonstrate the effectiveness of his guns, made Fox
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confident that Dahlgren would attack Charleston with vigor.
Therefore, Fox wholeheartedly endorsed Dahlgren's offer.
When Welles accepted the idea, Fox quickly urged Dahlgren to
hurry to New York to confer with Foote, w h o w as then making
final preparations before heading to C ha rleston.52
Events then took on an almost frantic pace.

The next

day, June 3, We lles wrote to DuPont to inform him that he
had ordered Foote to relieve him.

That same day, Dahlgren

traveled to New York and met with Foote, w ho agreed to
Dahlgren's joining him.

The next day Dahlgren reported to

Welles, telling h im about his discussions with Foote and
General Quincy A. Gillmore, who had recently been assigned
to command the land forces along the south Atlantic coast.53
It is unclear exactly what role Dahlgren was intended
to play in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
long run, however,

In the

it did not matter, because shortly after

Foote agreed to Dahlgren's Joining him, he informed Welles
that he was ill and that he would have to delay his
departure.

Foote's health quickly deteriorated.

Dahlgren

happened to be in N e w York m aking his own preparations
before heading to Charleston when he learned of Foote's
situation.

He rushed to Foote's bedside, only to learn "his

illness was considered fatal."

Upon returning to

Washington, Dahlgren's first stop w as to see Secretary
Welles.

Dahlgren noted that after Informing Welles of the

"events of ...

[his] Journey," Welles made no mention of the
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"consequences of Foote's illness."

Since

it was Sunday

morning, Dahlgren went to church; but shortly after the
service began a messenger arrived and told Dahlgren that the
secretary w anted to see him immediately.54
Because Welles h ad already sent DuPont notice he was to
be relieved, Foote's Illness left W el l es with

little choice

other than to name Dahlgren as the n e w squadron commander,
and he wanted to make this clear to Dahlgren.
appointment," W elles told Dahlgren,
upon the Department by Admiral
his way to assume these duties;
prompt action necessary."

"[Your]

"was a specialty imposed

Foote's affliction when on
... this interruption made

Welles then reminded Dahlgren

that he had been originally offered the position of "an
assistant and second to Foote;
particular purpose."

that he w a s to go for a

To make sure that there w as absolutely

no confusion about this, W elles told Dahlgren that "his
absence from the [Ordnance] Bureau w o u l d therefore be
tempor ar y."55
That Welles w as uncomfortable about naming Dahlgren as
DuPont's sole replacement

is eviden ce d by his diary entries

du ri ng the last days that Dahlgren spent
the two met to discuss final details.

in Washington, when

We l le s w a s Intent on

avoiding the problems of communication that he had
experienced with DuPont.

"Told him," wrote Welles,

"there

must be frankness and absolute sincerity between u s in the
discharge of his official

duties,— no reserve though we
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might differ.

I must know,

truthfully," Welles continued,

"what he was doing, what he proposed doing, and have his
frank and honest opinions at all

times.

He concurs, and I

trust there will be no misunderstanding."

But despite the

frank discussions a nd apparent concurrence of views, Welles
continued to worry.

Welles reminded Dahlgren that while

anyone who replaced DuPont would experience the animosity of
other officers because of DuPont's strong reputation amongst
h i s peers,

the feelings against him would be ampllfed

because his promotion h ad come largely from the “partiality
of the President."

Therefore, Welles told Dahlgren,

"Cllf

any of his seniors [whom Dahlgren had Jumped with his
promotion]

... desired to be transferred,

pe rm it te d to do so, without prejudice."

they must be
As troubling as

wer e his concerns about Dahlgren's relationships with his
fellow officers, W el le s had an even greater concern.

While

a ckn owledging that Dahlgren had "intelligence and ability
without question; his nautical
"are disputed."
critical

Moreover,

analysis,

qualities," Well es noted,

the secretary c ontinued with his

"his skill, capacity, courage, daring,

sagacity, and comprehensiveness in a high command are to be
tested."

But as if Dahlgren's lack of command experience

w ere not enough, W el le s believed there was an even greater
problem.

"He is intensely ambitious, and,

I fear,

too

selfish.

He has the h er oi sm which proceeds from pride and

w o u l d lead him to danger and to death, but whether he has
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the innate, unselfish courage of the genuine sailor and
soldier remains to be seen."56
Perhaps he w as too busy, but Dahlgren wrote little in
his Journal

about his last days in Washington, making

nothing more than passing remarks such as "getting matters
in order to leave."

Arriving in New York again late on June

24, he spent most of the next week m a ki n g his final
preparations before heading to Port Royal, South Carolina.
Not once did he Indicate the slightest hint of concern about
his ability to handle the task ahead of him, remarking only
on whether he w ou ld ever again get to see all of his
children, w ho were then scattered all around, his oldest son
Charley at Vicksburg, his middle son Ully with the Army of
the Potomac, his youngest son Paully at sea as a Naval
Academy midshipman,
safe from the war

and his fifteen year old daughter living

in Newport, Rhode Island.

As he left New

York on the m orning of June 30, Dahlgren noted simply,
11 the steamer

"At

... pushes off from the w h a r f C , 3 down the

superb bay and puts to sea ."57
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Chapter VI
Failure at Fort Sumter

"Inregret to say that an attempt to assault Sumter last
night w as unsuccessful.
Our column was repul se d with loss."
The appointment of a new commanding officer was not the
only

Important change that occurred involving the South

Atlantic Blockading Squadron

in the spring of 1863.

DuPont's failed assault also dramatically altered the plans
for c apturing Charleston.

Now, even Fox, wh o previously had

done all that he could to ensure that the navy alone
captured Charleston,

realized that the best chance of taking

the detested city was through the cooperation of navy and
army forces.

In fact, Fox even supported a plan which

called for the army to lead the way, a plan w hich wou ld have
enormous consequences for Dahlgren's command of the South
Atlantic Blockading S qu ad ro n. 1
DuPont's April

7th attack against Charleston w as based

on the Navy Department's naive assumption that the monitors
simply w o ul d be able to steam past Fort Sumter
Charleston harbor,

into

forcing the city to surrender.

But

DuPont's attack demonstrated that Fort Sumter w as the key to
Charleston's outer defenses not only because of

its guns,
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but also because the fort anchored a line of obstructions
which blocked the single ship channel between the fort and
Sullivan's Island to Its north.

It was this line of

obstructions which had prevented DuPont from simply steaming
into Charleston's inner harbor as the Navy Department had
hoped and expected.
Fort Sumter had been designed and built with an eye
toward any attack on Charleston coming from the ocean.
Situated Just to the south of the ship channel,

its

offensive and defensive powers were concentrated on its
north and east sides.

Its weakest point, both offensively

and defensively, was the long gorge wall
southwest,

facing to the

toward James and Morris islands.

An attack via James Island was definitely out of the
question.

Union forces h ad already tried this route in June

1862, but against the heavily fortified Confederate
which stretched across the width of the Island,
suffered what General
repulse."

lines

they

Hunter described as "a disastrous

Some Union army officers, however, believed that

Morris Island offered them an opportunity to exploit Fort
Sumter's vulnerable gorge wall.2
Typical of the barrier

islands which skirt much of the

Uni te d States' Atlantic coast, Morris Island was Just shy of
four miles in length and ran more or less along a
north-south line.

Narrow and for the most part treeless,

the island faced the ocean along its entire eastern side,
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while to the west

it bordered what were generally considered

impassible marshlands.

Uninhabited before the war,

the

island became Important when Major Anderson occupied Fort
Sumter in December 1860.

South Carolina authorities then

erected a strong artillery battery at Cummings Point at the
island's northern tip,
gorge wall.

less than a mile from Fort Sumter's

After the capture of Sumter, additional

defenses intended primarily to protect the battery at
Cummings Point were begun along Morris Island, the most
important of which was Fort Wagner, which stretched across
the narrowest section of the island, approximately
three-quarters of a mile south of Cummings Point.
because of an overall

However,

lack of resources and General

Beauregard's belief that Morris Island was not absolutely
essential

to Charleston's defense, work on Fort Wagner and

the other defensive works on the island proceeded slowly and
were not yet completed by the spring of 1863.

The hope in

Washington w as that the army w ould be able to land at the
southern end of Morris Island from its base on Folly Island,
directly to the south, and capture Fort Wagner before it was
completed.

This would make the Confederate battery at

Cummings Point untenable, since all of its defenses faced
north and east toward Charleston harbor and the Atlantic
Ocean.

With possession of Morris Island,

it was believed

that heavy long-range artillery batteries beyond the reach
of Confederate guns could "demolish Fort Sumter."

Once the
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fort w as destroyed, Union authorities thought that

it wo uld

be easy to clear a path through the line of obstructions.
Then, Union warships could steam into the h a r b o r . 3
There was good reason for officials in Washington to
support the plan.

On May 23, Quincy A. 6 1 1 lmore wrote to

General-in-Chief Hal leek's ch le f -o f- s ta f f, George W. Cullum,
and assured him that not only could "the forts in Charleston
be reduced," but

it could be accomplished without any

additions to either the army or navy forces already there,
save "a suitable number of the best heavy rifled guns."
G 1 1lmore's opinion carried a great deal of weight.
r espected military engineer,

A

in 1849 he graduated first

his class at the United States Military Academy.

in

Assigned

to the army's prestigious Corps of Engineers, he had since
s pecialized in coastal

fortifications, helping to supervise

the construction of coastal
and Hampton Roads,

as well

defenses in both New York harbor
as serving as Instructor of

Military Engineering at West Point.

Even more important,

G i 1 lmore had commanded the army operations against Fort
Pulaski, near Savannah, Georgia.

Utilizing plans very

similar to those now proposed for Charleston, Gillmore
succeeded in capturing Fort Pulaski after the navy h a d been
unsuccessful

there.

Gillmore's military qualifications

coupled with his bold promises stood in stark contrast to
the controversial political

general, David Hunter,

command of the Department of the South.

then

in

Hunter seemed
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primarily

Intent on securing permission to "organize colored

regiments,"
Charleston.

rather than w or ki ng toward the capture of
Thus on June 3, Gillmore w as ordered to take

co mm a nd of the Department of the South.4
Even though it was clear that the army w a s to take the
lead role in the new plan of operations,

at

least

the navy's full cooperation was also essential

initially,

for success.

Unfortunately, when Gillmore arrived at his headquarters at
Hilton Head, South Carolina,

in mid-June, he found that the

situation surrounding the command of the South Atlantic
Bl oc ka d in g Squadron meant that the navy's assistance was not
forthcoming.

Having already been

relieved, Admiral

informed he was to be

DuPont did everything in his power to

delay p roviding Gillmore any assistance,
unfair to do so because

stating it would be

it would commit his successor to a

course of action which he might not agree with.

Gillmore

found that other than complaining to his superiors in
Washington,

there w as

little that he could do but wait for

DuPont's successor to arrive.5
After almost two years of what must have sometimes
seeme d like a vain struggle to escape his desk Job in
Washington,

Dahlgren

wait

On the day of his arrival at Port Royal

long.

longed for action.

4, he met with Gillmore.

The General

He did not have to
on July

told Dahlgren that

because the Confederate defenses on Morris Island were
ne aring completion that the campaign "must be tried now or
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it wou ld be too late."

Dahlgren agreed to "grant the aid

asked," recording In his Journal

that he felt that he had

"no alternative" but to do so.6
Dahlgren met with G i 1lmore again the following day to
find out exactly what the navy was expected to do.
already been described,

As has

the army's plan called for an

amphibious landing along the south end of Morris Island.
Gillmore,

To

the entire operation hinged on transporting his

troops safely across the Stono River Inlet in small boats.
The navy's primary Job was to ensure that Confederate
vessels from Charleston and Savannah could not get near the
southern end of Morris Island.
did not end once the army

Of course the navy's role

landed.

As the army officers who

originally proposed the Morris Island attack had pointed
out, one of the great advantages of advancing along the
barrier

island w as that the navy's Ironclads and gunboats

w o uld be in an ideal position to provide supporting
artillery fire, both against any Confederate artillery
positions and troops.7
Ironically,

for all of the complaints that he had

registered about the navy holding the army up, Gillmore
informed Dahlgren that the army wou ld not be ready until
Wednesday,
delay.

July 8.

Dahlgren d id not complain about this

If anything, even this date w as too soon.

As he

confided in his journal, both he and his staff were "new to
the squadron & locality," and there were numerous details to
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take care of before the navy could provide the requested
aid.

Alterations to strengthen the damaged monitors had to

be stopped.

The bar off of the Stono River inlet h ad to be

b u oye d to help the vessels navigate the tricky shallow
w at er s safely
participate
vessel

.

Additionally, each vessel called in to

in the operation had to be replaced by another

to ensure the continued viability of the blockade

a long the rest of the coast for which Dahlgren's squadron
w a s responsible.

These preparations took time, and three

days hardly seemed enough.®
Dahlgren's concerns about having enough time were
alleviated somewhat on July 7 when General
unexpectedly

Gillmore

informed him that the army could not be ready

until Thursday, a day later than previously thought.

Even

though the extra day gave Dahlgren the peace of mi n d that
the navy w oul d definitely be in position, Dahlgren still
wo rr ie d about the timing of operations.

The campaign as

detailed relied on some measure of surprise.

Dahlgren had

been doing all he could to make sure that the navy did not
give any clues to the enemy of the upcoming attack.
example,

For

Dahlgren had been carrying out all of his

p reparations for the impending attack from Port Royal.
Additionally,

since he Intended to personally

operations, when Dahlgren

left Port Royal

with as much secrecy as possible.

lead the navy

on July 8, he left

This included leaving his

admiral's flag flying over his flagship while he quietly
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headed south
It look

In a transport ship hoping that this would make

like he w as still

Unfortunately,
were for nought.

at Port Royal.9

Dahlgren's efforts to preserve secrecy

When maki ng arrangements for the attack,

Dahlgren had ordered that the participating vessels not
normally stationed at Charleston should arrive after
nightfall

on July 8.

But when Dahlgren arrived off

Charleston that afternoon,
there at anchor.
disgustedly.
however.

some of the vessels were already

So much for "obeying orders," he wrote

Their presence only added to his anxiety,

"Do wonder," he noted in his Journal,

items of the plan will

all work!

bed I tried to sleep!,] but

and so wondering went to

in vain for the ship so groaned

8, shook as the sea tossed her about,
was still

"if the many

that

I could not."

He

awake at 5 a.m. when a message from Gillmore w as

delivered stating that he had postponed the attack a g a in . 10
The

long-awaited attack finally began early on July 10,

when at 5:10 a.m.

the army's masked batteries on the

northern end of Folly Island unleashed a forty-seven gun
barrage.

Dahlgren and the navy were ready.

Unlike his

predecessor, w ho openly distained the monitors,

Dahlgren

intended to lead the navy operations from inside one of his
squadron's two-gun Ironclads.

A nticipating the attack,

Dahlgren had raised his admiral's flag on the C a t s k i 11 at 4
a.m.
vessel

As soon as he heard the army's guns, he ordered the
to steam into action,

the monitors N a h a n t . M o n t a u k .
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and Weehawken following close behind.
took more than an hour to m anu ev er

The sluggish monitors

into position, and the

navy's first contribution to the assault only came at 6:15.
Due to the enfilading position that the vessels could take,
however,

their fire had an immediate and telling effect.

Within minutes of the monitors'

opening up,

the men m anning

the Confederate batteries on the south end of Morris Island
were forced to abandon their guns and could be seen running
up the beach toward Fort W a g n e r . 1*
With the Confederate guns now silenced by the monitors,
the army's movement across the Stono River inlet began.

A

series of small sand hills near the end of Morris Island
pre ve nt ed Dahlgren and the navy from seeing the actual
landing, but they knew the attack was underway from "the
rattle of musketry."

The tension created by not being able

to see what was ha ppening did not

last long, because within

m i n u t e s at least two regiments of Union troops were visible
advancing up to the long flat section of the island.12
Wit h the Union troops now in full view,
changed.

"The Ironclads," Dahlgren wrote

report of the action,

"moved parallel

the navy's role

in his official

to the low, flat

grou nd that extends northward from the sand hills toward
Fort Wagner, and as near to it as the depth of water
permitted,

rolling shells in every direction over its

surface to clear away any bodies of troops that might be
gathe re d there."

So far, everyt hi ng h ad happened quickly
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and according to plan.

It w a s Just 9 a.m. when the first

Union troops reached the top of the sand hills;
they were within a half-mile of Fort Wagner.

and at 9:30

As for the

monitors, by this time they had closed to within 1200 yards
of the Confederate fort and proceeded to shell

it.13

Dahlgren did not know it at the time, but Gillmore had
already called a halt to his operations.

His troops, w h o

h ad been up most of the previous few nights in preparation
for the twice postponed attack, were exhausted by their
effort.

As Gillmore's men tried to recuperate in the

intense heat of the July sun on the shadeless island,

the

four monitors m aintained a heavy bombardment against Fort
Wagner, finally w it hdrawing in the early evening after be in g
in action for nearly fourteen h o u rs .14
It had been a long, but exciting day for Dahlgren;
first battle," he recorded proudly
truly experienced it first hand.

in his Journal.

And he

Undoubtedly because the

C a t s k i 11 led the way, carried his admiral's flag aloft,
did most of the signalling,

“my

and

the Confederate gunners

concentrated their gunfire against

it.

This was borne out

by the damage reports of the four monitors: Weehawken zero
hits received; Montauk struck twice; Nahant hit six times;
C a t s k i 11 struck no less than sixty times.
the hits on the C a t s k i 11 were serious.
his official report of the day's action,
s hots struck,

Moreover, many of

As Dahlgren noted in
" Cwlhen these heavy

the concussion was very great, an officer

...
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touching the turret at such a time, was knocked down
senseless and much

injured."

escaped a possibly fatal

Dahlgren himself narrowly

injury when a direct hit

"dislodged" one of the bolts holding the iron plates
together, sending it ricocheting around the narrow confines
of the pilot house where he was standing.

Despite these and

many other injuries which he described as "very severe,"
Dahlgren reported that he was "most favorably
the endurance of these Ironclads,"

impressed with

a sentiment which

tremendously pleased his superiors in the Navy Dep ar tm en t. 15
Dahlgren noted that he retired to his cabin "a weary
man"

the night of his first battle.

noted that he was an uninformed man.

He might have also
That became obvious at

about six a.m. the following morning when

it w as reported to

Dahlgren that General Gillmore's forces had attacked Fort
Wagner at daybreak.
attack,

Not knowing about Gillmore's plan to

the monitors were not prepared for action when the

fighting erupted at about 4 a.m.

Listening to the sounds of

battle, Dahlgren and his men could only speculate about what
was taking place.

Finally at about 9 o'clock Dahlgren

receiv ed an official

dispatch from Gillmore, stating that

the army's assault had failed and requesting the monitors be
brought

in to bombard the rear of the Confederate fort to

help prevent

its reinforcement.

Dahlgren quickly assented

to Gillmore's request, and he again personally
m on it o rs in "and peppered away at Wagner."

led the four

He was, however.
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mor e than a little annoyed with his army counterpart and in
a rapidly penned note Dahlgren Informed G i 1 lmore that the
monitors could have assisted sooner if only the request had
been m a d e . 16
Dahlgren finally learned something of Gillmore's
Intentions the following morning, July 12, when the general
visited him.

Gillmore began by recounting the details of

the previous morning's assault.
attack,

in the

Gillmore told Dahlgren, suffered more than fifty

percent casualties.

Simply ordering another frontal

w ou l d more than likely result
noted,

The first column

assault

in a similar defeat, Gillmore

thus he decided to utilize the same tactics that had

enabled his forces to land on Morris Island itself, a
combined army and navy artillery barrage followed by an
infantry a s sa ul t. 17
With Fort Wagner now the target,

it w as expected that

the navy could play a much greater role than in the initial
landing on Morris Island.
army's guns were relatively

That was because most of the
light, 30-pounders and less,

w hi l e the navy ironclads on the other hand, had much heavier
guns,

11-lnch and larger.

Moreover, because the vessels

could take up an enfilading position al on g Wagner's weak
ocean front, the navy's guns stood to do tremendous damage.
Dahlgren only had one real concern.

Dahlgren very much

w an t ed to utilize as many of his squadron's
guns as possible.

large caliber

Another monitor, the N a n t u c k e t . had only
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recently arrived, m a ki ng five available.

These five

vessels, however, only carried a total of ten guns.

The

ship that he really wante d to utilize w as the iron-sheathed
frigate New I r o n si d es , the full broadside of which equalled
that of the five monitors combined.

The problem was that

the ship drew so much water that it could only cross the bar
off Charleston at exceptionally high tides, which occurred
Just a few times each month.

Just such a tide was due on

July 15, but at the mo rni ng high tide the sea was too rough
for the ship to cross.

Dahlgren ordered the vessel

to be

lightened as much as possible for the evening high tide.

He

also expressed his concerns to Gillmore,

if

telling him that

the ship could not cross the attack should be postponed from
the scheduled day of July 16.
the wind abated,

By the afternoon, however,

and with ship now lightened somewhat,

successfully crossed,

touching bottom only o n c e . 18

With the N ew Ironsides across the bar,
ready, but the army w a s not.
counter-batteries,

it

the navy was

Unable to complete all of its

late on July 15, Gillmore notified

Dahlgren that the attack would have to be cancelled for a
day.

Then the weather proceeded to work against the Union

operation.

A series of heavy summer rainstorms typical

the southeast

of

inundated the area, submerging the batteries

already completed and slowing the progress on those still
under construction.

This forced a second postponement,

the

attack now being scheduled for July 1 8.19
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As h a d seemingly become the norm with the Morris Island
campaign,

the attack still did not begin when planned.

A

violent thunderstorm Just before daybreak on July 18 flooded
the Union batteries again.
rather

As the army proceeded with the

ironic task of h av in g to bail

Dahlgren's forces waited.

themselves out,

At 8:30, Gillmore signalled that

he wo ul d be ready to move in no more than two hours.

All of

the navy's wooden gunboats which carried rifled pivot-guns
thus went

into action,

firing from beyond the range of the

Confederate smooth-bore guns of Fort Wagner.

Dahlgren also

ordered the ironclads to prepare for action.

Unfortunately,

not

long after this Gillmore sent word that the rainstorms

h a d s oaked the gunpowder supplies for his artillery and he
w a s then

in the process of bringing up dry powder that he

ha d in reserve.

Normally, Gillmore probably would have

p o stp on ed the attack until
were, however,

at least the next day.

a number of reasons not to do so.

There
Every

postponement enabled the Confederates to strengthen their
position.
hi s troops,

Gillmore's growing sick list also indicated that
already actively working for more than two

weeks, we re rapidly be coming exhausted, both physically and
mentally.

Therefore the attack, Gillmore informed Dahlgren,

w o u ld commence at n o o n . 2°
Dahlgren
monitors.

led the naval operations from one of the

He boarded the Montauk shortly before noon and

led a flotilla of six ironclads into position; one benefit
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of the army's delays was that repairs on the damaged monitor
Pataosco were completed.

Although the army's batteries had

already opened fire before the ironclads were in position,
the ships' enfilading position

made their fire much more

effective, and Dahlgren noted that "Ctlhe guns of the fort
were soon over-crowed by the weight of metal
respond with spirit."

and did not

Initially, an ebb-tide forced the

ironclads to take a position about 1,200 yards from Wagner;
but as the tide begin to flow Dahlgren took the vessels in
closer to shore, finally an choring the monitors about three
hundred yards from the Confederate position.
pride,

Dahlgren described the scene.

With obvious

"Such a cracking of

shells and thunder of cannon and flying of sand and earth
into the air....the Fort w a s quiet, would not answer with a
gun,

indeed under such a fire it was very unsafe for a man

to come out of the bomb-proofs.
continued,

"was very fine!,]

The gunnery,"

Dahlgren

the shells of the Ironsides

going right over the Montauki,] so we had it all our own
w a y ."21
Confederate reports describing the bombardment
supported Dahlgren's views, at

least in part.

Beauregard called it "unparalleled, until
siege,

General

this epoch of the

in the weight of projectiles thrown."

Brigadier-General Taliaferro,

commanding Confederate troops

in Fort Wagner, wrote:
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With this Immense circle of fire by land and sea,
he poured for eleven hours, without cessation or
intermission, a storm of shot and shell upon Fort
Wagner, which is perhaps unequaled in history.
My
estimation is that not less than 9,000 solid shot
and shell of all sizes from XV-lnch downward, were
hurled during this period at the work; the
estimate of others is very much greater.
The concentrated artillery fire had relatively
Impact, however.

little

With most of the defenders safely

inside

the fort's bomb-proof shelter, only eight men were killed
and twenty wounded during the bombardment.
itself also suffered only minor material

The earthen fort

damage.

Even the

massive 330 pound explosive shells from the monitor's
fifteen-inch guns did little more than to displace some wet
sand into the air, much of it simply settling back near its
original

location.

Additionally,

in anticipation of the

bombardment, many of Wagner's light field-pieces had been
buried under tons of sand, waiting to be exhumed when the
artillery barrage ended and the expected infantry assault
began.

Of course, watching from the Union

and naval vessels offshore,

land batteries

it would have been hard to

believe that the concentrated bombardment had done so little
actual

damage, either to the fort or its defenders.

Thus,

Dahlgren was not at all surprised when near sunset he
received a penciled note from Gillmore informing him that he
had ordered an assault.22
Dahlgren described the events of the next few hours in
his j o u r n a l .
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[B3y the w aning light we could see the m as se s
coming along the beach, but the darkness shut them
in ere they reached the Fort.— Presently came the
flashes of light and the sharp rattle from musket
& c a n n o n [.]
there could be no help from us for it
w as dark and we might kill friend as well as foe.
All we could do was to look on and await an issue
not in our c o n t r o l . The contest went on for an
hour and Ca3 half, lapsed and then died out.
It
w a s over, but who had won.
About 10 almost worn
out, with exertion for 19 hours.
I returned to my
den in the "Dlnsmore" and there learned that our
men h ad been repulsed with severe loss....The
Gen.[era 13 has not force enough e vi de nt l y. 23
Dahlgren was not alone in feeling that the Army did not
have enough men.

With his force reduced a full one-third

since the b eginning of the campaign,

Gillmore

Informed

General-in-Chief Hal leek that he re quired the immediate
addition of "8,000 or 10,000 effective old troops"
continue the campaign.

to

Believing that the recent Union

successes at Vicksburg and Port Hudson wo ul d enable Hal leek
to send him at least this many men, Gillmore closed:
shall husband my strength until

"I

re -enforcements arrive."24

When Hal leek received Gillmore's request he became
furious.

"It is, to say the least, seriously embarrassing,11

the general-ln-chlef fumed.

He r em in de d Gillmore of the

assurances that he made before the campaign began,
especially his statement that no additional
necessary.

troops w o u ld be

"Had it been supposed that you wou l d require

more troops,"

Hal leek continued in h is rage,

"the operations

w o uld not have been attempted with my consent or that of the
Secretary of W a r . "25
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Hal leek's statements show that the army high command in
Washington had little Interest

In either the Charleston

campaign generally or the Morris Island campaign
specifically.
Department.

The same could not be said of the Navy
Fox had great expectations for the movement on

Morris Island.

After

learning that Gillmore's forces had

successfully

landed on the south end of the barrier island,

Fox boasted:

"I

... got Gilmore

[sic] sent down as a man who

b el ie v ed that Charleston could be taken and the result
that we have just learned that a brilliant
made on Morrisons [sic]
assuredly,

Island."

"Dahlgren and Gilmore

Char 1e s t o n ....The rebellion

is

lodgement w as

With this, Fox continued
Csic3 will

certainly take

is going overboard fast."26

Dahlgren's report detailing the defeat at Fort Wagner
elicited an entirely different response from the Navy
Department.

Dahlgren stated that " C w H t h 20,000 men Fort

W ag ne r w ould have been ours ... and then the rest must
follow inevitably."

Fox

immediately went to see Hal leek and

asked him to rush reinforcements to Gillmore.

But as Welles

recorded in his private diary, Hal leek brusquely responded
that "if we [Fox and Welles] w o u ld take care of the Navy, he
w o u l d take care of the Army."

W elles and Fox refused to

accept Hal leek's rebuff as the final
We ll es

later recounted,

Dahlgren's dispatches;

"I went

answer.

Instead, as

... to the President with

told him the force under Gillmore was

insufficient for the work assigned;

that

it ought not now
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fail; that it ought not to have been begun unless it was
understood his force was to have been

increased;

that such

was his expectation, and I wis he d to know if it could not be
done."

Welles continued his plea for sending the

reinforcements by arguing that "It w o ul d be unwise to wait
until Gillmore w as crushed and repelled, and then try and
regain lost ground, which seemed to be the policy of General
Hal leek;

instead of remaining inactive til Gillmore,

exhausted, cried for help.

His wants should be

anticipated."27
According to Welles,

Lincoln "agreed with me fully."

Of this fact, no one could be surprised.

After all, here

was the President's friend Dahlgren, w ho was In Charleston
in part because of the President's influence, asking for
assistance.

How could Lincoln refuse?

Shortly thereafter

it was announced that 5,000 additional men were being sent
to reinforce General
"I thought

Gillmore.

it should be 10,000

And while, as Welles noted,
if we intended thorough work,

... tlJ am glad even of this assurance."28
While the arrival
1 w as Indeed welcomed,

of the first reinforcements on August
their presence was no longer as

crucial as Dahlgren and Gillmore had once assumed.

That was

because Gillmore had decided to change his plan of
operations.

Until

the failure of the July 18 assault, he

had believed that the capture of Fort Wagner w ould be a
relatively simple task.

This belief w as reflected in his
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decision to attack at sunset.

Afterward, Gillmore realized

that the timing of the attack had been a mistake.

The

leading column managed to seize the southeast bastion of
Fort Wagner Just as night fell.

Gillmore noted that in the

darkness the attackers were at a severe disadvantage.
Unable to distinguish attacker from defender,

the Union's

artillery, which was the greatest advantage that the Union
forces enjoyed at Charleston, w as forced to cease firing.
The attacking column had little choice but to fall back.
Casulaties reflected the completeness of the defeat;
Gillmore

lost more than 1,500 officers and men,

Confederates,

the

181.29

After two failed direct attacks,
to order another.

As he wrote wrote

Gillmore decided not
in his final

report of

the campaign, because "itihe demolition of Fort Sumter was
the object

in view" of securing Morris Island,

valuable time,

"[tio save

it was determined to attempt the demolition

of Fort Sumter from ground already

in our possession."

Gillmore's decision transformed the Union campaign
siege.

into a

Major T. B. Brooks, w ho w a s in charge of the actual

day-to-day engineering work on Morris Island, stated that
after the failed second assault,

the Department of the

South's operations consisted of three components:
" Celstabllshment of defensive

first,

lines across Morris Island,

order to secure our 1o d g e m en t ....[Second,] Construction of
batteries employed in the demolition of Fort
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S u m t e r ....[Th1r d , 1 Execution of approaches and batteries
against Fort W agn er ." 30
At the outset of
much

o per at io ns Dahlgren had concentrated

of his squadron at Charleston

in order to provide as

much support to the army as possible.

This had severely

weakened the blockade up a nd down the entire south Atlantic
coast, but Dahlgren had deem ed this necessary because of the
importance placed on capturing Charleston.
h ad been assumed that the campaign
thus

Furthermore,

it

w o ul d be short-lived and

the blockade w ou ld be quickly restored to its former

strength.

Now, however,

there seeme d no immediate prospect

for returning the vessels to their stations, and this
p resented a real problem.

Ironically,

General

probably the most upset about the situation.

Gillmore was
On July 22 he

w rote to Dahlgren and expressed h i s concern about the
concentration of vessels at Charleston.

It w as not the

effect on the blockade that c o nc er ne d him, but rather the
loss of protective naval

support for his troops scattered

a long the coast, especially at Port Royal.
The army's actual

operations called for the

construction of a series of parallels. They served two
purposes.

First, each parallel

brought the Union line

closer to Fort Wagner; when they wer e close enough the fort
w o u l d ultimately become untenable.

Each parallel was also

designed to hold new artillery batteries,

some of which were
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aimed at Fort Wagner, while others were for breaching Fort
Sumter's gorge w a l 1.31
A pattern quickly developed.
of darkness,

Wo rk in g under the cover

the Union army slowly but steadily pushed its

trenches forward.

In turn,

the navy provided around the

clock support, suppressing Confederate artillery and sniper
fire from Fort Wagner and h elping to prevent a
counter-attack.

The most difficult and dangerous part of

the operation was e stablishing the artillery batteries in
the completed parallels.

The first of these operations came

in the early morning h ours of July 24.

Normally,

Dahlgren

alternated the ironclads in the daily firing against the
Confederate positions in order to allow some of the members
of the squadron to rest, but transporting the artillery
across the open beach required that the Confederate guns be
totally silenced.

That m o r ni n g all of the Dahlgren's

ironclads were close inshore firing away, while the wooden
gunboats participated in the bombardment from long range.
For nearly five hours,

Dahlgren noted in his Journal, his

squadron "CpDounded away Cat Fort Wagner,! scattering the
sand,

and silencing "the feeble reply it m a d e . "32
Completion of the secon d parallel brought the Union

A r my 's entrenchments to within 870 yards of Fort Wagner and
p l a c e d its long-range batteries "at a mean distance of 3,525
yards from Fort Sumter."

This was just the beginning step

in the Army's siege operations.

The work of pushing the
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lines forward continued, as d id the pattern of nearly
constant naval support.33
The siege tactics had enormous ramifications for
Dahlgren and his squadron.

The constant work quickly showed

its effect, especially on the monitors.

Dahlgren

informed

the Navy Department that while none of his m o ni to rs were so
seriously damaged that they could not be repaired in a few
w ee ks each at most, because of the constant need for their
use he could not send them to Port Royal
repaired.

to have them

He asked that the Navy Department exchange two

unda ma ge d monitors for two of his damaged vessels;

in fact,

Dahlgren suggested, why not send a third monitor as w el l ?34
The officers and crews of the monitors showed the
effects of the operations even more than the vessels did.
The wo rk i ng conditions Inside the poorly ventilated vessels
were barely tolerable

in the best of conditions, but

Charleston's summer heat,

they became nearly unbearable.

Temperatures inside the ironclad vessels soared,
high as 140 degrees.
now kept

in

reaching as

Moreover, because the m on it or s were

inside the Charleston bar day and night,

it was

necessary to be prepared for a sudden attack at all

times.

This precluded the usual practice of allowing the crews to
sleep on deck at night, which previously had at

least

p ro vi de d some relief; and because the vessels we re almost
constantly engaged during the day, the awnings that each
m onitor was supplied with to provide shade, remained in
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storage.

By late July,

the officers and seamen of the

ironclads were rapidly breaking down under the strain.
" [Tlhere is," Dahlgren

informed the secretary of the navy,

"a diminution of officers from sickness and of men from
expiration of terms and sickness, so that on the whole,
without being discouraged or feeling unequal
have my hands full."
acute.

to the task, I

The need for officers was especially

Two of the monitors did not have commanders, and a

third was without an executive officer.

In an effort to try

and provide relief for the men on the monitors,

Dahlgren

requested that the Navy Department provide his squadron with
an old, but large sailing vessel, which he proposed to use
more or less like a hotel

for the crews.

recognition of the extreme conditions,
the men should receive bonus pay.

In further

Dahlgren argued that

Additionally, and in an

ironic twist considering Dahlgren's participation

in the

navy's first grog-less ship, Dahlgren requested that the
monito rs be exempted from the navy's recently passed
regulation ending the daily alcohol

ration for seamen.35

Dahlgren showed the impact of the constant exertion in
the hot Charleston weather as well.

Never a hardy or robust

m a n — about six feet tall he weighed about 130 pounds— in
early August Dahlgren became so weak
h im to leave his bed.

it w as difficult for

His daily journal

during this period

contains a litany of complaints of his ill-health, which he
w as convinced w as due entirely to Charleston's weather.
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Undoubtedly contributing to his physical

condition was the.

fact that Dahlgren apparently suffered from a chronic case
of seasickness.

While he never admitted this personally,

according to George F. Emmons, w h o was Dahlgren's Fleet
Captain,
vessel

"The Admiral was somewhat affected by motion of a

in a seaway....A sailor never likes to acknowledge

this, nevertheless, a great many suffer more or less all
their

lives."

To try and combat his condition, every night

Dahlgren anchored his flagship
also found relief
but small
Journal,
of Mint."

in a protected

in another form.

"Improved

anchorage.

He

by frequent

drafts of ale on ice," Dahlgren recorded in his
"and of a teaspoonful

of Brandy on Ice with a sprig

Thus when the Navy Department rejected his

request to provide the monitor crews with a whiskey ration,
he not surprisingly reacted very angrily.
from Bur.CeauI of Med. H e i n e !

"Mem.Corandum!

against Whiskey

c r e w s . ... Strange that persons w ho cannot know
people w ho must know.

to the
will judge of

Wish the people at W a s h . [ ington!

w o u l d try a day's labor in a Monitor."

Ironically,

Dahlgren

himself recognized the Bureau of Medicine's reason for
d en yi ng the request, namely that the "issue of whiskey
p r o ve s a temporary comfort;"

...

because after extolling the

virtues of ale and brandy on his own health, he noted,
"Nothing but will has kept me u p — my head screams and I
c ou l d hardly walk five m in u te s. "36

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241

Of course,

the army's operations were not affected by

Dahlgren's physical

condition.

On August 9,

the "third

parallel" was opened, Just 540 yards from Fort Wagner.

Work

on the dozen artillery batteries aimed at W agn er and Sumter
rapidly neared completion as well.

Gillmore

informed

Dahlgren that all should be ready for the bombardment to
begin on August 14.
entire campaign,

In keeping with the past history of the

the bomabardment of Fort Sumter did not

begin when p lanned because shortly before the scheduled
attack the army's ordnance officer discovered that the
powder supply for heavy guns was of "inferior and Irregular
quality."

Fortunately, a loan of gunpowder from the navy

and the opportune arrival of a shipment of powder from the
north made the delay a short one.37
The army was eventually ready by August

17.

Even in

ill-health, Dahlgren planned on participating in the first
direct attack of Fort Sumter since DuPont's failure of April
7.

At 5:30 a.m., he raised his flag on the monitor

W e e h a w k e n . which then led a flotilla of seven Union
ironclads into battle.

Since the first order of business

w a s to silence Fort Wagner in order to allow all of the
army's land batteries to engage Fort Sumter,

Dahlgren

anchored about 1,000 yards "abreast of Wagner"

and opened

fire, and the other Ironclads quickly followed the
flagship's lead.

At first, Dahlgren noted in his staff

J o u r n a l , the Confederate gunners in Fort Wagner responded
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"very rapidly!,]
projectile
shot."

... using every conceivable form of

imaginable,

from a Minle' ball

to a solid X-lnch

But soon, he noted with obvious satisfaction,

the

combined firepower of the ironclad fleet became so Intense
that "Fort Wagner w as covered by a cloud of dust and smoke,"
and the fort grew silent.38
With Fort Wagner silenced, Dahlgren turned his
attention to Fort Sumter.

In an incredibly Ironic twist,

Dahlgren abandoned his own ordnance technology when he
transferred his flag to the monitor Passalc because it was
armed with a rifled Parrott gun Instead of the usual Xl-lnch
Dahlgren gun that most of the monitors carried.
did most other commanders,

He knew, as

that the longer range Parrott gun

enabled the Passaic to engage Fort Sumter from a distance
where the enemy's fire would pose less risk.

Dahlgren

anchored the P a s s a i c , along with the Patapsco which was also
armed with a rifled Parrott gun, some 2,000 yards from
Sumter and ope ne d fire.

For nearly two hours the two

monitors m ai nt ai ne d a steady

long range barrage and Dahlgren

noted that from the very first shot not a single one missed
the target.39
The question of the safety of the monitors was shown to
be more than just an idle abstraction that day.

When

Dahlgren ordered the P a s s a 1c and Patapsco to withdraw to
allow the crews to get some rest, he learned that during the
attack on Fort Wagner earlier that morning, one of his
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m on it or commanders, Captain George W. Rodgers w ho commanded
the C a t s k i 1 1 . was killed when a shot struck the top of the
pilot house.

The shot broke the roof's Iron plates, driving

parts of them into the pilot house, where they struck and
kille d Rodgers, along with another of his officers.40
Dahlgren reported the death of Rodgers as the "one sad
exception"

in what had otherwise been a great beginning in

the Union's effort to destroy Fort Sumter.

As both he and

Gillmore noted in communications to each other, the day's
bombardment had "greatly damaged"

the Confederate fort.

But

both officers also thought that the key to ultimate success
was to maintain the attack until
destroyed;

Sumter was completely

and in the evening of August 17, Dahlgren and

Gillmore agreed to "the same programme for to-morrow that we
had to-day.
In the days following,

the bombardment continued and

Fort Sumter's brick walls quickly began to disintegrate
under the constant fire.
destruction.

Dahlgren closely monitored the

Each day he boarded one of the ironclads and

"steamed up to take a look at Sumter."

On August 19, the

third day of the bombardment, Dahlgren noted that Sumter's
gorge wall was "pretty well used up, but not breached."

By

the following day, however, Dahlgren stated that Sumter's
outer brick work on the gorge w a l 1 w a s "beaten

in at the top

and b e lo w it so as to make visible the arches within."
After five days of constant bombardment, Dahlgren reported:
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"Sumter

Is now completely dilapidated at the Gorge & many

shells have gone throiugh]

the farther walls."

Beauregard reported pessimistically to Richmond:

General
"West and

northwest scarp walls of Sumter badly shattered by reverse
fire of enemy's 200-pounder Parrott guns and iron-clad
f l e e t . . ..Batteries are disabled.

Gorge wall d a m a g e d . ... F a 11

of Sumter now only a question of time."42
Both Dahlgren and Gillmore wanted to make sure that
Beauregard's prediction came true, and the sooner the
better.

In the evening of August 21, Gillmore sent the

following letter to Beauregard:

I have the honor to demand of you the
immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort
S u m t e r ....The present condition of Fort Sumter and
the rapid and progressive destruction which it is
undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its
complete demolition within a few hours a matter of
c e r t a i n t y ....
Should you refuse compliance with this
demand, or should I receive no reply thereto
within four hours ... I shall open fire on the
city of Charleston....
When no answer w a s received,

the one-gun battery which

Glllmore's engineers h ad erected in the m arshlands to the
west of Morris Island, opened fire.

Some illustration of

the magnitude of the North's hatred toward Charleston w as
illustrated by the bombardment on Charleston
only did the "Swamp Angel,"

Itself.

Not

the name which the Union gunners

gave to the gun, open fire at 1:30

in the morning,

it also

utilized incendiary projectiles known as "Greek Fire" rather
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than conventional projectiles.
of Charleston,

Fortunately for the citizens

the "Swamp Angel" burst after firing only

thirty-six times and the army did not attempt to place
another gun In the ma rshlands.43
The same day that Gillmore demanded Sumter's surrender,
Dahlgren also tried his hand at causing the fall of the
Confederate fort.

Dahlgren called his ironclad commanders

together and explained his intention to attack Sumter that
night,

the advantage bein g that under the cover of darkness

the vessels w ou l d make difficult targets for the enemy's
gunners.

But Dahlgren found that his subordinates had "[nlo

partic ul ar zeal"

for a night attack.

Captain Stephen Rowan

w h o commanded the difficult to maneuver New Ironsides voiced
the loudest protest against the operation.
understandable.

This was

His vessel had a much greater draft than

the mo ni to rs and would be very susceptible to grounding in
the shallow w aters near Sumter.

Despite the obvious lack of

confidence, Dahlgren ordered the attack anyway.
first,

everything went wrong.

When Dahlgren went to board

the W e e h a w k e n . he found the monitor still
worse,
seen."

not a single one of the other
After

From the

at anchor.

Even

ironclads "was to be

losing half an hour gathering his ironclad

fleet together, Dahlgren ordered the operation to begin.
badly as the operation h ad started,
worse,

things became even

and Dahlgren described it in his private journal.
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Just as I was abreast of [Battery] Gregg, all
w e l 1, comes the Scout and says the Passaic is
aground.
So here Is a nice m e s s — took instant
measures,— but so much time had been lost by the
time she w as off and I knew it, that there was too
little of the night left.
So I had to abandon the
attempt.
Very vexatious.
Too little interest
felt in the proceedings, that is the trouble.44
The "catastrophe,"

as he described the poorly executed

night attack in his private Journal,

frustrated Dahlgren.

The next day he wrote to Secretary Welles and complained
that while "the shore batteries

[had]

... ravaged Sumter,"

he lacked the me an s necessary to complete the job.
did he not have enough

Not only

ironclads, according to Dahlgren,

those that he did have were worn out.

This w as due to the

lengthy Joint operations on Morris Island.
from shore," he complained,

"tax me heavily,

"[TJhe calls
for the

trenches can not be advanced nor even the guns [in the shore
batteries be] kept
Wagner, and yet

in play, unless the ironclads keep down

in doing so the power of the ironclads is

abated proportionately.

Please," Dahlgren pleaded,

"send me

ironclads."45
Dahlgren expressed his concerns to Gillmore as well.
After receiving what had become a routine request for the
navy to silence Fort Wagner,
will be glad to do [so].

Dahlgren responded sharply,

"I

It should be understood, however,

that this course is likely to expend the force of the
Ironclads so as to render other active operations on my part
impossible."

Dahlgren pointed out that the army's constant
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requests for the protective fire of the monitors were
w e a r i n g his squadron out, both vessels and crews.

Because

of this, he warned the General, even "if Sumter and Wagner
are reduced"

the navy might not be able to take advantage of

the s i t u a t i o n .46
Dahlgren's concerns were

indeed legitimate.

While the

South Atlantic Blockading Squadron had seven monitors, one
w as more or less permanently stationed outside Savannah to
prevent the Confederate Ironclad in that port from venturing
forth.

Another was then at Port Royal repairing, and the

Superintendent of Monitor Repairs estimated that at least
twenty-four days were required to complete them.
rem ai ni ng five monitors,
which Dahlgren noted,
The

Of the

three ha d use of only one guns,

left Just two "entirely complete."

irony of this, Dahlgren pointed out to Gillmore, was

that while he was now expected to what DuPont had failed to
do back

in April, his squadron wa s so weakened by the almost

two month

long operation that

it did not even compare with

the force that Admiral DuPont h a d then.

Despite the

p rob le ms with the monitors, Dahlgren had little alternative
but to provide Gillmore and his troops the protection that
the general

requested.

Dahlgren thus ordered three of his

Ironclads to silence Fort Wagner.

And while Dahlgren surely

w o u l d have been comforted if he ha d been privy to the
Confederate report stating that Wagner's gunners once again
h ad to seek refuge in the fort's bombproof to escape the
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"destructive"

enfilading fire of the Union warships, he was

even more concerned about the impact that the activity would
have on his planned operations against Sumter set for that
n igh t .47
Despite having had half of his ironclads firing at Fort
W ag ne r for most of the afternoon, Dahlgren decided to go
a head with a second consecutive night attack.
this one went better,

And while

it w as hardly a stellar success.

Boarding the Weehawken at 11 p.m., Dahlgren did not fire the
first shot until 3 a.m.
always,

The

long delay h a d two causes.

As

the monitors were slow and difficult to maneuver

into position.

Navigation was further c om plicated this

night by a heavy fog, which at times completely obscured
Fort Sumter from view and

forced the Ironclad gunners to

aim

"by direction of stars."

When Dahlgren finally o rdered the

five moni tor s to withdraw

at 7 a.m.,

they h ad ma na g ed to

fire a paltry seventy-one rounds, which Dahlgren described
in a wonderful

understatement,

"was less than should have

b e e n ."48
After two consecutive days and nights of around the
clock operations, Dahlgren and his Ironclad crews were
completely exhausted.

Dahlgren thus considered it more than

"acceptable" when Sunday, August 23, proved "a quiet day."
The main reason for the quietness was that the Union army's
bombardment w as wi nd in g down.
day and night bombardment,

After seven days of constant

the army's thirteen

long-range
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guns aimed at Fort Sumter had fired off more than 5,000
rounds w e ig hi ng more than half a million pounds.
this total were about one thousand additional

Adding to

rounds

expended by the navy's own four-gun battery on Morris
Island, as well

as the contributions from the navy's

Ironclads and gunboats.

6 1 1 lmore's chief of artillery

reported that due to the unparalleled bombardment,

Sumter's

gorge wall wa s "almost a complete m as s of ruins."

Moreover,

from his long distance

Inspections of the fort, he believed

that only one gun w as still

serviceable.

of the fort," he continued,

"is so far complete that

today of no avail
harbor.

"ITlhe destruction
it is

in the defense of the harbor of Charleston

By a longer fire,

it can be mad e more completely a

ruin and a mas s of broken masonry, but could scarcely be
more powerless for the defense of the harbor."
that

He concluded

it made no sense to continue the s h el li ng .49
Sumter's destruction began a new phase for the Union

operations.
Washington

As h ad been discussed m o n th s earlier
it was now up to the navy to take the

Dahlgren seemed intent on doing.

in
lead, which

The same day that the

Union bombardment of Sumter ended, Dahlgren wrote to
Secretary of the Navy Welles,
the harbor."

"I propose p assing Sumter into

While Dahlgren's statement mad e it appear that

getting past Fort Sumter was a relatively simple task, he
realized that this was not the case.

His biggest concern

w a s the line of obstructions that the Confederates had
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er ected in the ship channel between Fort Sumter and Fort
Moultrie,

The obstructions, Dahlgren added as a caveat

in

his report to Welles, might be "of such a nature as to
prevent"

his ironclads from reaching Charleston's inner

h arb o r. 50
The obstructions were an obvious source of anxiety for
Dahlgren.

He was thus not very upset when severe weather on

August 24th and 25th forced him to cancel
ru nn in g past Fort Sumter.

any attempt at

The delay gave him time to

develop a plan for dealing with the obstructions, which he
detai le d to his officers on August 26.

The nighttime

operation called for the monitors and New Ironsides to head
toward Fort Sumter and open fire.

This time, however,

bombardment w ou ld only serve as a diversion.

their

While the

ironclads were occupying the attention of the Confederate
gunners,

a small

steam tug would tow a detachment of small

boats up to the line of obstructions.
in the boats,

Once there, the men

all of whom were "volunteers for a special

service", wer e to use "tackles, straps,

fishhooks,

... saws,

augers, cold chisels, hammers" and a host of other devices
to try to make an opening in the obstructions large enough
to al lo w the monitors "to move up to Rebellion Road."5 *
Dahlgren recognized that he could not plan for every
eventuality.

"The general

noted in his orders;

idea alone can be sketched," he

"the rest must be left to the coolness

and Judgement of commanding officers to meet with unexpected
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events."

What he did not write, but perhaps should have,

w a s that some eventualities could not be overcome even with
"coolness and Judgement."

That was demonstrated that

e vening when the plan was put

into operation.

Starting out

at about 9 p.m., which w as an hour later than Dahlgren had
stipulated,

the monito rs and other vessels were opposed by

extremely strong currents,

greatly slowing their progress.

Then "Ctlhe weather which h ad been threatening,"

Dahlgren

reported in his account of the affair, "became very bad,
blow in g and raining violently."

In the dark and rain

everything became a ma ss of confusion.

The officer

In

charge of cutting the obstructions reported that while he
h a d gotten near the obstacles In the water,

the current near

Sumter was "like a sluice," preventing him from getting any
closer.

This settled matters.

ord er ed his ships back.
journal,

At about 2:30 a.m., Dahlgren

He wrote despondently

"raining incessantly, and as dismal

in his

a night as one

w ou ld wish to s ee."52
This first aborted attempt at getting by the
obstructions was also the last one that Dahlgren's forces
made.

The following night Dahlgren cancelled the proposed

operation when a mixup

in the deployment of his squadron's

vessels led to the one steam tug that was su ited for towing
the small boats up to the obstructions being sent outside
the Charleston bar Just prior to the sceduled operation.
"If I attend not to every detail," Dahlgren recorded in
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disgust

In his Journal,

"thus things go."

The forecast for

bad weather the next day caused another cancellation.
on August 29,

Then

it w as reported to Dahlgren "that Sumter has

fired several shots."

That settled m atters as far as

Dahlgren w as concerned, and he bluntly told General
Gillmore:

"My movement

is p ost po ne d. 115^

Dahlgren's decision
Gillmore.

led to an acrimonious exchange with

As soon as the general

learned of the reason for

Dahlgren cancelling his operations, he telegraphed Dahlgren
that the army's lookouts, w ho were "specially directed"
watch for ordnance fire from Sumter, were "positive"
"Sumter has not fired a shot to-day."

Dahlgren

to

that

Immediately

signalled back to Gillmore that while the army's lookouts
might

"be correct," he had received reports to the contrary.

Acc or di ng to Dahlgren,

the navy's "operations were based on

the supposition that Sumter was silenced,"

and clearly in

his mi nd this meant totally and completely silenced.
Sumter may have fired a shot,

Since

this meant that the navy's

operations were cancelled.54
Even if Dahlgren w a s correct that several

shots had

been fired from Fort Sumter, his decision to cancel

the

operations aimed at breaking the Confederate obstructions
seems unwarranted.

Dahlgren readily admitted in his reports

to Washington that Sumter no longer posed a serious
offensive threat.

On the other hand, the report of ordnance

fire from the fort may have provided Dahlgren a convenient
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excuse not to deal with the obstructions personally.
Throughout the Civil War, Union navy officers exhibited an
absolute dread of underwater obstructions because of the
recent

Introduction of explosive devices,

torpedoes, now called mines.

then called

Time after time Union naval

op er at io ns were stymied by torpedoes, real and imagined; and
Farrag ut 's "Damn the torpedoes!
Mobile Bay in August
exceptional

... go ahead!" speech at

1864, w as certainly one of the few

examples of aggressive action by the Union navy

in the face of torpedoes.

While certainly not

lacking in

personal bravery, as he exhibited constantly by leading the
m o n i t o r s into battle time after time, Dahlgren never
e x h i b it e d any aggressiveness with the obstructions.
fact,

In

a more scientific approach w as his response to the

torpedoes, which w a s not at all surprising considering his
scientific background.

For example,

the first time that any

of his vessels were confronted by torpedoes, Dahlgren
req ue st ed that the navy construct submarines with explosive
devices attached to their bows.
Dahlgren wrote,

"With such a contrivance,"

"a quantity of powder could be brought to

bear upon obstructions which w ou l d dislocate any nice
arrangements."

Furthermore,

the day prior to cancelling the

o perations against the obstructions, Dahlgren Informed
Secretary Welle s that he had been approached by someone who
p r o p o se d removing the obstructions,

if the navy provided a
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contract to do so.

"I am willing," Dahlgren told Welles,

"to recommend such an a g r e e m e n t ."55
It was also possible that Dahlgren/s physical

condition

may have been influencing him to make less than a whole
h ea rt ed attempt to breach the obstructions.
deteriorated dramatically

In late August.

His health
On August 26, the

day of the first attempt against the obstructions, Dahlgren
wrote

in his Journal,

"I w as so feeble that I could hardly

rise from the chair and walk across the room."
later he made an extremely dark appraisal
"CMyl debility
sit

in a chair.

of his condition.

increases so that to-day it Is an exertion to
I feel

I do not see well.

like lying down.

How strange,

My head is light.

no pain, but so feeble that

it seems like gliding away to death.
Why not[?3" he asked in conclusion,
run?"

Two days

How easy it seems.
"to one whose race is

Whatever explained his decision, Dahlgren was not

g oing to order another attack against the obstructions.
Instead he asked Gillmore to resume the army's bombardment
of Fort Sumter from Morris Island.56
Dahlgren did not explicitly state what had to happen
before he would renew the navy's efforts to get past Fort
Sumter

into Charleston's inner harbor.

Gillmore probably

belie ve d that once it w as demonstrated that Fort Sumter did
not have any guns mounted,

the navy would resume their

operations against the obstructions.
he disagreed with Dahlgren,

Therefore,

even though

Gillmore again ordered his
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batteries to open up against Fort Sumter in order to
dismount any guns that still

remained.

The army's

bombardment began on the morning of August 30, but bad
weather prevented the navy from participating until
evening of September 1.

the

Thus uncertainty remained about

whether or not the fort had been completely silenced.

After

the navy finally Joined the attack, all that Gillmore wanted
to know was if the monitors had been fired upon from Sumter.
When he was told that they had not been, he undoubtedly
assumed that Dahlgren would once again begin to operate
against the obstructions.57
Dahlgren had no intention of doing this, however.

He

now reported to Secretary of the Navy Weiles that even
though Fort Sumter was "almost entirely disabled,"
Charleston could not be captured until Fort Sumter itself
w as occupied by Union forces.

The navy could not move

against the fort because of the obstructions.

The Army was

not able to occupy the fort because they had not yet
captured Fort Wagner.
Dahlgren,

But all was not lost.

According to

the army was close to capturing Fort Wagner and

thus he decided to assist Gillmore in a final push to do
s o. 58
The need to occupy Fort Sumter was a major change in
the Union's military plans.
thought that

Until

this point,

it had been

it w oul d only be necessary to silence the

Confederate fort.

Dahlgren, however, had clearly come to
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believe that his vessels could not get past the obstructions
which blocked the ship channel between Fort Sumter and Fort
Moultrie.

But

if Fort Sumter were occupied by Union

forces— which Dahlgren believed w ould be the natural
consequence of capturing Fort W a gn e r— it wo ul d not be
possible for the Confederates to maintain the line of
obstructions that they had established.
ironclads w o ul d be able to steam directly

Then, the Union
into the inner

harbor and capture Charleston itself.
Even when the focus of the Union campaign had shifted
after the first bombardment of Fort Sumter ended on August
23, Gillmore and the army had not stopped trying to capture
Fort Wagner.

Utilizing the same metho d of advancing its

trenches that

it had been using since mid-July, by September

3, the army's lines were no more than seventy yards from the
front of Wagner

itself.

Still,

not a foregone conclusion.

the capture of the fort was

To protect Wagner,

h ad burled hundreds of explosive

its defenders

land mines directly

in

front of the fort, which threatened to disrupt a frontal
ground assault.

But with all of the navy's ironclads

wo rk in g in conjunction with the army's heavy artillery,

it

w a s h oped that the troops in Wagner could be driven o ut . 59
From September 3 onward,
navy,

the Union artillery, army and

focused primarily on Fort Wagner.

Hour after hour,

day after day, shot and shell rained down on the Confederate
fort.

Unlike previous bombardments which had little impact
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on either the fort or its defenders, now the Union guns
w or ke d with deadly accuracy.

On September 5th alone, of the

900 soldiers that defended Wagner,

100 were

casualties because of the day's bombardment.
Fort Wagner w a s now clear;
6, General

listed as
The fate of

and on the m o r n in g of September

B eauregard ordered the evacuation of Wagner,

to

take place that night.60
The Confederate's evacuation surprised the Union
forces.

In fact, Gillmore had planned to assault Fort

Wagner the very next morning, September 7.
was no longer necessary;

Obviously this

instead, Gillmore reported

euphorically to Dahlgren,

"Ctlhe whole of Morris Island is

ours."6 *
The Union's campaign had been predicated on the
assumption that once Morris Island fell, Fort Sumter would
also fall.

Therefore,

as soon as he received Gillmore's

message, Dahlgren demanded that General
Fort Sumter,
defensible."

Beaureg ar d surrender

telling h im that the fort w a s "no longer
If the fort w as not surrendered, he warned,

shall move at once o n It."

Beauregard h a d a decidedly

different opinion about the importance of Morris Island to
Fort Sumter's defense.

Refusing to surrender Sumter,

Beauregard tersely told Dahlgren that he "must take it and
hold it if he can."
to attack Sumter.
demonstrate,

Dahlgren

immediately began to prepare

Unfortunately, as events w o u l d quickly

the attack which followed w o u l d be one of the
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most

ill-conceived, and poorly executed operations to occur

during the entire Civil

W a r . g 2

Dahlgren thought that

it would be easy to take Sumter.

When Commander T. H. Stevens protested his last minute
assignment to lead the attack, Dahlgren admonished him,
“ 'There is nothing but a corporal's guard in the fort, and
all we have to do is to go and take possession

[of it].'"

Dahlgren's statement w as not just false bravado intended to
inspire a hesitant officer.
said.

He really believed what he

This was reflected in his plan of attack, which

consisted of little more than landing some four hundred
ma ri ne s and seamen
Sumter.

in small boats right at the base of Fort

Armed only with muskets, bayonets,

and side arms,

the troops w o ul d then simply storm what Dahlgren believed
w as a defenseless fort, and Sumter would be

in Union

h a n ds . 63
Dahlgren planned the attack for the night of September
8, and he spent most of that day "arranging"

the details.

The biggest problem, at least so it seemed to Dahlgren at
the time, w as securing enough boats to transport his men to
Sumter.

That m or ni n g Dahlgren asked Gillmore to return some

of the navy boats and crews that had been assisting various
army operations,

telling the General,

"I am organizing an

expedition for to-night."64
Dahlgren's request

initiated a remarkable exchange

between the two Union commanders.

Not kn ow ing about
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Dahlgren's plans, Gillmore h ad also arranged to attack
Sumter that night.

The General

thus wrote back to Dahlgren,

"There should be but one commander

in an operation of this

kind, to Insure success and [to! prevent mistakes.
designated two small

regiments.

them," Gillmore asked,

"[with]

Will your party join with
the whole to be under the

command of the senior officer, or will
together and act
closed,

in concert?

"is much the best.

For many Northerners,
symbol

I have

the parties confer

The former method,"

Gillmore

What do you say?"®®
Fort Sumter was the most visible

of the detested Confederacy.

Undoubtedly, whoever

captured it would be immediately blanketed with accolades.
Dahlgren's lifelong quest for personal
Having spent all of his professional

glory knew no bounds.

life trying to cover

himself with fame, Dahlgren w as not going to share the
credit for capturing Fort Sumter.

He told Gillmore that he

h ad no intention of m ak in g the attack on Sumter a joint
navy-army operation.

Furthermore,

navy, and thus himself,

to insure that

it was the

that received the credit for the

operation, Dahlgren told Gillmore that he was prepared to
assign as high a ranking officer as he had to in order to
insure that he out-ranked any army officer that Gillmore
pl ac e d in charge.66
Gillmore expressed incredulity at Dahlgren's response.
He reminded Dahlgren that the most

important point of the

attack w as capturing the fort, not who planted "our flag
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over

it."

Dahlgren w a s firmly committed to havi ng the navy

alone capture Fort Sumter, however.
when Gillmore p lanned to attack.

He demanded to know

Not receiving an answer

quickly enough, Dahlgren telegrammed testily to Gillmore,

"I

am waiting. "67
Dahlgren apparently became so w or ri ed Gillmore and the
army would beat him to the punch that he decided to attack
without ever

learning Glllmore's intentions.

His force

found itself unprepared and untrained for the task at hand.
Landing at the base of Sum te r/s walls,
to scale the walls.

Even worse,

they

they found themselves

facing a well-a rm ed and alerted enemy.
attack w as detected,
signal

lacked equipment

As soon as the Union

the troops Inside Sumter

launched

flares and the Confederate batteries surrounding the

fort began to fire at the defenseless boats.

Meanwhile,

the

troops in Sumter w ho had been anticipating the attack threw
ha nd grenades down at the disorganized Union sailors.
attack quickly deteriorated into bedlam,
officers w ho actually
But for many,

and the few

landed tried to call a hasty retreat.

it w as already too late.

m a d e up the original

The

force,

Of the 400 men that

less than 300 returned.68

Believing that the attack could not fail, Dahlgren
apparently planned to go into Sumter himself.
at hand to w itness the attack.

He was close

His boat was about

one-quarter of a mile away when he heard "the fire of
musketry from Sumter."

Then, Dahlgren

later recorded in his
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Journal,
my

"Moultrie o pens— the affair of short duration and

Impression

... not favorable.

"fired like a devil.

Moultrie," he continued,

The shells b r ea ki ng around me and

screaming in chorus."

Dahlgren did not wait around "to see

how the matter ended;"

instead he gave the order to return

to his flagship.

But Dahlgren's boat got caught

in the

strong currents of the harbor.

Lacking a rudder,

it proved

difficult to maneuver the small

craft and at one point the

boat came very near b eing swept over the breakers at the bar
and into the open ocean.

But finally,

after hours of hard

pulling at the oars, Dahlgren's boat reached one of the
blockading vessels anchored just

inside the Charleston

bar. 69
The boat attack was a disaster and Dahlgren knew there
w a s no good way to explain it.
simply to Welles,
assault Sumter
repulsed with

The next day he reported

"I regret to say that an attempt to

last night was unsuccessful.

Our column w as

loss."70
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Chapter VII
A Bitter End

"It w ould not be easy to say h ow I received an order so
unjust in its n a t u r e ....And yet there is no appeal from the
pleasure of this poor old imbecile [Wellesl."
The capture of Fort
Dahlgren's career.

Sumter w a s to be the capstone of

While exceedingly pr ou d of both his

promotion to rear-admiral

and his appointment to command the

important South Atlantic B lockading Squadron,

neither

accomplishment completed his lifelong quest for personal
glory and greatness.
to win a great victory
the

The only way to achieve his goal was
in battle.

But rather than providing

climactic conclusion to his long and arduous struggle to

be seen as a naval hero,

the failed boat attack proved to be

the beginning of a rather anti-climactic conclusion to both
Dahlgren's Civil War and navy careers.
Immediately following the failure to take Fort Sumter
by s t or m it appeared that Dahlgren w o u l d continue an
aggressive campaign to capture Charleston.

But it quickly

became clear that he had no intention of renewing the navy's
campaign against either Fort Sumter or Charleston, at least
with the forces that he then h a d under his command.

On
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September 24, Dahlgren wrote to Fox and asked him if the
Navy Department

intended for him "to make the final

attack

w it h the seven monitors" he presently had in his squadron.
A few days later Dahlgren wrote to Welles.

"I could offer

no assurance," he told the secretary of the navy,

"that an

attack with seven monitors could yield, with certainty, such
a result as the Department might deem desirable.
other hand,"

Dahlgren continued,

m o n i t or s could be had,

On the

"if a reserve of five

... there w ou ld be every reason to

look for suc ce ss ."1
Dahlgren's boat attack fiasco and subsequent request
for reinforcements nearly equal

in size to the force that he

already had was exactly the type of thing which normally
r esul te d in a commanding officer being removed from his
post.

When Secretary Welles learned about the failed

assault, he noted rather disgustedly in his diary,

"it had

been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement."

He

further said of Dahlgren, while "intelligent," he w as "out
of place"

and could "better acquit

ordnance officer

... [himself] as tan]

... than in active command."

But while

W e l l e s ' s private appraisal of both the attack and Dahlgren
we r e quite harsh, h is public reaction was very different.
He told Dahlgren that the Navy Department had "confidence"
in his "Judgement, firmness, and discretion," not to mention
h i s "skill

and bravery."

Welles's official praise of

Dahlgren stood in stark contrast to his private assessment.
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It w as also clear from his official

correspondence with

Dahlgren that Welles h ad no Intention of removing him from
his command.
simple.

But, why not?

The answer was really quite

Just as when he w as originally appointed to command

the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Dahlgren was still
the officer best suited for serving the Navy Department's
interests.

Those

interests had changed dramatically,

h ow ev er .2
In large part,

the Navy Department had sent Dahlgren to

Charleston because he promised to use the monitors
aggressively.

The importance of this promise, besides

h aving the obvious potentiality of destroying and capturing
the most hated city

in the South, was that

it would aid

W elles and Fox in their ongoing controversy with Admiral
DuPont, who blamed the monitors for his failure to capture
Charleston.

Elizabeth Blair Lee, who was in close contact

with both Welles and Fox, saw firsthand the Navy
Department's effort to have Dahlgren succeed as a way of
dealing with DuPont.

In August

1863, she wrote to her

husband Samuel Phillips Lee, who commanded the Union navy's
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron:

There is evidently a desire on the part of the
[Navy] Dep[ar]tlment]— to give Dahlgren (who is no
favorite— but has the ear & c o n t r o l [,] so says
Fox[,] of Congress) no room for any complaint on
any score— and then DuPont is on the other side
bent upon defeat of our operations at Charleston
by way of self Justification— so the D e p a r t .Cment]
is in a tight place 8. evidently is oblivious of
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all Its duties save those at Charleston as
thro'[ugh 3 these two Admira ls it is on a sort of
trial before the public— Brother [Postmaster
General Montgomery Blair] mad e this remark to me
some weeks since— & evidently thought that Fox's
sickness w as caused by his intense excitement 8<
labor over this matter 8. he evidently feels slaked
upon the issue which DuPont has made with him
personally.
He never talks to me five minutes in
the last two months without getting on this DuPont
fight with the Dep[ar]t[ment] — in which it is
evident that both he & W e ll e s have become very
bi tter.3

Dahlgren, of course, had not m an ag ed to capture
Charleston.

But even in defeat, Dahlgren continued to serve

Welles's and Fox's interests;

in fact, keeping Dahlgren

in

command of the South Atlantic B lo ck adi ng Squadron w as more
important than ever.

That was because DuPont's attack on

the Navy Department began to take shape by the late summer.
Leading the assault on the Navy Department was Henry
Winter Davis.

The powerful Radical Republican congressman

from Maryland was not at all

interested in the technical

meri ts of the Union navy's ironclads, but he thought he
could use the issue to attack President Lincoln and the
moderate members of the Cabinet, w hich

included Welles, who

favored a conservative approach to reconstruction.

Davis,

like Chase and Stanton, supported a drastic plan requiring
the abolition of slavery before a state could be considered
for readmission

into the Union,

and an acknowledgement that

the ultimate authority on reconstruction w a s the Congress,
not the Presid ent .4
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Fortunately for Well es and Fox,
very precise
intentions;

they apparently had

information about DuPont's and Davis's
in fact,

it appears that they may have even

known what documents the latter planned to use against them.
Welle s and Fox defended themselves accordingly, and central
to their defense was Admiral

Dahlgren.5

Their strategy w o rk ed brilliantly.

When DuPont and

Davis finally unleashed their attack on the monitors

in the

fall, Welles and Fox were ready with dozens of reports.
A m o n g the most
Dahlgren.

important were those written and compiled by

As the commanding officer of essentially the same

fleet of Ironclads that DuPont had commanded earlier,
Dahlgren's favorable opinions about the monitors and the New
Ironsides carried enormous importance.

Furthermore,

in a

debate which the Navy Department successfully framed in
technical

terms, Dahlgren's reputation as a techlcal

genius

only made his testimony more damning to DuPont's arguments,
and thus much more

important to the Navy Department's

d e f e n s e .5
The ongoing struggle between the Navy Department and
DuPont over the qualities of the monitors, which was really
a struggle between the moderate Lincoln administration and
its Congressional

enemies, dragged on for months.

culminated, more or less,

It

in late spring 1864, when the Navy

Department published its, Report of the Secretary of the
Navv

in Relation to Armored V e s s e l s .

Of course,

the
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importance of Dahlgren to their case meant Welles and Fox
h a d to live with his decision not to renew the attack on
Charleston without the addition of at least five more
monitors.

Unfortunately,

Dahlgren's request

as Welles noted in his response to

in the fall

1863, construction of the new

monit or s was far behind schedule.

At best,

the Navy

Department could send four more monitors to Charleston by
early December.

The navy's campaign to take Charleston

w ou l d have to w a i t . ?
Although no one knew it at the time, what was
supposedly a temporary postponement of the navy's campaign
against Charleston eventually became permanent.

Various

problems continued to plague the navy's ironclad
construction program, p ushing the completion of the vessels
Dahlgren said he needed well

into 1864.

monitors were finally completed,
Charleston.

But when the new

they were not sent to

By then, Grant had been appointed the army's

general - in-chief and he w a s able to convince the Lincoln
administration to have all of the Union's forces, with the
exception of Porter and Banks in the Red River campaign

in

Louisiana, work together in a series of coordinated
campaigns.

The capture of Charleston did not figure into

Grant's overall

strategic plans.

finally completed,

When the monito rs were

they were sent to the Gulf Squadron.

There, Farragut used them to enter Mobile Bay.

In sharp

contrast to Dahlgren at Charleston, Farragut steamed
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straight

Into Mobile Bay,

explosive torpedoes.

Ignoring the obstructions and

Following the closing of Mobile to

Confederate blockade runners,

the Navy Department turned its

attention to Wilmington, North Carolina,
Confederate port still

the last

readily accessible to the outside

w or l d . 8
As the Navy Department w as forced to concentrate
ironclads on more strategically

its

important targets in 1864,

Dahlgren and his squadron faced an impasse at Charleston.
He was unwilling to attempt to force his way past the
obstructions as Farragut had done at Mobile Bay.

Thus his

squadron of ironclads did little more than continue to seal
Charleston off from blockade runners, a task that they did
effectively after Dahlgren established an anchorage

Inside

the Charleston bar for the monitors, and bombard Fort Sumter
periodical 1y .
When Charleston finally fell
1865,

into Union hands early

it h ad little to do with the navy's efforts.

in

After

reaching Savannah, Georgia, which completed his "March to
the Sea," General Will ia m Tecumseh Sherman turned his army
northward.

With no major fortifications on its landward

side, Charleston was completely defenseless to an attack
from this direction.

On February 17, the Confederate army

evacuated the city.
Dahlgren was among the first Union navy officers to
enter Charleston.

The city, he wrote, was 11[dDesolate,
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desolate," but, this w as "well merited."

For after all,

Charleston "was the hotbed of the Rebellion and for half a
century has striven by wo r d and deed to produce Rebellion."
Then after initiating the Civil War,

"the whirlwind

came,— Blood and treasure flowed as if they were w at er — for
four years our efforts were Jeered at & taunted," but, now,
"at

last comes fate— and the wret ch ed lying, boasting crew

sneak away from their dear City and will
nor their own hides.

not risk

its bricks

Go in ignominy & disgrace."^

Dahlgren's statement showed that he recognized that
at least one very important way,
failed.

in

the Charleston campaign had

Ever since Fort Sumter had been fired upon

in April

1861, the goal of the North had been to destroy Charleston
and to make

its inhabitants suffer retribution, because as

Dahlgren suggested, as far as the North w a s concerned it was
South Carolina, especially the citizens of Charleston,

that

h a d caused the w a r . 10
Of course,
had Dahlgren.

if the navy's campaign h ad failed, so too
To secure the command of the South Atlantic

B lo ck ad i ng Squadron he had made bold assurances of success.
At one point he even went so far as to tell a navy colleague
in Washington that the day he attacked Charleston would
either be his "bestt,] or the last" of his

life.

Dahlgren's promise of either capturing Charleston
spectacular naval

But
in a

attack or dying in the attempt never

m a t e r i a l i z e d . 11
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Undoubtedly the highlight of Dahlgren's last months in
co mm an d of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was April
14, which he described as 11The D a y . 11

To commemorate the

capture of Charleston a grand celebration was held in the
now battered Fort Sumter.

Among others,

Anderson w a s in attendance,

General Robert

and he raised what was reputed

to be the very flag that he had lowered when he surrendered
the fort exactly four years earlier.

The Reverend Henry

W ar d Beecher addressed the crowd of assembled sailors,
soldiers,

and dignatarles.

noted, was "moderate."

Beecher's address, Dahlgren

This contrasted sharply with the

sermon that Beecher gave when he
been fired upon

in April

1861.

learned that Sumter had
Then, he called on the North

to ma k e the South suffer physical
s ou nd in g more

But now,

like Lincoln's calls for a moderate plan of

reconstruction,

the time for conflict w as past because,

Beecher assured his audience,
war

retribution.

the people who had caused the

in the first place had "an endless retribution" awaiting

t h e m . 12
After Charleston's fall,

Dahlgren's primary

responsibility was overseeing the dismantling of his
squadron.

The Navy Department

instructed Dahlgren to reduce

h i s force to six tugboats and fifteen other steamers.
w a s ordered to send all of the monitors north.

He

"Economize,"

w a s the w or d of the day, and Dahlgren w as told to make sure
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that the vessels that remained only utilized steam power "in
an emergency
In mid-June, Dahlgren finally received "the Important
letter," which ordered him "to proceed north."

His last few

days in Charleston were a hectic combination of carrying out
the Navy Department's orders to cut the squadron to bare
bone, visiting with his officers to offer his goodbyes, and
packing for the voyage home.

Leaving Charleston on June 17,

Dahlgren noted the views on

his outward voyage, "We passed

Sumter, then Wagner and all

the familiar scenes of the last

two years— And a little after 5
Bar....so ends a command of

[pm] turned out to cross the

two ye ar s. "14

Dahlgren began his post-war career with a we 11-deserved
vacation.

He took everyone by surprise when on August 2,

1865, he ma rr ie d Madeleine Vinton Goddard.
Dahlgren's naval

colleagues,

Some of

accustomed to ascribing base

motives to everything that he did, could not help but wonder
whether the money and influence that his wife enjoyed as the
daughter of a wealthy former United States congressman were
not the main reasons for the marriage.

It certainly could

not be explained by Goddard's looks, noted one navy officer
w ho wrote:

"You may recollect the lady as one of the ugliest

of her sext,]

though adorned with many golden ch ar ms !"1®

Dahlgren's vacation ended in early November.
brief time there had been some discussion

For a

in the Navy

Department of sending him to Europe to conduct a tour of the
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ordnance faciltles there, but perhaps because of his recent
m arriage the trip never materialized.

Instead, he was

assigned to serve on the highly publicized court-martial
trial

of Commodore Thomas T. Craven.

In command of the

Niagara in 1865, Craven's vessel w as part of what was known
as the Flying Squadron, which the Navy Department created to
try to capture the Confederacy's small
raiders.

fleet of commerce

Chasing after their elusive prey

largely on the

often m onths-old Information provided by American diplomats
stationed in ports throughout

the world w as somewhat

like

trying to find the proverbial

needle In a haystack.

But

late March

in

1865, Craven found the Confederate ram S t o n ew al 1

d ock ed In F e r r o l , Spain.

There was one major problem as far

as Craven was concerned.

The Niagara and the Sacramento

s ai li ng with him were both wooden vessels, while the
S t o n e w a l 1 was an ocean-going Ironclad.

In Craven's opinion,

the S t o n e w a l 1 was "more than a match for three such vessels
as the N i a g a r a .11

When the Stonewal 1 left the protection of

the neutral waters of the Spanish port, Craven did not
attack the Confederate

ironclad; and b ei ng faster than the

two Union vessels the S t o n e w a l 1 steamed to points u nk no wn .16
Craven was charged with "Falling to do his utmost to
overtake and capture or destroy a vessel which
duty to encounter."

The court split three ways, with some

m e m b e rs arguing for a conviction,
acquittal,

it was his

others arguing for an

and a third party arguing for what Dahlgren
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de scribed as a partial

acquittal.

Dahlgren,

a long with

Farragut, who w as the president of the tribunal,
this latter position.

Eventually,

spearheaded

after days of discussion,

the entire court agreed to this viewpoint. Craven was found
"guilty of the charge

in a less degree."

As for sentencing,

the court recommended that Craven "be suspended from duty on
leave-pay for two y e a r s. " 17
Wel le s w as furious with the court's decision.
argued that

in this case the court could not

He

legally convict

Craven of a lesser charge and he sent the case back "for a
revision of the finding."

But the me mbers of the court

o bviously sympathized with Craven because they simply
r evised their decision by finding Craven guilty as charged,
with the sentence to remain as before, a two year suspension
on leave-pay.
exploded.

Learning of the c ourt's latest actions Welles

"A court martial

Craven," W el le s wrote

of high officers in the case of

in his diary,

"has made

itself

r id ic ul ou s by an incongruous finding and award which 1
cannot approve.

It is not pleasant to encounter so large a

number of high officers of high standing, but I must do my
duty if they do not."

Ironically, Welles's only choices

we r e to accept the court's latest ruling or to set aside the
verdict altogether.

Arguing that to allow the precedent of

court's decision stand was the greater evil, W e ll e s decided
to set aside the conviction "and Commodore Thomas T. Craven
is hereby relieved from arrest."

Dahlgren was as upset with
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W e l l e s as the secretary w as with the court.
fashion Dahlgren penned a lengthy rebuttal
decision.
bec au se

In typical
to W el le s' s

But Dahlgren decided not to send it, a wise move,

it probably would have focused Welles's anger on him

instead of Farragut, whom the Secretary blamed for the
co ur t' s d ec is i on . 18
It w as extremely unusual

for Dahlgren to remain

public ly silent to anything that he perceived as a personal
affront,

but he h ad good reason not to raise anyone's

against h i m at the moment.

ire

Durin g the early days of

Cr av en ' s trial, Dahlgren received a very unexpected visit
from his brother Charles.
Mississippi

N o w almost penniless,

the former

cotton planter and Confederate general

ha d come

to Washington to enlist his older brother's help to secure a
presidential
Journal,

pardon.

"after all

"[Rlather hard," Dahlgren wrote

in his

I have done & suffered for four years in

p u t t i n g down the Rebellion; one affliction after another."
Despite these feelings, Dahlgren demonstrated loyalty to his
bro th er and immediately sought the support of his many
political
state,

contacts.

When he spoke to the secretary of

Dahlgren w a s relieved when Seward "said promptly he

w o u l d have the Pardon paper for my brother— Very K i n d . " 19
Dahlgren's status as one of the navy's highest ranking
o ff ic er s resulted In his being n am ed to a succession of
h ig hl y visible positions.

In February 1866, Dahlgren was

a p p oi nt ed to the Commission on Harbor Defenses.

Following
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this post he w as named president of the Naval Ac ademy's
Board of Visitors.

As these Jobs kept Dahlgren only

moderately busy, he found plenty of time to re-establish
himself

in Washington's highest social circles.

The

list of

people who attended the various dinners and parties that
Dahlgren went to, or those who came to his home, reads like
a veritable who's who of Washington's elite.

Then, when the

weather began to grow warm, Dahlgren moved his family to
Newport, Rhode Island "for the s e a s o n . "2°
The comfortable existence that Dahlgren had enjoyed
since his return to Washington came to a sudden end in the
autumn of 1866.

On September 28 the Navy Department

Issued

orders for h im to take command of the South Pacific
Squadron.

"It would not be easy to say how I received an

order so unjust

in its nature, so rude in its manner,"

Dahlgren n oted upon receipt of the directive.
there is no appeal

"And yet

from the pleasure of this poor old

imbecile CWellesl; w ho so soon is capable of forgetting
service rendered to the public cause."21
Dahlgren proved a poor choice for this command.

The

United States w a s then working to increase its influence
the region.

in

In doing so, the United States offered to

mediate a dispute between the Allied Republics, which
Included Peru, Chile, Bolivia and Equador, and Spain.
Unfortunately, Dahlgren's actions while in command may have
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been the reason behind the Allied Republics rejection of the
United States offer.22
Just prior to Dahlgren's appointment, what appeared to
be a serious Incident occurred between an officer of the
South Pacific Squadron and an officer of the Peruvian navy.
Captain Fablus Stanly,

in command of the USS T u s c a r o r a .

reported that when he visited with Admiral
Tucker,

the highest ranking officer

John Randolph

in the Peruvian navy,

that Tucker failed to show him proper professional
Stanly's report, unfortunately,
of important details.

courtesy.

failed to explain a number

First of all, at the time that the

incident took place, Tucker, who was an American, was
dealing with the mutiny of forty-eight Peruvian officers w ho
refused to serve under him.

But even more important, Stanly

failed to note that when the incident occurred, Tucker had
not yet been commissioned and was still

officially a

civilian, was in civilian clothes, and was not even on a
Peruvian vessel, but rather w as a passenger on an English
mall stea me r. 23
When Dahlgren was appointed to the South Pacific
Squadron few of the important details of the Incident were
known

in Washington.

What was known, was that Tucker was a

former Confederate navy officer who had been, of all

things,

in command of the Confederate navy forces at Charleston.
Just before leaving for his new command, Dahlgren went to
the Navy Department to inquire how he should deal with
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Tucker.

According to Dahlgren, Welles called Tucker "an

unpardoned rebel w ho was liable to be hanged If he appeared
at Fort Monroe."

Furthermore,

Dahlgren recalled in his

journal, W elles did not "wish me or any officer to be
disgraced by compulsion to offer him c l v i 1ities.
By the time that Dahlgren reached his new command,
facts of the incident were clear.

the

Because the Incident had

taken place before Tucker had any official

standing,

the

diplomats on hand quite logically decided to treat the
entire episode as a personal

one between Stanly and Tucker

and considered the case closed.
this decision.

Dahlgren refused to accept

He argued that Tucker's status at the time

of the incident had no bearing on the issue.

Since the

Peruvian government had not yet offered an official

apology,

which the United States had requested before the full
specifics were known, Dahlgren ordered the suspension of
courtesies "to the officers in the Peruvian service who
still

remain excluded as citizens of the U.S.

amnesty of the President."

from the

After doing so, Dahlgren noted

in his Journal with more than a hint of satisfaction,
the ball

"so

is o p ene d."25

Dahlgren's actions escalated the
the scope of the original one.
to Chile told Dahlgren

incident far beyond

The United States minister

"that unless this difficulty can be

speedily and amicably arranged our influence on this coast
will be lost."

Furthermore, he told Dahlgren,

"I believe
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the Allies were

inclined to accept our offer Cto mediate],

but under the present circumstances of course cannot do so."
Dahlgren showed that he realized the seriousness of the
proceedings.

In a dispatch to Washington he noted that "the

Peruvian Government

is very sore on the subject, and takes

It seriously enough."

But he did not want to back down.

"I

really cannot perceive," he told his superiors in
Washington,

"that the United States is called on to back out

entirely."26
In Washington an entirely different decision was made.
It was time to end this entire affair because it was
interfering with much more

important matters.

Seward wrote

that while the "sentiments of Admiral

Dahlgren in regard to

the character of

... are approved and

commended,"
primarily

... Admiral

[Tucker]

he ordered that henceforth all courtesies, which

involved ceremonial

gun salutes, would be

exchanged with the Peruvian navy.
that Seward's directive arrived,
resolved itself.

Ironically, by the time
the situation had largely

In mid-March 1867, Tucker resigned his

commission over an entirely different

issue.

Receiving

Seward's order shortly afterward, Dahlgren reacted angrily:

Seward's letter is highly complimentary to my
sentiments but says Tucker must be looked on as a
Peruvian Of ficer— A shameful 8. outrageous
backd ow n— needless too, for Tucker backed out
first.
There must have been a stir among the dry
bones in the N.Cavy] Deptarl ttm ent ].... all I
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w a n t e d [was] that they should hold the ground in
W a s h .[Ington], but the imbeciles would n o t . ^ 7
For the time being,

the Allied Republics refused the

American offer to act as mediator;

and while no concrete

evidence exists to Indicate that Dahlgren's actions played
any role

in this decision,

the controversy caused by

Dahlgren's order to withhold salutes to Tucker could not
have be nefited America's diplomatic efforts.

Dahlgren

remained in charge of the South Pacific Squadron until July
1868; and following the resolution of the Tucker

incident

the last year or so of his command was relatively uneventful
in c o m p a r i s o n .28
Upon his return to the United States in July 1868,
Dahlgren w a s again named chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
He accepted the assignment, but he was not at all happy.

He

complained that "retrenchment being the order of the day"
meant that his Job entailed little more than filling routine
requests for ordnance supplies.

Almost

immediately, he

requested a transfer back to his old post at the Washington
Navy Yard.

Welles refused,

telling Dahlgren that he was in

the correct pi a c e .
Not everyone agreed with Welles.

Many people opposed

Dahlgren's appointment, arguing that he would hinder any
advancement

in the navy's ordnance.

Dahlgren felt that many

If not all of the attacks on h i m stemmed from the efforts of
greedy

inventors whose Inventions he had rejected.

He

_
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believed that his critics were simply trying to steal
the government's coffers.
support this notion.
Congressional

from

There was some evidence to

Since late in the Civil War, various

committees had conducted investigations on the

status of the army's and navy's ordnance.

Many of these

investigations had indeed originated with an inventor
seeking economic redress for the damages reputedly

inflicted

on h im because of the decision of either the army's or
navy's Ordnance Bureau.
inventors may have
investigations,
a more

But while the claims of individual

initiated the many of the Congressional

they also dealt with a more fundamental, and

Important question; what was the future of America's

military ordnance?30
Throughout the Civil War,

Dahlgren had argued that his

smoothbore, muzz 1e - 1oading cannon were the best
in the world.

large guns

Events during the war, he argued, had done

nothing to change his opinion.

Dahlgren repeatedly stated

that he did not believe that heavy rifled guns would ever
replace smoothbores.
early 1869.

The issue finally came to a head in

In testimony before another Congressional

committee, Dahlgren stated,
repeated action,
smooth-bore guns.

"My own experience,

from

Induces me to give preference to heavy
I always thought that they hurt our

ironclads more in battle than the rifles did, and I am
inclined to believe that the same opinion prevails largely
in the navy.”31
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Dahlgren had good reason to be proud of his distinctive
guns.

As Henry Wise,

then chief of the navy's Ordnance

Bureau, reported to Congress In November 1865,

“ 'Not a

single gun of the Dahlgren system burst prematurely,'" which
w a s rather remarkable considering that by the end of the
Civil War more than 1,800 Dahlgren smoothbores of various
sizes had been cast.

The same could not be said of the

Parrott rifled 100-pounder, which was the main rifled gun
use d by the navy during the Civil War.
hund red of these guns, nineteen burst

Of some three
in service.

Still,

the era of the low velocity smoothbore had passed away at
the same exact time that wooden ships became obsolete.
Dahlgren refused to acknowledge this.

While ordnance

specialists throughout the wor ld were working to perfect
rifled, breech-loading guns, he continued to hold onto the
p a s t .32
Dahlgren sent off what turned out to be his final
ordnance report to a Congressional
1869.

committee on February 11,

It took only four days for the committee to respond.

After reading their recommendations, he noted tersely in his
Journal,

“both my guns 8. Rodman's are condemned."3 ®

Dahlgren wa s devastated.

He asked to resign from the

Ordnance Bureau and to be assigned command of the Washington
Navy Yard.
relent until

His request w a s refused.

But Dahlgren did not

the Navy Department finally honored both his
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resignation from the Ordnance Bureau and his request to take
command of the Washington Navy Yard.34
Dahlgren returned to his old and familiar post
August 1869.

There, on November 13, he celebrated his

sixtieth birthday.

"I complete sixty years to-day," he

noted on the occasion.
only the worse

"Grateful

in point of time."

of his physical

to say,

in good health and

But Dahlgren's diagnosis

condition w a s overly optimistic.

long suffered from various ailments,
began to experience chest pains.
12,

in

Having

the following summer he

And on the morning of July

1870, Dahlgren died rather suddenly.35
Dahlgren died an angry and bitter man.

His superiors

in the Navy Department had become nothing but "imbeciles,"
who invariably made decisions that ran counter to all good
sense,

at least as far as Dahlgren was concerned.

His

children from his first marriage had also become a major
disappointment.
affliction."
Ulric,

At one point he called them his "greatest

One of his children was an exception, his son

But even a greater source of grief for Dahlgren, his

favorite child h ad died in a controversial
Richmond in March 1864.

cavalry raid on

While Union authorities claimed

that the raid was designed to free Union prisoners held in
Richmond,

Confederate authorities claimed that the orders

found on Ulric Dahlgren's body also called for an attempt to
assassinate President Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, and
to burn Richmond.

Dahlgren claimed that the orders were a
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forgery.

He wou ld devote a great deal

exonerate his son's reputation.

of time trying to

He eventually completed a

biography of his young son, but tragically for Dahlgren, a
publisher could not be found who would agree to publish the
work until
course,

1872,

two years after Dahlgren's death.

Of

there w as also the controversy surrounding

Dahlgren's ordnance career, which ended with his resignation
from the Ordnance Bureau in 1869, and for all
purposes his complete withdrawal

intents and

from the profession which

h ad been the main source of his fame and reputation."^®
As distressing as all of the things may have been,
Dahlgren's greatest source of anger and bitterness was his
command of

the naval

failure of

the boat assault on Fort Sumter on September 8,

1863, onward,
criticism.

forces off Charleston.

Dahlgren became the target of severe

It turned out that much of this criticism

originated with his army counterpart, General
Gillmore.

From the

The general

Quincy

strongly questioned Dahlgren's

decision not to make an all out effort to reach Charleston's
inner harbor

immediately following the close of the first

bombardment of Fort Sumter, on August 23,
to Gillmore,

1863.

"These were the decisive days."

At first,

Gillmore used both friendly newsmen and political
to wage an
command.

According

contacts

all out effort to get Dahlgren removed from
But,

as noted earlier, because of Dahlgren's role

in the Navy Department's fight with both DuPont and its
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Congressional

enemies, Dahlgren remained in command until

the end of the war.

Failing to get Dahlgren removed,

Gillmore did the next best thing, he wrote a book
exonerating his actions at Charleston while placing the
entire blame for the Union's failure to take Charleston
squarely on Dahlgren's shoulders.37
From the time that Dahlgren read Gillmore's book
February 1865, he vowed to refute Gillmore.

in

And in the last

five years of his life Dahlgren repeatedly explained why
Charleston had not fallen until February 1865.
was concerned,

As far as he

there were numerous reasons to explain this.

First, he asserted,

the army's campaign to take Fort Wagner

and Morris Island took longer than planned;

thus the

monitors were worn out before he could make an attempt
against Charleston itself.

Next,

the officers he had

appointed to lead the boat assault on Fort Sumter had been
guilty of "mismanagement."

Furthermore,

the South Atlantic

Blockading Squadron never received the additional monitors
that Dahlgren had requested and that the Navy Department had
promised,

therefore, Dahlgren argued to his dying day, he

never had enough vessels to take Charleston.
perhaps most

important

Finally, and

in his defense, Fort Sumter had never

been completely destroyed; and as long as Sumter remained in
Confederate hands, the obstructions could not be removed.38
Many of Dahlgren's arguments had merit.
historical

If his

reputation is used as the yardstick, his efforts
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at personal

vindication were successful.

But no matter how

well he may have defended himself against the criticism,
Dahlgren had failed in at least one important way.
than anything in the world,
as a naval hero.

More

Dahlgren desired fame and glory

Unfortunately for Dahlgren,

no explanation

or rationalization could ever secure him what he coveted
above all e l s e .

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes to Chapter VII
1Dahlgren to Welles, September 10, 1863, O R N . 14, p.
641; Dahlgren to Fox, September 24, 1863, Ibid., pp. 671-72;
Dahlgren to Welles, September 29, 1863, Ibid., pp. 680-81.
2Welles, Weiles D i a r v . I, pp. 434, 475; Welles to
Dahlgren, October 9, 1863, O R N . 15, pp. 26-27.
3For the circumstances of Dahlgren's appointment, see
Chapter V of this dissertation; Elizabeth Blair Lee to
Samuel Phillips Lee, August 29, 1863, in, Laas, e d . , Wartime
Washington -_The Civil War Letters of Elizabeth Blair L e e ,
pp. 303-04; for Welles's concern about DuPont, see, Welles,
Weiles D i a r v . I, pp. 295, 302, 307, 311, 312, 320-21.
4For the full complexity of Davis's efforts, see,
Niven, Gideon W e i l e s . pp. 467-95; see also, Williams,
Lincoln and the R a d i c a l s , pp. 288-305.
5 The most likely source of this information w a s Senator
Grimes.
DuPont, mistakenly belielving that Grimes w as his
ally and not the Navy Department's, informed the Senator of
his plans and sent him a complete set of the documents he
planned to use.
See, DuPont to Grimes, June 16, 1863,
DuPont L e t t e r s . Ill, n. p. 190; DuPont to Grimes, August 8,
1863, Ibid., pp. 219-25; Grimes to DuPont, August 15, 1863,
Ibid., pp. 228-29.
6 Niven, Gideon W e i l e s . pp. 467-95; the Navy
Department's defense is in, Report of the Secretary of the
Navy.In Relation to Armored Vessels (Washington, 1864),
hereafter cited as Armored V e s s e l s . Welles's first request
for reports from Dahlgren concerning the ironclads came
shortly after Grimes received DuPont's package of documents,
see Welles to Dahlgren, August 26, 1863, O R N . 14, p. 519;
after not receiving reports on the subject from Dahlgren in
about two weeks, Welles made an additional request.
This
second request showed great urgency.
See, Welles to
Dahlgren, September 11, 1863, Ibid., pp. 642-43; for the
first of Dahlgren's ironclad reports, see, Dahlgren to
Welles, September 23, 1863, Ibid., pp. 659-668; the most
important of Dahlgren's ironclad reports is, Dahlgren to
Welles, January 28, 1864, Letterbook F, JADLC— also in ORN
294

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

295

14, pp. 590-601.
Dahlgren wrote this 5 4 page report
immediately following the receipt of letters from Welles and
Fox, of January 9 and 12, 1864, respectively.
While these
letters are not in Dahlgren's papers, nor Welles's, Fox's,
nor O R N . in his private Journal Dahlgren acknowledged
r eceiving them, noting that both letters were "prodigiously
flattering— and asking for good character to the Monitors."
See, Dahlgren, January 21, 1864, Journal Entry, Vol. 11,
JADSU; for his responses, see, Dahlgren to Welles, January
22, 1864, ORN, 15, pp. 250-51; Dahlgren to Fox, January 22,
1864, Ibid., pp. 251-52.
These two reports by Dahlgren,
plus numerous other reports that Dahlgren wrote containing
favorable comments about the ironclads are all contained in
Armored V e s s e l s .
^Davis's attack on the Lincoln administration did not
end here.
He simply moved on and ultimately saw the passage
of the Wade-Davis Bill, which Lincoln pocket-vetoed. See,
Niven, Gideon W e l l e s , pp. 478-87; Williams, Lincoln and the
Radicals, PP. 318-26; Thomas, Abraham L i n c o l n , pp. 438-40.
8 For problems with construction of the monitors, see,
W e l l e s to Dahlgren, November 21, 1863, O R N . 15, p. 134;
W ell es to Dahlgren, December 3, 1863, Ibid., p. 146; for
Grant's impact on military policy, see, McPherson, B a t t 1e
Crv of F r e e d o m , pp. 721-24; for the Navy at Mobile Bay and
Wilmington, see, Fowler, Under Two F l a g s , pp. 236-45,
266-72.
9 Dahlgren, February 18, 1865, Journal
JADSU.

Entry, Vol.

13,

10For the most vivid contemporary articulation of the
view that South Carolina lay at the root of the secession
movement and thus deserved punishment of the highest order,
see, John Smith Dye, History of the Plots and Crimes of the
Great.. Conspiracy to _0v_er_thnow. Liberty in America (New York,
1866, reprint edition, Books for Libraries Press, Freeport,
New York, 1969>.
11Dahlgren to Henry A. Wise, September, 1864, Henry
Augustus Wise Papers, New York Historical Society, New York.
12Dahlgren, April 14, 1865, Journal Entry, Vol. 13,
JADSU; Henry Wa rd Beecher, "Sermon," April 14, 1861, in, New
York T i m e s . April 15, 1861; Henry Ward Beecher, "Address at
Fort Sumter," April 14, 1865, in, New York T i m e s . April 18,
1865.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

296

1 3 F ox to Dahlgren, May 31, 1865, O R N . 16, p. 340;
Dahlgren, June 6, 17, 1865, Journal Entries, Volume 13,
1865, J A D S U .

*4Welles to Dahlgren, June 9, 1865, O R N . 16, p. 343;
Dahlgren, June 14, 17, 1865, Journal Entries, Vol. 13,
JADSU.
*8Aulick to Wise, August 8, 1865, Letterbook 15, # 6,
Henry Augustus Wise Papers, New York Historical Society, New
York.
16Dahlgren, November 6-December 6, 1865, Journal
Entries, Vol 13, JADSU; Craven to Welles, Febraury 28, 1865,
ORN 3, pp. 434-36; Craven to Welles, March 29, 1865, Ibid.,
pp. 461- 62; Abstract logs of Niagara and S a c r a m e n t o . Ibid.,
pp. 464-66.
17Welles, Weiles D i a r v . II, pp. 261, 267, 392-93, 396;
Dahlgren, November 6-December 6, 1865, Journal Entries, Vol
13, JADSU; Navy Department, General Order No. 68, December
6, 1865, copy in JADLC.
18Welles, Wei 1es D i a r v . II, pp. 392-93, 396; Navy
Department, General Order No. 68, December 6, 1865, copy in
JADLC; Dahlgren, Response to Welles, Undated, Box 30, JADLC.
19Dah lgren, November 9-10, December 9,
Entries, Vol. 13, JADSU.

1865, Journal

20por examples of his social life, see, Dahlgren,
November 9, December 25, 1865, January 27, February 1, 12,
March 19, April 13, 20, 1866, Journal Entries, Vol 13,
JADSU; for Dahlgren's comments on the Harbor Commission,
see, February 20, 26, March 15, 29, 1866, Ibid.; The report
of the Board of Visitors to the Naval Academy for the Year
1866 is contained in, "Message from the President of the
United States," S. Ex. Doc. 53, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.; also
see, Dahlgren, June 3, 1866, Journal Entry, Vol 13, JADSU.
2 *Welles to Dahlgren, September 28, 1866, JADLC;
Dahlgren, Undated Journal entry immediately prior to October
14, 1866 entry, Vol. 14, JADSU.
22James W. Cortada, "Diplomatic Rivalry between Spain
and the United States over Chile and Peru, 1864-1371,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs 27 (Spring 1974): 47-57.
23The entire incident can be followed from Tucker's
perspective In, David P. Werlich, Admiral of the Amazon:
John_RandoiPh Tucker. His Confederate Colleagues, and Peru

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

297

(Charlottesville, VA, 1990), pp. 111-33; Stanly to Pearson,
October 16, 1866, JADLC; Pacheo to Hovey, November 23, 1866,
in, Record Group 59, Diplomatic Dispatches from U. S.
Ministers Lima, Peru, National Archives, Washington D.C.,
hereafter cited as DDLP; Pearson to Stanly, December 10,
1866, JADLC.
24Dahlgren to Welles, October 12, 1866, JADLC; Welles
to Dahlgren, November 21, 1866, JADLC; Dahlgren, November
15-22, 1866, Journal Entries, Vol. 14, JADSU.
25Dah lgren to Thompson, January 8, 1867, JADLC;
Dahlgren, February 3, 1867, Journal Entry, Vol. 14, JADSU.
26KilPatrick to Dahlgren, February 15, 1867, JADLC;
Dahlgren to Welles, February 26, 1867, JADLC.
27For what w a s happening in Washington, see, Welles,
Wei 1es P i a r v . Ill, pp. 66-7, 68-69; for Seward's comments,
see, Seward to Hovey, March 18, 1867, DDLP; for Dahlgren's
response, see, Dahlgren, April 20, 1867, Journal Entry, Vol.
14, JADSU.
28The Allied Republics would eventually accept the
Unted States offer of mediation, but not until 1871, see,
James W. Cortada, "Diplomatic Rivalry between Spain and the
United States over Chile and Peru, 1864-1871,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs 27 (Spring 1974): 47-57.
29Dahlgren, August 1-3, 1868, Journal Entries, Vol. 15,
JADSU; Dahlgren asked for the transfer in September 1868,
see, Dahlgren, September 12, 1868, Journal Entry, Ibid.
30For Dahlgren's feelings about the opposition toward
him, see, Dahlgren, September 12, 1868, Journal Entry,
Ibid.; the proceedings of two of the most important
Congressional investigations on ordnance are: "Report to the
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Heavy Ordnance,"
S Report 121, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.; "Report of the Joint
Committee on Ordnance Experiments on Heavy Ordnance," S
Report 266, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
31Dahlgren, January 28, 1869, "Experiments on Heavy
Ordnance," S Report 266, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 89-97.
32Wise, quoted in, Tucker, A rming the F l e e t , p. 255;
for the statistics on Dahlgren guns, see, Ibid., pp. 221-23;
for a general description of the Navy's rifled guns,
including the Parrott gun, see, Ibid., pp. 224-255.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

298

33Dahlgren, February 11-15, 1869, Journal Entries, Vol.
15, JADSU; for both Dahlgren's report and Congress's answer,
see, "Report of the Joint Committee on Ordnance Experiments
on Heavy Ordnance."
34D a h 1gren's efforts can be followed from his Journal
entries, see, Dahlgren, March 10, 30, April 26, July 12,
August 2, 1869, Journal Entries, V o l . 15, JADSU.
3 5 D a h 1gren, November 13, 1869, Journal Entry, Ibid.; M.
V. Dahlgren, Memoir of John A. D a h l g r e n . pp. 646-49.
3 6 For Dahlgren's sentiments toward his children, see,
Dahlgren, January 15, 1864, Journal Entry, Vol. 11, JADSU;
see also, Dahlgren, July 24, 1868, Journal Entry, Vol. 15,
JADSU; for Ulric Dahlgren's participation in the raid
against Richmond and the controversy that followed, see,
Virgil Carrington Jones, Eight Hours Before Richmond (New
York, 1957); for John Dahlgren's defense of his son, see,
John A. Dahlgren, Memoir of Ulric D a h lg ren . ed. Madeleine
Vinton Dahlgren (Philadelphia, 1872).
37See, Gillmore, Engineer and Artillery O p e r a t i o n s ,
quote from pp. 62-63; for Gillmore's use of sympathetic
newsmen, see, J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil
War (Pittsburgh, 1955), pp. 490-91, 542; to see how some of
Gillmore's other efforts materialized, see, Welles, Weiles
D i a r y . I, pp. 434-35, 474-75.
38Dahlgren's defense took numerous forms.
For official
reports, see, Dahlgren to Welles, June 1, 1865, O R N . 16, pp.
380-403; Dahlgren to Welles, October 16, 1865, Ibid., pp.
429-55.
Dahlgren's defense can also be seen in a number of
publications after the war, see, John W. Draper, History of
the American Civil War 3 vols. (New York, 1867-70); see
also, Lewis R. Hammersly, The Records of Living Officers of
the U.S. Navv and Marine Corps (Phi ladelphia. 1870).
Dahlgren's correspondence with Draper and Hammersly— the
last of this correspondence dates to within weeks of
Dahlgren's death— as well as his defense which consisted of
h u n dr eds of pages written narrative, is contained in, Box
18, JADLC; for additional correspondence with Draper, see,
John W i l lia m Draper Papers, Library of Congress, Washington
D. C.; finally, see, M. V. Dahlgren, Memoirs of John A.
Pah 1g r e n . which John Dahlgren h a d begun before his death,
and w a s completed and published by Madeleine Dahlgren.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources— Unpublished
Samuel Warren Abbott Papers.
Washington D. C.
Luther G. Billings Papers.
Washington D. C.

Library of Congress.

Library of Congress.

Charles Follen Blake Papers.
Washington D. C.

Library of Congress.

Judge John Cadwalader Collection.
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia.

Historical

Society of

Thomas T. Craven Papers. George Arents Research Library.
Syracuse University. Syracuse, New York.
John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren Papers. Library of
Congress. Washington D. C.
_______.Library of Congress. Washington D. C. Naval
Historical Foundation Collection
_______. George Arents Research Library. Syracuse
University. Syracuse, New York.
_______. New York Public Library. N ew York.
_______. Duke University Library.
John William Draper Papers.
Washington D. C.
Percival Drayton Papers.
Ph i 1a d e 1ph ia .

Durham, North Carolina.

Library of Congress.

Historical

Society of Pennsylvania.

_______. New York Public Library. New York.
Ferdinand J. Dreer Autograph Collection.
of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia.

Historical

Society

John C. Van Duger Papers. Duke University. Durham,
North Carolina.
John Ericsson Papers. Library of Congress. Washington D. C.
David G. Farragut Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C.
299

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

300

Hamilton Fish Papers. Library of Congress. Washington D. C.
Andrew Hull Foote Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C.
Forbes Family Papers. Library of Congress. Washington D. C.
Edward Carey Gardiner Collection.
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia.

Historical

Society of

Quincy A. Gillmore Papers. National Archives.
Washington D. C. Record Group 94. Adjutant General's
Department: Generals' Papers and Books.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C.
Record Group 94. Adjutant General's Department:
Generals' Personal Reports. M-1098, Reel 7,
V o l . X I , pp. 541-619.
Simon Gratz Collection.
P h 11a d e 1p h 1a .

Historical

Society of Pennsylvania.

Joseph T. Green Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C. Naval Historical Society Collection.
Henry I. and Robert Greer Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C.
Louis Manigault Papers.
Washington D. C.

Library of Congress,

Benjamin Mitchell Papers.
Washington D. C.

Library of Congress.

George C. Remey Papers. In, George Mason Remey Papers.
Library of Congress. Washington D. C.
John Rodgers Papers. In, Rodgers Family Papers. Library
of Congress. Washington D. C.
Cornelius Marius Schoonmaker Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C.
Truman Seymour Papers. National Archives. Washington D. C.
Record Group 94. Adjutant General's Department:
Generals' Personal Reports. M-1098, Reel 6,
Vol. X, pp. 67-71.
Daniel Angel 1 Smith Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C. Naval Historical Foundation

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301
Col lection.
Society Collection.
P h 1 1a d e 1p h 1a .

Historical

Augustin Louis Taveau Papers.
North Carolina.

Society of Pennsylvania.
Duke University, Durham,

John Wesley Turner Papers. U. S. Army War College.
Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
United States. Navy Department. National Archives.
Washington D. C. Record Group 45, Entry 354, Letters
Sent by Commandant, Washington Navy Yard.
______ . National
Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 45,
Entry 356, Letters Received by Commandant, Washington
Navy Yard.
______ . National
Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 45,
Entry 395, Letterbooks of Officers of the U. S. Navy at
Sea. #49-Daniel A m m e n ; #5?-0rders and Circulars of
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron; #58-Henry A. Wise.
______ . National
Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 1, Letters to the Secretary
of the Navy.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 2, Letters and Telegrams Sent
to Naval Officers.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 4, Letters and Telegrams to
Inspectors.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 7, Letters Sent by H. A.
Wise, 1863.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 16, Letters Received from the
Secretary of the Navy.
______ . National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 35, Reports of the Proof and
Inspection of Cannon.
. National Archives. Washington D. C. Record Group 74,
Bureau of Ordnance. Entry 51, Letters Relating to
XV-inch Guns.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

302

Gideon Welles Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C.
Wi lkes Family Papers. Duke University. Durham,
North Carolina.
Henry Augustus Wise Papers. Library of Congress.
Washington D. C. Naval Historical Foundation
Col 1ect i on.
_______ . New York Historical

Society. New York.

Primary Sources— Published
Basler, Roy P. The .Col 1ected Works of Abraham L i n c o l n .
9 vols. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1953.
B u e l , Clarence C . , and Johnson, Robert Underwood, eds.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil W a r . 4 vols.
New York: The Century Co., 1884-1887.
Chase, Salmon Portland. "Diary and Correspondence of
Salmon P. Chase." in, Annual Report of the American
Historical Association for the Year 1 9 0 2 . Washington
D. C., 1903; reprint edition, New York: Da Capo Press,
1971.
Cull urn, George Washington. Biographical Register of the
Off leers and-Graduates of the U.S. Military A c a d e m y .
3 vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1891.
Dahlgren, John A. A_ Few Hints to Cao_tains of the New
IX. Inch Shell G u n s . Boston: Printed for the
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography by Tlcknor and
Fields, 1856.
-------. Form of Exercise and Manuvre for the BoatHowitzers of the U.S. N a v v . Philadelphia: A. Hart,
1852.
_______• Memoir of Ulric Da h l g r e n . Edited by, Madeleine
Vinton Dahlgren. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co.,
1872.
_______. "Report on
November 20,
Secretary of
S Ex Doc 11,

Cruise of Ordnance Ship Plymouth,"
1857, printed in, Annual Report of the
the Navy. United States. Congress. Senate,
35th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 603-20.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

303

_______. "Report of the Board of Visitors to the Naval
Academy for the Year 1866," In, Message from the
President of the United States. S. Ex. Doc. 53, 39th
Cong. 1st Sess.
_______. She 1 is and_She 11 -rGuns. Philadelphia: King &
Baird, 1856.
_______. System of Boat Armament in the United
States Navv: Reported to Commodore M o r r i s .
Philadelphia: A. Hart, 1852.
Dahlgren, Madeleine Vinton. Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren.
Rear-Admiral Uni ted States N a v v . Boston, J. R. Osgood
& Company, 1882.
Dowdey, Clifford, ed. The Wartime Papers, of R. E. L e e .
Boston, Little, Brown, 1961.
Gillmore, Quincy A. Engineer and Artillery Operations
Against the Defenses of Charleston Harbor in 1 8 6 3 .
N e w York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865.
_______. Official Report to the United States Engineer
dgp.antme.D-t— of. -the .sl.eg e_and--redu.c-t lon-..o.f. Fo.r_t.-P.ul..agk L.
Seara.lA,. February,-Mar.ch.,..and-ftp.r.i.1... 1.362- New York:
D. Van Nostrand, 1862.
Hayes, John D . , ed. Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection From
His Civil War L e t t e r s . 3 vols. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1969.
Maury, M. F. "Report to the Secretary of War, August, 1851,"
In, United States. Congress. House.
H. Ex. Doc. 5,
32nd Cong. 1st Sess.
Palxhans, Henri Joseph. An A c c o u n t o f the Experiments Made
in-the-Fnench N avy... foe-the.T.r.ia]_oi-Bomb C annon.Translated by John A. Dahlgren. Philadelphia:
E. G. Dorsey, 1838.
Russell, William Howard. My Diarv North and S o u t h . Edited
by, Eugene H. Berwanger. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1988.
Sears, Stephen W . , ed. The Civil War Papers of George B.
McClellan: Selected-Correspondence. 1860-1865.
N e w York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989.
Thompson, Robert Means, and W a i n w r i g h t , Richard, eds.
Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox:

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

304

Assistant Secretary of the Navv. 186 1- 186 5.
2 vols. New York: Publications of the Naval History
Society, 1918-1919; reprint edition, N e w York: Books
for Libraries Press, 1972.
United States. Congress. House. Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Navy. December 1, 1856. H. Ex.
Doc 1, 34th Cong. 3rd Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy.
December 1, 1862. H. Ex. Doc. 1, 37th Cong. 3rd Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy.
December 7, 1863. H. Ex. Doc. 1, 38th Cong. 1st Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy.
December 5, 1864. H. Ex. Doc 1, 38th Cong. 2nd Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy.
December 4, 1865. H. Ex. Doc. 1, 39th Cong. 1st Sess.
_______. F. P. Stanton. H. R. 473, A Bill to Increase the
efficiency of the naval s e r v i c e . February 20, 1851,
31st Cong. 2nd Sess.
______ . F. P. Stanton. House Report 35, "To Accompany Bill
H.R. No. 473." February 20, 1851, 31st Cong. 2nd Sess.
______ . H. R. 474, "Making Appropriations for the Naval
Service." February 22, 1851, 31st Cong. 2nd Sess.
United States. Congress. Senate. Stephen Mallory.
"Improving the Navy." S. Report 271. 33rd Cong.
1st Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
December 3, 1857, S. Ex. Doc. 11, 35th Cong. 1st Sess.
_______. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
December 6, 1858, S. Ex. Doc. 1, 35th Cong. 2nd Sess.
_______. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
July 4, 1861, S. Ex. Doc. 1, 37th Cong. 1st Sess.
______ . Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
December 2, 1861, S. Ex. Doc. 1, 37th Cong. 2nd Sess.
______ . Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the
War, "Hearings on Heavy Ordnance."
S. Report 121,
38th Cong. 2nd Sess.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

305

_______ . "Regulating Pay of Navy."
32nd Cong. 1st Sess.

S. Ex. Doc. 68,

_______ . "Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the
War: Heavy Ordnance." S Report 121, 38th Cong. 2d Sess.
_______ . "Report of the Joint Committee on Ordnance
Experiments on Heavy Ordnance." S Report 266,
40th Cong. 3d Sess.
United States. Navy Department. Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies In the War of the
Rebel 1 Ion. 31 vols. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1894-1922.
_______ . Report of the Secretary of the
Navv In Relation to
Armored V e s s e l s . Washington D. C.: GPO, 1864.
United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union, and
Confederate A r m i e s . 128 vols. Washington D.C.: GPO,
1880-1901.
Welles, Gideon. Diarv of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the
Navv Under Lincoln and J o h n s o n . Edited by, Howard K.
Beale. New York: W. W. Norton 8. Company, 1960.
Secondary Sources

Albion, Robert Greenhalgh. Makers of Naval Policy.
1798-1947. Edited by, Rowena Reed. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1980.
Alexander, Bevln. Lost Victories: The Military Genius of.
Stonewall J a c k s o n .. New York: W. W. Norton 8. Company,
1992.
Allison, David K. "John A. Dahlgren: Innovator in Uniform."
In, Captains of the Old Steam Navv.: Makers of_th£
American Naval Tradition. 18 40-1880. pp. 26-45. Edited
by, James C. Bradford. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1986.
Ammen, Daniel. The Atlantic C o a s t . New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1883.

Charles

Anderson, Bern. Bv Sea and Bv River: A Naval History of the
Civil W a r . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
Andrews, J. Cutler. The North Reports the Civil W a r .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

306

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,

1955.

Bauer, K. Jack. "Samuel Francis DuPont: Aristocratic
Professional." In, Captains of the Old Steam Navv:
Makers of the American Naval Tradition. 1840-1880.
pp. 26-45. Edited by, James C. Bradford. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Blue, Frederick J. Salmon P. Chase: A Life in P o l i t i c s .
Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987.
Bowers, John. Stonewall Jackson: Portrait of a Soldier
New York: Morrow, 1989.
Boynton, Charles B. History of the Navv during the
Rebel 1 ion. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1867-68.
Bradley, Chester D. "President Lincoln's Campaign Against
the Merrimac." Journal of Illinois State Historical
Society (Spring 1958): 59-85.
Brown, D. K. Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship

D & s.LgnPropu l sion and Armamen.t In .the-Ro.yaJL.NAVY.,.
1815-1560. London,

1990.

Bruce, Robert V. Lincoln and the Tools of W ar.
Indianapolis: Bo bbs - M e r r i 11, 1956, reprint edition,
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989.
Burton, E. Mllby. The Siege of_Char_l e s t o n . 1861-186.5.
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,

1970.

Canfield, Eugene B. Civil War O r d n a n c e . Washington D. C.:
GPO, 1969.
Canney, Donald L. The Old Steam Navv. Volume One: Frigates.
Sloops, and Gunboats. 18 1 5 - 1 8 8 5 . Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1990.
Colletta, Paolo E. American Secretaries of the N a v v .
2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.
Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Forts. Henrv and Done Ison:
The Kev to the Confederate He artland. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1987.
Cortada, James W. "Diplomatic Rivalry between Spain and the
United States over Chile and Peru, 1864-1871,"
Inter-Am e c 1can Economic A ffairs 27 (Spring 1974):
47-57.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

307

Cowley, Charles. Leaves from a Lawyer's Life. Afloat
and A s h o r e . Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1879.
Current, Richard N. Lincoln and the First S h o t .
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963.
Davis, William C. Duel Between the First
Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1981.

Ironclads.

DuPont, H. A. Rear-Admiral Samuel Francis D u P o n t . New
York: National American Society, 1920.
DuPree, A. Hunter. Sgience..in.the..Feder.a 1 ...Sovernment
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957; reprint
edition. N e w York: Arno Press, 1980.
Dye, John Smith. History of the P l ots and Crimes of the
Great Conspiracy to Overthrow Liberty in A m e r i c a .
New York, 1866, reprint edition, Freeport, New York:
Books for Libraries Press, 1969.
Earle, Ralph. "John Adolphus Dahlgren," Proceedings 51
(March 1925): 424-36.
Eaton, Clement. The Growth of Southern C ivi liz a t i o n .
Ne w York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961.
_______• A History of .the Southern Co.nf e_der_acv_. New York:
The Free Press, 1954.
Farwell, Byron. Stonewall: A Biography of General Thomas J.
J a c k s o n . New York, 1992.
Fisher, Charles R, "The Great Guns of the Navy, 1797-1843,"
American Neptune 75 (October 1976): 267-95.
Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A N a r r a t i v e . 3 vols. New
York, 1963, reprint edition, New York: Vintage Books,
1986.
Fowler, William N. Under Two Flags: The American Navv
in the Civil W a r . N e w York: W. W. Norton 8. Company,
1990.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. R. E. Lee: A B i o g r a p h y . 4 vols.
N e w York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934-1935.
Hagan, Kenneth J. This People's Navv: The Making of
American Sea P o w e r . New York: The Free Press, 1991.
Hammersly, Lewis Randolph. The Records of Living Officers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

308

of the U, S. Navv and Marine C o r p s . Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott, 1870.
Hazlett, James C., Olmstead, Edwin, and Parks, M. Hume.
Field ftrt-illerv Weapons of the Civil W a r . Newark,
Delaware, University of Delaware Press, 1983.
Headley, Joel Tyler. Farragut and Our Naval
New York: E. B. Treat 8. Co., 1867.

Co mm and ers .

Henig, Gerald S. "Admiral Samuel F. DuPont and the Attack
on Charleston, April 1863," Naval War College Review
30 (February 1979>: 68-77.
Hill, Jim Dan. Se.a flogs_of_ the Sixties: Farragut and
Seven C on temporaries. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1935.
Holley, Alexander. A Treatise on Ordnance and A r m o r .
N ew York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865.
Hoppin, James Mason. Life of Andrew Hull Foote.
Rear-Admiral United States N a v v . New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1874.
Howarth, Stephen. To_Shining Sea: A History of the United
States Navv. 1775 -19 91 . New York: Random House, 1991.
Hunter, Alvah Folsom. A_Year on a Monitor and the
Ees-tructlon of Fort S u m t e r . Edited by Craig L.
Symonds. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina
Press, 1987.
Jenkins, E. H. A History__o_f _the French Navv: From Its
Beginnings to the Present D a v . London, 1973.
Johnson, John. Th£_Defense of Charleston Harbor.
1863-1865. Charleston, SC, 1890; reprint edition,
Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.
Johnson, III, Ludwell H. "Fort Sumter and Confederate
Diplomacy." Journal of Southern History 27 (I960):
441-77.
______ . M/The Few Brave and Hungry Men': Another Look at the
Fort Sumter Crisis." The South Atlantic Quarterly
84:1 (Winter 1985): 81-88.
Jones, Samuel. The Siege of C harleston. New York: Neale,
1911.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

309

Jones, Virgil Carrington. The Civil War at S e a . 3 vols.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960.
______ . Eight .Hours Beior-e, Richmond. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, 8. Winston, 1957.
Karsten, Peter. The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of
Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American
Naval i sm. New York: The Free Press, 1972.
Laas, Virginia Jeans, ed. Wartime Washington: The Civil War
LsJLt S.r.3..q.£. E 1iz abe-t h_Bla Lr.-Leg. • Urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 1991.
Leech, Margaret. Reveille in Washington.— 1860-1865.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941.
Lott, A. S. Most. Dangerous Sea: A History....of.. Mine W a r f a r e .
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959.
Macartney, Clarence Edward. Mr. Lincoln's A d m i r a l s .
New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1956.
McPherson, James M. Battle Crv of Freedom: The Civil War
E r a . New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Miers, Earl Schenck, ed. Lincoln Dav bv Dav: A Chronology.
180 9- 186 5. 3 vols. Washington: Lincoln
Sesquicentennial Commission, 1960.
Milligan, John D. "Andrew Foote: Zealous Reformer,
Administrator, Warrior." In, Captains of the Old
Steam Navv: Makers of the American Nava 1 JTradLt-Lon^
1840-1880. pp. 3-25. Edited by, James C. Bradford.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Nash, Howard P. A Naval History of the Civil W a r .
New York: A. S. Barnes, 1972.
Niven, John. Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the
N a v v . New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Padfield, Peter, Guns at S e a . New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1974.
Paludan, Phillip Shaw. "A Peop 1e 's.C ontest11j The. Union
and Civil War. 1861-1865. N e w York: Harper & Row,
1988.
Parish, Peter. The American Civil W a r . N ew York:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

310

Holmes & Meier Publishers,

1975.

Pauli In, Charles Oscar. Pauli In's History of Naval
Administration. 1775-1911; A C o l l e c t ion of Articles
from the U.S. Naval Institute P r o c e e d i n g s . Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968.
Peck, Taylor. Round-Shot to Rockets: A History of the
Washington Navv Y a r d and U.S. Naval Gun_Fac_torv..
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1949.
Perry, Milton F. Infernal. Machine:. The Story, of. Confederate
Submarines and Mine .Warfare. Baton Rouge, Louisiana:
LSU Press, 1965.
Peterson, Clarence Stewart. Admiral John A. Dahiaren:
Father of U. S. Naval O r d n a n c e . N ew York: Hobson
Book Press, 1945.
Potter, David M. The Impending Crisis. 184 8-1861.
Completed and edited by, Don E. F eh ren b a c h e r . New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1976.
_______• Lincoln and His Party in the Secession C r i s i s .
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.
Ripley, Warren. Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil W a r .
New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1970.
Royster, Charles. The Destructive War: William Tecumseh
Sherman. Stonewall Jackson, and the Am e r i c a n s . New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Salter, William. The Life of James W. Grimes. Governor of
Iowa. 1854-1858; A Senator of the United States.
1859-1869. New York: D. Appleton and company, 1876.
Scharf, Thomas J. History of the Confederate States Navv
From Its Organization to the Surrender of _its_Las_t
Vessel . New York: Rogers 8. Sherwood, 1887.
Schneller, Robert John. "The Contentious Innovator: A
Biography of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren U.S.N
<1809-1870>: Generational Conflict, Ordnance
Technology, and Command Afloat in the Nineteenth
Century." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1991.
Schroeder, John H. "Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum
Precursor of the Steam Navy." In, Captains of the Old

S-te-am-NaYY: .Maks.rs_ol.-the. American .Naval TuadltLoEu
1840-1880. pp. 3-25. Edited by, James C. Bradford.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

311

Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press,

1986.

Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young
N a p o l e o n . New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988.
Smith, Elbert B. Francis Preston B l a i r . New York:
The Free Press, 1980.
Smith, William Ernest. The Francis Preston Blair Family
in Pol 1t i c s . 2 vols. New York: The MacMillan Co.,
1933.
stampp, Kenneth. And, th e, Wac.,,Came;- The , Nor t h and.fcha
Secession Crisis. 18 60-1861. Baton Rouge: LSU Press,
1970.
Stanton, William. "Matthew Fontaine Maury: Navy Science for
the World." In, Captains of the Old Steam Navv: Makers
of the American Naval Tradition. 1840-1880. pp. 46-63.
Edited by, James C. Bradford. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1986.
Swanberg, W. A. First Blood: The Storv of Fort S u m t e r .
New York: Charles Scrlb ne r/s Sons, 1957.
Symonds, Craig L. Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War
B l o a r a p h v . New York; W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.
Thomas, Benjamin P. Abr.ftham.JjLngol Q.l_ ft-B-1QflEaBhYNew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.
Thomas, Emory. The...CgQle.dejr.a.te...tlaHan 1.86.1^15.6.5.
New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1979.
Todorich, Charles M. "Franklin Buchanan: Symbol for Two
Navies." in, gftpt.al.ns. o f .th.e-QLcL St.eftm.Na v Y --Maker s
of the American Naval Tradition. 18 40- 18 80. pp.
87- 112. Edited by, James C. Bradford. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Trefousse, Hans L. The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's
Vanouard for Racial J u s t i c e . New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969.
Tucker, Spencer. Armlng_the _F1 e e t :_ U.S. Navv Ordnance in
the Muzzle-Loading E r a . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1989.
Werlich, David P. Admiral ..of the Amazon: John Randolph
Tucker. His Confederate Colleagues, and P e r u .
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

312

1990.

West, Richard S., Jr.
Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Navv
D e p a r t m e n t . Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merr111, 1943.
------- . "Lincoln's Hand In Naval Matters."
History 4 (June 1958>: 175-83.

Civil War

------- • Mr. Lincoln's N a v v . New York: Longmans, Green,
1957.
Williams, Frances Leigh. Matthew Fontaine M a u r v : Scientist
of the Sea. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press 1963.
Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and the R a d i c a l s . Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1941.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA

Thomas James Legg
Born In Queens, New York, May 12, 1958.
Bishop Loughlin Memorial
June 1976.

High School

Graduated from

in Brooklyn, New York,

Received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the

State University of New York, College at Cortland, May 1980.
Taught secondary social

studies at Stamford Catholic High

School, Stamford, Connecticut,
June 1984.
a civil

From September 1984 until August

1987 worked as

engineering technician with the N e w York State

Department of Transportation.
degree

from September 1980 until

Received a Master of Arts

in history from the State University of New York,

College at Brockport, August
In August 1987,

1987.

the author entered the College of

William and Mary as a graduate assistant
of History.
history,

in the Department

Concentrating in nineteenth-century American

the author has taught courses in American history

in both the History Department and American Studies Program
at William and Mary, as well

as in the History Departments

at Old Dominion University and Thomas Nelson Community
College.

During the 1993-94 academic year, he served as the

Assistant to the Dean of Graduate Studies.

Received a

Doctor of Philosophy degree from the College of William and
Mary, May 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

